The necessity of thus first studying out and accurately determining in the mind the plan of the discussion before the Introduction is commenced, appears not only from the fact that unless this be the case it is all a matter of mere accident whether there be any correspondence between it and the body of the discourse, but also from the consideration that it is only thus that unity, in which lies all the life of invention as well as of discourse, can be secured. The very idea of a discourse, as a product of a rational mind that ever has an aim in its proper workings, involves the necessity of unity; and this unity appears in .discourse mainly in the proposition and the discussion as the essential parts. The clear perception of what is needed to be effected. in the mind addressed by way of preparation, in order that this aim of the discourse can be attained in it, is absolutely indispensable both to guide invention in constructing the Introduction and to stimulate it so that its work shall be easy and successful.

§ 70. THE PERORATION, as that part of a discourse in which the theme is applied, will vary with the different specific objects aimed at in the application.

Sometimes the application will be in the form of explanation, either for the purpose of correcting erroneous views or for further instruction. This form of the peroration may be denominated the explanatory. Sometimes the object of the peroration may be to correct a wrong opinion, or to confirm a particular truth involved in the general theme; in which case the peroration will be confirmatory.

Sometimes the object may be to address the subject more directly to the feelings, which will give rise to the excitatory or pathetic peroration.

Or, once more, some action may be proposed, in the peroration, to the mind addressed, and then the persuasive peroration will have place.

§ 71. THE RECAPITULATION is a form of peroration common to the various objects mentioned. The respective processes of explanation, conviction, excitation, or of persuasion pursued in the discourse are, in this form, concisely repeated for the purpose of a more full and complete effect.

PART I-EXPLANATION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTORY VIEW.

§ 72. In explanation, the object of discourse is to inform or instruct; in other and more technical words, to lead to a new conception or notion, or to modify one already existing in the mind. ·

§ 73. The work of explanation is accomplished simply by bringing the object of the conception distinctly and favorably before the mind addressed.

§ 74. Although explanation, properly, is a purely intellectual process, since it aims merely to produce or modify a conception or notion which is a pure intellectual state, still as the understanding itself is influenced by the feelings and the state of the will, reference to these departments of mind is not wholly excluded from explanatory discourse. The passions are, however, to be employed only in strict subordination to the design of the discourse; that is, only for the purpose of facilitating the process of explanation. This is done chiefly or wholly by securing an undisturbed attention to the object presented.

Hence the necessity that the taste be consulted in all explanatory discourse; in order that a fixed attention may be secured. The mind does not perceive well when it is not pleased. Xenophon has well observed that instruction in any case is impossible from one who does not please.*

The attention of the hearer may be disturbed, also, by the existence of some favorite opinion which may be unfa vorably affected by the object presented in the discourse; and argumentation may be necessary as a preparatory work even for the purpose of explaining a truth.

So, likewise, the attention may be disturbed by some feeling or purpose in the mind addressed, which must be appropriately managed by the speaker who would secure attention to his explanation.

These processes, however, are not essential, but merely incidental in explanatory discourse. It is sufficient, therefore, here merely to indicate generally the relation of this to the other processes in discourse.

§ 75. The subject or theme of explanatory discourse is some object or truth to be perceived.

The state of mind to be produced by explanation, as has been before observed, is a conception. The term is used in a strictly technical sense, as distinguished from a judgment. As it is important that the meaning of these logical terms should be clearly apprehended, the following definitions will not be out of place here. A Conception is that state of the understanding in which an object or truth is simply perceived, without any affirmation or denial respecting it. A judgment, on the other hand, is that intellectual state in which an object or truth is not only perceived, but some

* Mem. Lib. I. C. II., § 39. παίδησιν παρα τοῦ μη ἀρέσκοντος

Μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν είναι

When I per

affirmation or denial is made respecting it. ceive "a tree," I have a conception of it. When I affirm "it is an apple-tree," I have a judgment respecting it.

A logical proposition, in the proper sense, that is, a sentence which expresses a judgment may, nevertheless, be viewed simply as an object of conception. As when it is said "Law is a rule of action," although the sentence contains a judgment or affirmation, still the mind may regard it merely as a thing to be perceived or understood and not as that on which a judgment is to be formed. Logical propositions, thus, as well as mere names of things, may form proper subjects of explanation; since they may be regarded merely as conceptions.

It may be further remarked that the object which constitutes the theme of explanation is not necessarily any real object or truth; but only one as so regarded by the writer. It may be a purely imaginary object not supposed by him to have any foundation in reality; or it may be an erroneous conception in his mind of a real object or truth; or, farther, it may be a conception founded on reality but modified through the influences of his peculiar habits of observation.

Explanation is, in this respect of its subject or theme, distinguished from conviction. In explanation, the subject is ever an object of a conception. In conviction, it is ever a judgment.

§ 76. The unity of explanatory discourse, so far as it is determined by the theme, requires that the conception which forms the theme, be one. This one conception, however, may be simple or complex; may embrace but one individual or a class.

In order to insure this broader unity the writer should ever carefully see whether the particular topics which he is