cussion, and still farther by the process by which the discussion is conducted.

§ 48. The principles which regulate this process regard either the mind of the speaker* himself, the occasion of speaking, the mind addressed, or the object of the discourse.

§ 49. In selecting his theme and determining the particular aspect to be taken of it, the writer has need to consult his own mind chiefly in reference to the capabilities of supplying the particular thoughts and illustrations by means of which his subject is to be presented and developed.

No one in proper discourse writes merely with a view to an effect on himself. Sometimes, indeed, the pen may be employed in investigation. Such compositions, however, are not proper discourse, which always more or less definitely or directly respects another mind. The writer, therefore, will need ever to select a theme on which he is competent to write; respecting which he has ample information and means of illustration within his power.

It is nevertheless a great mistake, although a common one, to suppose that a subject very familiar and at the same time very comprehensive, is most favorable to ease of execution. Invention is an originating, creative process in its essential nature. As such it is the most proper and delightful work of a rational being; and whenever it is pursued, imparts a pleasure which itself fires anew the energy of the inventive faculty. This is the inspiration of original

* In order to avoid all unnecessary multiplication of words, but one of the specific terms, "writer" and "speaker," will ordinarily be used hereafter, even when the generic notion of the person dis coursing, whether through the pen or the voice, is meant.

genius-the rapture that necessarily attends the production of new thoughts and forms of thought. Whenever a familiar and, at the same time, a broad and comprehensive theme is selected, if especially the limits of the composition be narrow, only general, familiar views can be taken, and there is no life of invention. It is a cold, inanimate work of the memory recalling dead thought. There is no inspiration, no satisfaction. There must be some new view taken, something original, or the work of invention must necessarily be laborious and heavy. Now it is specific views that furnish the occasion of original invention. In them the writer shuns the general, common-place notions that are familiar to all. The more specific and definite, therefore, the theme, the easier will be the work of invention. Caution only is necessary that the field of view be not too limited for the writer's power of invention; since only the most vigorous and practiced writer can take the most minute and particular views.

Young writers should be on their guard against what are called "fertile subjects." They are generally unfavorable to the exercise of invention, and therefore, most difficult to handle; because they are so comprehensive that only general and common-place views can be taken.

It may be proper here to put young writers on their guard, also, in selecting themes, against specious mottoes or titles. The dress of language in which the theme is invested is not the theme itself. The one may be rich and gorgeous, while the other is miserably lean and dry. It need hardly be said that the facility with which the work of invention will proceed will depend on the richness of the thought itself which constitutes the theme, not on the garb it may chance to wear.

§ 50. A proper regard to the occasion of speaking

will determine the process of invention not only in reference to the character of the theme to be selected, but, also, in reference to the latitude as well as particular field of view that is taken, and the illustrations that are to be presented.

§ 51. There is obviously, likewise, a necessity of consulting the character of the audience; the extent of their information, their peculiar habits of thought, their feelings also, and their relations to the speaker.

There is perhaps no point to which Cicero's fundamental rule in regard to all discourse, that it consist with propriety“ut deceat”—has greater force of application than here. It cannot be too earnestly inculcated on every speaker to consult carefully the minds and feelings of those whom he is to address in the selection of his theme and, also, in the development of it. Any offense against propriety or decorum here is more fatal to all the ends of speaking than any where else.

§ 52. The character of the theme and the particular view that is taken of it as well as the general mode of developing it will also be affected by the particular object which the writer may wish to accomplish in his discourse.

It is assumed that all proper discourse has an object. A speaker does not speak without an end in view. This end or object lies in the mind addressed, and consists in some change to be effected there by the discourse.

Dr. Whately, indeed, enumerates some species of what he calls "spurious oratory," as where one speaks merely to seem to say something, when there is in fact nothing to be said; or to occupy time; or for mere display of eloquence

The very name, however, "spurious oratory," indicates that all true discourse must have an object or end to be accomplished by the communication of thought to another mind. We must seek, therefore, in the mind addressed the determination of the particular possible objects of discourse.

§ 53. The ultimate end of all discourse partakes of a moral or ethical character; but the immediate objects through which this ultimate end is reached may lie in the understanding, the feelings, or the will of the persons addressed.

§ 54. The possible immediate objects of all proper . discourse are but four in number, viz: EXPLANATION, CONVICTION, EXCITATION, and PERSUASION.

A change produced by discourse in the understanding may be either a new or modified conception, or a new or modified judgment. Hence the two forms of address to the understanding.

§ 55. The process by which a new conception is produced, is by Explanation; that by which a new judgment is produced, is by Conviction; A change in the sensibilities is effected by the process of Excitation; and in the will, by that of Persuasion.

These processes, it will be observed, are named from the positive species; and the designations given embrace as well them as their opposites. In explanation, thus, we either produce a new conception, or correct or modify one already existing. Conviction includes both the production of a new opinion cr judgment, and the removal or modification of one already existing. So, likewise, excitation embraces the awakening of a new feeling, and the strengthening or allaying of a previous emotion or passion; and in persuasion, we either

mɔve to a new choice or dissuade from an existing intention or purpose.

§ 56. The unity of a discourse is more narrowly determined by the singleness of the object which is pursued in the development of a subject.

In order to unity, there must indeed be a single theme or subject of discourse, (§ 47). Singleness of subject will not, however, of itself secure unity. It is further necessary that there be one leading object proposed to be effected, and that this object be steadily pursued throughout the discourse.

§ 57. The 'several processes of explanation, conviction, excitation, and persuasion, are so related to each other that, while they may all concur in the same discourse, they yet can follow only in one single order.

Explanation precedes conviction, as the truth must be understood before it can be believed; explanation and conviction naturally precede excitation, as the object of feeling must be perceived and generally be believed to exist before feeling can be awakened ; and persuasion properly follows the other three processes, as in order to a change of will, the feelings are generally to be aroused, the judgment convinced, and the understanding informed.

Unity requires that this order never be reversed; except for the purpose of awakening attention, or disposing for emotion, as will be more particularly remarked hereafter.

§ 58. The work of invention can never proceed with ease or success unless unity is strictly observed— unless the single subject and the single object of the discourse be clearly apprehended, and that object be steadily and undeviatingly pursued.