the purpose of a more explicit statement of the theme.

It may appropriately, also, so far exhibit the light in which the theme is to be contemplated, or explain the particular mode of discharging it, as that the whole description shall be more fully and correctly understood.

§ 119. THE INTRODUCTION CONCILIATORY will respect the occasion of the discourse, the theme itself, the mode of discussing it, or the speaker personally; as it is evident that from these various sources either a favorable or an unfavorable disposition may arise in the minds of the hearers.

It is less often the case in explanatory than in any other species of discourse that this kind of introduction is necessary. Still it will be well ever to inquire whether from any of the sources enumerated there can arise any feeling or opinion unfavorable to the full understanding of the dis cussion, or any interest to be awakened from any one of them that shall secure a more earnest attention.

§ 120. THE PERORATION in explanatory discourse may be in any of the particular forms enumerated in § 70.

The peroration explanatory will apply the representation either to some particular theme contained in the more general one that has been discussed, or to some kindred subject.

The peroration confirmatory will be in the form of an inference readily deduced from the view that has been given.

The peroration excitatory will apply the general theme or some view taken of it to the excitement of the appropriate feelings.

The peroration persuasive will address the theme of some view taken of it to the will as an inducement to some act.

§ 121. If various forms of the peroration be employed, the principle laid down in § 57, requires that the respective forms employed succeed each other in the order in which they are stated in the preceding section.

PART II.-CONFIRMATION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTORY VIEW.

§ 122. IN CONFIRMATION, the object of discourse is to convince; in other words, to lead to a new belief or judgment, or to modify one already existing in the mind.

Here lies the essential distinction between explanation and confirmation. While both processes address the understanding, the former seeks to produce a new or different perception, the latter, a new or different belief or judgment.

§ 123. As a judgment is ever expressed in a logical proposition, the theme in confirmation must ever be in the form of a logical proposition; the truth of which is to be established in the mind of the hearer.

In this respect confirmatory discourse differs from all other kinds; as in those the theme is always a conception.

It may be observed here that while the theme in confirmation must always admit of being expressed in the form of a logical proposition, having subject, predicate and copula, aud so far as stated must imply this, it is not necessary always that it be actually expressed in discourse in the strict technical form of such a proposition. Thus the theme of a

discourse, the object of which is to prove that "the soul is immortal," may be stated in the form of "the immortality of the soul."

§ 124. Confirmation in rhetorical invention agrees with the process of investigation in the circumstances that both processes properly respect a judgment, and that both are controlled by the same logical principles. It differs from investigation in the respect, that the judgment is already known in confirmation both in its matter and in its truth, while in investigation either the truth or both the matter and the truth of the judgment are unknown.

In undertaking the work of confirmation or convincing, the speaker must of course know the matter of the judgment which he is to establish. He must be regarded, also, as believing it himself and of course of knowing the evidence on which it rests. He professes this in undertaking to convince. He must know, thus, both the matter of the proposition and its truth.

In investigation, on the other hand, it may be wholly unknown whether there is such a truth as the process of investigation may lead to as its proper result. Known truth may be taken, and by the application to them of variou principles of reasoning, entirely new truths may be ascertained and proved in the very process of investigation. The mathematical analyst, thus, applies to an assumed formula certain processes by which its members are changed in their form and comes thus to new truths--to truths, perhaps, of which he had never dreamed until they stood out proved before his eye.

More commonly, however, in investigation the truth is at least guessed at, or conceived as possible. The matter of

the judgment is before the mind, and the process of investigation consists in the discovery of the proof on which the truth of it rests.

Confirmation employs the results of this discovery for the conviction of another mind. This latter species of investi gation, therefore, which respects the proof on which an assumed or conjectural truth rests, coincides to a certain degree with invention in confirmation. For it is the proper office of invention here to furnish the proof for a given asserted judgment. It differs from this process of investigation only in the circumstance that it directs all its operations with a view to an effect on another mind. Investigation might rest satisfied with any adequate proof; invention seeks the best. Invention explores the whole field of proof and then selects; investigation is content to take what is at hand provided it be sufficient to establish the truth proposed. Investigation implies a candid mind ready to be convinced by the proof discovered; invention in rhetoric regards a mind possibly préjudiced against the truth, and struggling against every fresh charge of proof.

§ 125. The mind addressed in confirmation may be regarded as in any one of three different states; either without any belief in regard to the proposition to be confirmed, or in weak faith, or in positive disbelief. The processes in confirmation, although in the main alike, will yet vary in some slight respects in the different cases.

The speaker will need ever to have a distinct regard to this diversity of mental state in his hearers, and always to know whether he is to produce an entirely new conviction, or to stengthen or remove one already existing. Differ ent kinds of arguments often, or a different arrangement