to treat of can be embraced in one complex conception. If not, he has reason to suspect that unity will be sacrificed. If he is unable to reduce the specific topics of his discourse under a single class, he will be in danger of violating unity. It must not be supposed, however, that because the proposition as stated includes two or more topics, for that reason alone, unity must necessarily be sacrificed. Thus, the subject of an essay may be "the causes and effects of the Crusades." This theme, although, as stated, it embraces more than one topic, may be discussed with a perfect observance of unity. The crusades, as a single class of events, may be presented concretely in their historical relations, that is, in the single relation of time, or abstractly under the single causal relation to antecedent and subsequent events.

§ 77. The particular processes by which the explanation of an object or truth may be effected, are five in number, viz: NARRATION, DESCRIPTION, ANALYSIS, EXEMPLIFICATION, and COMPARISON or CONTRAST.

All objects, even such as are purely abstract or spiritual, as represented in discourse, must be contemplated under the relations either of time or of space. Hence, the original and proper processes of explanation are but two in number; one, in which the object is viewed under the relations of time, the other, in which it is regarded under the relations of space.

But an object viewed in its relations to time may also be contemplated in its relations to its own parts or to other objects of the same class. And an object existing in space may be represented by a designation of the adjoining parts. Thus, the mammoth, an extinct species of animals, may be represented either under the idea of time, giving rise to classification by the indication of its varieties, or under the

idea of space, by the indication of its component parts, as head, body, limbs, &c.

Or, again, it may be represented by the exhibition of one of the species taken as an example. The account of the mammoth found entire in a frozen state by a Tungusian, named Schumachoff, in 1799, furnishes thus the best representation of this extinct species of the Elephant.

Or, farther, the object may be designated through its relations to other individuals of the same class. We represent, thus, by comparing objects through the points of resemblance or by contrasting them through the points of diversity or opposition.

We have thus the five different processes of explanation enumerated, viz:

1. Narration, when the object viewed as a whole, is represented in continuous time or as in succession;

2. Description, when the object, viewed as a whole, is represented in space generally;

3. Analysis, when the object is regarded as consisting of parts related either to time or to space;

4. Exemplification, when the object is regarded as generic, including species or individuals under it, and is represented through one of the class; and

5. Comparison and Contrast, when the object is regarded as belonging to a class, and is represented through its resemblance or opposition to others of the same class.

§ 78. While these processes may all be combined in certain cases in the same discourse, they are yet easily distinguishable. They may in some cases, each, constitute the single and only process of explanation. They are, also, subject to entirely different principles regulating the use of them in discourse.

Hence the propriety and utility of considering them distinctly.

As has been before observed, every art embraces diverse particular processes, all of which, in the more complicated forms of the art, are carried on simultaneously together. In the acquisition of the art, however, these processes are analysed, and studied and exemplified in practice separately and singly. An extended arithmetical process generally combines the varicus particular processes of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, if not various other higher processes. In acquiring the art, however, the attention of the learner is advantageously directed to these particular processes singly and successively. Each is studied and exercised upon, before the next is taken up. When each several process is thus made familiar by separate and continued study and exercise, the more complicated operations are performed with ease and success. It is so with every art. So self-evident, indeed, is this principle that nothing but the fact of the strange neglect and oversight of it in the art of constructing discourse could justify a repeated reference to it in vindication of the course that is here proposed. The learner cannot be too earnestly or too frequently reminded of the necessity of studying and exercising upon each particular process in discourse separately; and of continuing his study and practice upon each in order, until a perfect practical familiarity with it is acquired.

CHAPTER II.

OF NARRATION.

§ 79. NARRATION is that process of explanation which presents an object in its relations to continuous

time.

Strictly speaking, narration proper presents an object only in the several successive forms which it assumes at successive periods of time. History, in which only the chain of events is exhibited, affords one of the most perfect exemplifications of pure narration.

The human mind, however, in its maturer development, can hardly avoid, when it contemplates events transpiring in succession, conceiving of a cause which binds those events together. The operation of a cause, moreover, we ever represent to ourselves as taking place in succession of time. Cause is thus the law or internal principle of succession; and succession of events is the outward manifestation of the operation of that law.

This relation of cause to the succession of events in time, shows at once the philosophical propriety of regarding the relation of cause and effect as the true governing principle in narration. It determines, at the same time, the proper subjects of narrative discourse and the laws which regulate it.

It will be convenient to exhibit the specific processes of na 'ration, according as they include distinctly or not the idea of a cause-in other words, regard mere outward succession or not--separately and successively.

§ 80. The simplest process in narration consists in the exhibition of an object in the different forms which

it presents in successive periods of time without distinct reference to the connecting causes.

§ 81. The principle of arrangement in this process is simple succession of time.

In all simple narration, the explanation is effected by the exhibition of the object represented in the successive changes. We cannot exhibit the object as literally chunging; we can only assume different points of time and mark the particular phases the object presents at those points respectively, and leave it to the mind of the hearer to fill up the intervening period and imagine the actual progress of the change from one aspect or phase to another.

As it is possible in discourse, thus, only to present the object at successive stages, passing over the intermediate intervals, judgment is necessary in the selection of those phases of the object which are most important. In the history of a nation, the most important changes in the direction of its exertions, whether abroad as in wars, or towards its internal affairs as in the modifications of its government and the cultivation of the various arts, may, thus, be selected is the points to be exhibited to view.

Still the order of time furnishes the law of arrangement. When the continuity of succession is broken, the mind of the reader is liable to be offended; and his interest is at once weakened. This truth is illustrated in the wearisome effect of those treatises on general history, which take us, in successive chapters, to different countries, and thus are ever interrupting the continuous succession of events.

§ 82. The simple process of narration is at once rendered complex by the distinct exhibition of the relation of cause and effect in the events described.

In this process more ripeness of judgment, greater skill