of society, restricts or confines the energies of men, or inju riously affects their best interests.

The ultimate general principle on which all these particular maxims of presumption rest, seems to be this: that the world is governed by infinite intelligence controlled by perfect rectitude and goodness. In respect to this, the sentiment is true, that "whatever is, is righť”; and the proper and the genuine results of goodness and truth harmonize with each other, and also with what, for the most part, transpires in providence. In all cases of presumption, consequently, whatever accords with the natural laws of providence is to be presumed to be true, right, or expedient, as the case may be.

§ 170. One presumption may sometimes be opposed by another when the circumstances of the case must determine which shall outweigh the other.

Mahommedanism, thus, exists; and so far a presumption lies in its favor. With those who know of nothing existing in incompatibility with it, and who are not informed or convinced in regard to its evil effects, perhaps, this fact of its existence would furnish a strong presumption in favor of continuing it. But its allowance of violence, and its evil effects generally, are to those who are convinced of this, a sufficient rebutter against the presumption drawn from the fact of its existence.

CHAPTER VII.

OF REFUTATION.

§ 171. By REFUTATION, in its more limited sense, is meant the overthrow of opposing arguments.

Refutation is sometimes taken in the sense of defense generally. Thus the argument of the defendant in a judicial trial, has been denominated a refutation. But in the more proper use of the word, refutation has been restricted to objections or opposing arguments.

§ 172. Refutation proper consists in the overthrow either of one of the premises on which an objection rests, or of the conclusiveness of the reasoning.

While refutation is governed by the same general principles that apply to all argumentation, and has to do with the same arguments or kinds of proof, it possesses the peculiarity, that it is applied to the overthrow of opposing arguments. Hence, a more direct call is made in it on the logical principles for the detection of sophistical reasoning. The overthrow of a premise falsely or incorrectly assumed in an objection, may, indeed, be accomplished in other methods common to all reasoning; but the detection of error in the course of the reasoning is to be effected in accordance with the principles of logic, which expose the possible modes of sophistical argumentation.

§ 173. As all evidence does not possess the character of absolute certainty, it is possible, in some cases, that there may be real evidence, or valid arguments, on both sides of the question. In such cases, it is not indispensably necessary to refute the opposing arguments; but it may be sufficient, while allowing it its

proper weight, to overbalance it with arguments of greater weight.

This is a principle ever to be borne in mind that, in cases of probable reasoning generally, really valid arguments may be advanced on both sides. The existence of such unanswerable arguments should not confound or disconcert. The opposite side may still be that of truth. In such case, it seems important to apply the principles of the Topics; to determine carefully the degree of weight to be allowed the objection, and to oppose to it an argument of a higher rank, or an accumulation of arguments of the same class.

§ 174. It is always sound policy to state objections fairly, and to allow them all the force to which they are entitled.

Nothing is more opposed to persuasiveness in reasoning, than the appearance of unfairness. Sound principle was accordingly reckoned by the ancients among the three essential requisites in the character of the orator. Where the speaker is to appear before the same audience frequently, or to address one acquainted with his character as a candid and honest reasoner, the necessity of observing this principle is manifest. And even where the general character of the speaker can have no influence in favorably disposing the minds of the hearers, still, as unfairness is with difficulty disguised, and even suspicion of it is exceedingly prejudicial; as, moreover, the consciousness of candor and fairness will give the speaker himself a tone of confidence and authority, itself most favorable to effect, it is ever safest, as a matter of policy, to conduct the argumentation in perfect fairness.

§ 175. The principles of arrangement in regard to

refutation, are substantially the same as those which apply to direct confirmation, Chap. V. As subordinate and incidental to confirmation, however, the application of those principles to refutation becomes slightly modified.

In the first place, if the arguments to be refuted are sufficiently met in the main direct arguments, the proper place to refute them is in the course of presentation of those direct arguments.

In the next place, if the objections are independent of the direct chain of reasoning, they should be answered at the commencement, if already weighing in the minds of the audience; and at the close, if they are anticipated as about to arise in the mind, or are to be presented by an adversary.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE INTRODUCTION AND PERORATION IN CONFIRMATION.

§ 176. The Introduction Explanatory in confirmation may respect the proposition itself, the particular mode of discussion to be pursued, or some circumstances connected with the occasion of speaking.

It is unnecessary to particularize the several topics proper for an introduction explanatory in confirmation. It is sufficient to turn the attention of the speaker to those general fields of view which it may be important for him to survey, that he may ascertain what points will require elucida

tion in order to prepare the way for the ready apprehension of his discourse.

§ 177. The Introduction Conciliatory in confirmation will respect the person of the speaker, the character of the proposition, the mode of discussion or the circumstances of speaking.

§ 178. The several points in reference to the person of the speaker, to which attention may need to be directed in conciliation, are the relation of the speaker to the audience; to his opponent; to the question to be discussed, and to the occasion of speaking.

§ 179. The three qualities requisite in the speaker in reference to the audience, as prescribed by the ancients, are GOOD SENSE, GOOD PRINCIPLE, and GOOD

WILL.

Good sense is requisite, because an audience will deem itself insulted if a speaker presumes to come before it but illinformed in regard to the matter to be discussed. The speaker, from his very office, professes his ability to enlighten and inform his audience. Negligence to obtain a proper understanding of the subject, shows at once a want of capacity to speak, or a high contempt of the audience.

A character for integrity is necessary, inasmuch as just so far as the speaker shows himself unworthy of confidence, will every thing he says be received with misgivings and suspicions; while the bare assertions of a reputedly honest man will often be received with the submission which is due to actual demonstration.

If, further, the audience be convinced that the speaker is actuated by good will to them, all the influence of the feel