ings over the movements of the intellect will be favorable to his designs.

While general reputation or character in regard to these qualities will be most serviceable in effecting conciliation so far as it depends on them, the speaker may do much in removing an unfavorable impression from the minds of his hearers, or in producing one that is favorable, by his manner at the time. The character of his discourse, as marked by the particular features of intelligence, familiarity with the subject; gravity, modesty, pure moral sentiment; by kind ness, deference, and respect for his hearers, will conduce greatly to awaken a favorable disposition in them towards himself. At the same time, indirect professions together with allusions to facts in his history which may present his character favorably in these respects, may be often benefi cially employed.

It is obvious that the same general means are to be made use of as well when an unfavorable disposition is to be set aside as when a favorable sentiment is to be awakened.

§ 180. The speaker's relation to his opponent will need to be regarded by him, whenever the character of his opponent in respect to the three points, before named, may influence the mind of the hearer; and also, whenever the personal relation existing between them may favorably or unfavorably affect the disposition of the hearer.

Advantage, thus, may be taken of the character of the adversary as being ill-informed in the case, wanting in principle, or unkindly disposed to the hearers. Or the advantage which an opposite character may give an opponent will need to be set aside or lessened by counter considerations.

The personal relations subsisting between the speaker and

his opponent will frequently affect the disposition of the hearers in reference to the discourse. To speak in opposition to one closely allied in any of the social relations of life, will create a favorable or unfavorable disposition in the minds of the hearer, according as it may appear to them to have been prompted by principle, or by selfishness or malice.

§ 181. The speaker's relations to the subject of discussion or to the side of the question which he maintains may, also, obviously favorably present him to the audience or otherwise; in either case, they will demand his attention.

Exemplifications of this kind of introduction are to be found in Demosthenes' Oration on the Crown where he maintains his right to be heard as one equally interested with Ctesiphon in the issue of the trial; in Cicero's Oration for Cluentius, against whom he had previously spoken with great severity; and in Erskine's speech on the trial of Thomas Paine.

§ 182. Once more, the occasion of speaking will often in some relation which the speaker may bear to it,' affect the minds of the hearers and render necessary suitable means of conciliation.

Cicero thus in his oration against Cæcilius commences with an exposition of the reasons which induced him who had never before appeared except in defence, now to become a prosecutor against Verres.

§ 183. The character of the proposition will demand a conciliatory introduction when either the subject generally or the particular view taken of it by the speaker at the time is likely to be offensive to the hearers.

The advantage which a speaker addressing those of his own party or sect or generally those of the same principles with himself on a topic of common interest to them, over his opponents, must obviously be great; and while it becomes him to turn this advantage to good account, it is still more necessary to his opponent to lessen, so far as practicable by any of the various means of conciliation, this prepossession against himself. In the famous orations on the crown, Demosthenes had to encounter the natural repugnance which men feel against hearing a man commend his own actions; while Aeschines labored under the conviction that the judges were of the party of his adversary. Each orator, accordingly, in his introduction, endeavored to lessen the difficulty which he had in this respect to encounter.

§ 184. The mode of discussion imposed on the speaker may be such as to call for some effort at conciliation in the Introduction when it requires him to treat of topics offensive to the audience or to make use of terms or a course of reasoning not easily intelligible to them.

In Judicial Eloquence, thus, arguments embodying pure legal principles are generally uninviting and with difficulty inte‹gible to a jury; and the advocate, who would secure a favorable hearing, will need to use much address and art. So purely metaphysical discussions on religious subjects before a popular audience generally repel and offend. Men, moreover, are loath to hear of their own faults or weaknesses; and the speaker who is obliged to recur to them has reason to fear that, unless due precaution is taken, their unwillingness to hear will entirely prevent the intended effect of his discourse.

§ 185. In the same way, the circumstances in which

the speaker appears before his audience may render them indisposed to a favorable hearing, when the arts of conciliation suitable to the case will be needful.

The military array which Pompey had thrown around the tribunal on the trial of Milo so influenced the minds of the judges that Cicero felt it necessary, at the commencement of his oration, to allay their fears and turn to his own account the influence of Pompey, which at first seemed to the judges to be arrayed against him.

§ 186. Several of these varieties of conciliatory Introduction, it may often happen, must be combined in the same action.

The speeches of Demosthenes on the Crown, and of Cicero in the case of Milo, alluded to above, are examples of the various combinations of these different kinds of Introduction.

§ 187. Confirmation admits all the various kinds of peroration enumerated in § 70. Recapitulation, moreover, will here be especially useful.

PART III.-EXCITATION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTORY VIEW.

§ 188. In Excitation the object of discourse is to move the feelings, either by awakening some new affection, or by strengthening or allaying one already existing.

The propriety of ranking excitation among the several objects of discourse, and of founding upon this object a distinct species governed by its own laws and characterised by peculiar features, will hardly be questioned by any who recognize the feelings or affections as a distinct class of mental phenomena. In fact, we find a class of discourses constructed in particular reference to this object, and distinguished from all others by peculiar characteristics. To this class belong most of what have been denominated demonstrative discourses, particularly those pronounced on funeral and triumphal occasions, in which the object is to awaken admiration, joy, grief, or other emotion. Here belongs, likewise, a considerable part of pulpit oratory, viz: that part, the object of which is to awaken or cherish some christian affection or grace, or to allay or remove some improper passion in actual indulgence.

That this object has not been distinctly recognised in sys