tinguished from other species of reasoning only by the source from which the arguments are derived. It comprehends mainly those arguments which are in § 139 denominated empirical.

E.

The argument from progressive approach, so called, is but a species of induction, in which we argue from the increase or diminution in the effect according as a particular cause is increased or diminished in several examples, to the perfect completeness, or the entire removal of the effect when the cause is perfectly operative or wholly removed. g. If we put a ball in motion on a rough surface, its motion soon ceases; on a smoother surface, its motion is proportionally prolonged: hence, we infer that if there were no resistance at all, the motion would be perpetual. A sophistical use of this argument has been made by some enthusiastic advocates of Temperance. They have assumed that disease and death are the consequence exclusively of a corrupt constitution inherited from parents who have violated the laws of health, or of a transgression of those laws. by the individual himself. They then urge the facts that temperance and correct regimen promote health and long life, just in proportion as the constitution is free from origi nal corruption and the laws of health are observed. They hence infer that a perfect and universal observance of the laws of health will in time purify the stock itself; the hu man constitution will be restored to its perfect state, and disease and death will disappear.

§158. EMPIRICAL proofs never carry with themselves necessary certainty; although they possess all degrees of probability, from mere probability to full but not necessary certainty.

Proofs derived from our own experience we can never

question. They are decisive so far as they go; but the cortainty which they produce is very different from that which is produced by analytic and intuitive reasoning.

Antecedent probability arguments sometimes produce full certainty. If the cause certainly exists and no hindrance can arise, the effect is certain; and the proof is decisive of belief. Just so far as doubts may arise in regard to the sufficiency of the cause or the opportunity of its operating, just so far will the reasoning from this class of proofs be invalidated.

Signs possess full certainty, or higher or lower degrees of probability, according as the cause or occasion to be proved by them is more or less necessary to their existence.

The conclusiveness of examples as proofs depends on the question whether they are determined, in the particular character in which they are presented as proofs, by the same cause which is supposed to produce the thing to be proved, $ 156. From observing the organic structure in one plant, the naturalist will safely conclude in regard to any other plant of the same species. He cannot, however, so conclude in regard to the color. But one cause can be supposed to operate in the former case; in the latter, various causes may have influence.

§ 159. From the diverse nature of the different kinds of arguments enumerated it will appear at once that while some are applicable to all subjects, others are adapted only to particular kinds of subjects.

Analytical proofs are applicable to every kind of subject, as is obvious from their nature.

Of Synthetical proofs, the intuitive class belong to mathematical reasoning or pure science.

Empirical proofs are employed in all reasoning

that respects matters of experience, whether the reasoning terminates on facts or on general truths.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE ARRANGEMENT OF ARGUMENTS.

§ 160. The importance of attention to arrangement in confirmation depends mainly on two principles.

The first respects the state of the mind addressed. The method suited to a mind favorably disposed, will generally be unsuitable to a mind opposed to conviction, and vice versa.

The second principle respects the dependence of the proofs on one another. Some proofs are explained by others, which must be previously exhibited in order to the full effect of the reasoning. Some proofs presuppose others. Some, once more, have great weight if preceded by certain others, and are of little moment unless preceded by them.

The force and effect of reasoning depends, indeed, hardly less on the order than on the matter of the proofs. Perfectly conclusive arguments when presented in the proper order may lose all their force if advanced in a different order.

§ 161. If the proof advanced be single but susceptible of analysis, the principle which regulates the arrangement of the parts will obviously be the same as tha in analytic explanation, §§ 94—106.

For illustration, Dr. Barrow, in his discourse on the Divine Impartiality, presents in the a priori part of his reasoning the following arguments from the divine attributes as analysed by division, viz: 1. From God's wisdom; 2,

his righteousness; 3. his power; 4. his goodness. These arguments from God's attributes, together with those from his relations, form the heads of his a priori reasoning.

His a posteriori argument is analysed by partition. The parts given are 1. God has proposed the same terms to all of obtaining his favor; 2. He has furnished the same means and aids to all; 3. He has provided the same encouragements; 4. He watches over all alike in his providence; 5. He has conferred on Christians the same privileges; 6. He holds all alike subject to the same final retribution.

§ 162. If the reasoning embrace arguments of distinct classes, the principle of arrangement is to be sought, first, in the state of the mind addressed.

If there be already a state of belief, and the object of the discourse is to confirm and strengthen it, then the weaker arguments will generally need to be placed first and the stronger ones last. In this way the deepest and strongest impression will be the last.

If there be an opposing belief to be set aside, it will be better to advance the stronger first, in order to overthrow opposition at once. The weaker may follow which will serve to confirm when they would be of no avail in the first assault. In order to leave, however, a strong impression, some of the stronger should be reserved to the close; or, what is equivalent, the arguments may be recapitulated in the reverse order.

Although this principle of arrangement, derived from a consideration of the state of the mind addressed, is not the higher and more controlling one, but must generally give way to the next to be named, still the state of the mind

addressed must be first consulted, for that will often determine what kind of arguments are to be employed as well as the order of arrangement.

This principle, it will be observed, respects only the comparative strength of the arguments.

§ 163. The second principle to be regarded in the arrangement of proofs respects the dependence of the arguments on one another.

This principle requires, in the first place, that the analytic proofs precede all others.

The reason of this rule is obvious. As in exhibiting a proof of this class, the proposition itself must necessarily be explained, the relevance and force of every other proof will be more clearly seen after such an explanation. In a judicial question, for example, whether certain specified acts constitute legal murder, after the definition of murder has been given, the arguments from authority or "legal precedents" will obviously be more intelligible and also of more force as confirmatory.

§ 164. This principle requires, in the second place, that antecedent probability arguments precede examples and signs.

The example, introduced after the antecedent probability argument, will serve both to illustrate and also to confirm it. Indeed, in this order, they reflect light on each other. Mr. Burke, in his speech on the Nabob of Arcot's debts, in endeavoring to prove that India had been reduced to a condition of extreme want and wretchedness, first presents the causes in operation to produce it; then, examples of the operation of those causes; and finally particular signs of the fact. The mind very readily receives the whole statement,