As has been mentioned, a weakness of the Labor Management Relations Act provision arises from the absence of any consideration for the need to prevent disputes as to grievances or other differences flowing from the application or interpretation of existing collectivebargaining agreements. Bargaining does not end with the signing of a contract. Rather, the contract provides a charter or framework within which labor and management must in the nature of things carry out their mutual obligations and responsibilities through a process of friendly adjustment without resort to economic force, for the benefit of all concerned. To this end, therefore, we believe it crucial for machinery and procedures to be perfected, so far as possible.

These objectives, however, cannot be reached through forcing upon labor and management a system of compulsory arbitration since such an approach, even if it should take the form of requiring the parties to provide for a method of arbitration in their contracts, has, in our opinion, the effect of settling of controversies by Government order without respect for the desires of those involved. This result would not be a true settlement for the elements of the dispute would undoubtedly remain. Moreover, such a provision of law might well have the effect of depriving labor of the justified use of economic force. The most practicable method of carrying out the purpose of preventing work stoppages as to the application or interpretation of collective agreements would be through basic reliance upon the encouragement of the processes of free collective bargaining. Since we are also convinced of the desirability of clauses in agreements providing for effective machinery to settle issues raised under these agree ments, the bill proposes that this should be a declared national policy, that employers and representatives of employees use every reasonable effort not only to make and maintain collective-bargaining agreements of certain duration, terminable only upon notice, and prohibiting the use of economic coercion in violation of these terms, but also to establish procedures under these agreements, including final and binding arbitration, for peacefully settling disputes arising under them (sec. 205). In addition the parties are to cooperate with the efforts of the Conciliation Service to settle any disputes which might arise. These proposals as well as those relating to the United States Conciliation Service are contained in title II of the bill.

NATIONAL EMERGENCIES

Title III of the bill contains the provisions for dealing with national emergencies which result from or are threatened by a work stoppage in "a vital industry which affects the public interest." It cures the defects of the Labor Management Relations Act provisions for dealing with such emergencies by making the procedures simple and by omitting any mandatory procedures. These, experience has shown, contribute nothing toward aiding a settlement of the dispute, but arouse antagonisms and delay settlement. Title III therefore (1) provides for emergency boards to investigate the dispute, (2) empowers the emergency boards to make recommendations which are to be made public, (3) provides an adequate cooling-off period of 30 days and (4) does away with the last-offer ballots.

This committee recognizes the paramount necessity in a democracy for adhering to the principles of free collective bargaining. Conced

ing for the purposes of argument that even though the prohibition of strikes and lock-outs might in some instance, result in continued production, it would do so under Government compulsion only at the sacrifice of freedom. If carried to the extreme of logic, the Government must assume the responsibility for fixing the terms and conditions of employment through compulsory arbitration or other means similarly repugnant to our society. The great majority of disputes do not involve a public loss necessitating drastic measures. Such few disputes as may result in national emergencies of a character actually imperiling the public safety may in our judgment be met successfully through measures for bringing the forces of public opinion effectively to bear upon the issues in support of the President and in such a manner as to induce settlement by the parties themselves.

This committee believes the provisions of title III offers the wisest solution to the admittedly difficult problem of emergency dispute. The procedures are to be resorted to only under certain limited conditions. The industry involved must be "a vital industry which affects the public interest," and the President must find that a national emergency exists or is threatened. We realize that a national emergency should, where possible, be averted before it actually exists and that, under some circumstances, a national emergency may be created not merely after a work stoppage has occurred, but by the threat of such a stoppage. The bill therefore authorizes the President to utilize the emergency procedures when he finds that a national emergency is threatened or exists because a work stoppage has resulted or threatens to result from a labor dispute in such an industry. When he makes such a finding the President is to issue a proclamation to that effect.

The procedures which title III then provides for use in attempting to bring about settlement of the dispute are designed to insure conditions under which the parties themselves will be induced to settle the dispute. Title III does this by providing for appointment of an emergency board by the President after issuance of the proclamation which is not only to investigate the dispute but also is charged with the duty of seeking to induce the parties to reach a settlement of the dispute themselves. By directing the board to make recommendations as well as findings, both of which are to be made public, the bill substitutes for the work stoppage, the pressure of public opinion as a stimulus to private agreement. The tremendous power of public opinion was testified to by witnesses before this committee in the hearings on the bill. (See testimony of William H. Davis and William M. Leiserson, transcript of hearings, Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, February 7 and February 23, 1949.)

The same witnesses testified that their long experience demonstrated conclusively that the cooling-off period will always be agreed to by the parties without the compulsion of an injunction where the parties feel that efforts are being made to help the parties to settle the dispute privately without Government compulsion. This view is supported by the experience with the cooling-off period under the Railway Labor Act. The bill therefore omits any direction to use an injunction to secure the cooling-off period or for any other purpose.

Experience under the Taft-Hartley Act demonstrated that Government imposed cooling-off periods frequently merely delayed settlement

of the dispute, since the parties would postpone any real efforts at settlement until the period had expired. The committee bill, therefore, believes the cooling-off period should be of as limited duration as possible while at the same time giving the emergency board an adequate opportunity to perform its function. Title III therefore limits the cooling-off period to a maximum of 30 days.

Norris-LaGuardia Act

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

In recognition of the inroads which various sanctions under the Taft-Hartley law have made upon the Norris-LaGuardia Act by authorizing and, as we have seen, in some cases requiring one-sided injunctions against unions without full court hearing, and without the orderly determination of the issues by the National Labor Relations Board, we are convinced that it is essential not only to affirm but specifically to restore that act to its original status. This step, taken in the bill, doubly insures that collective bargaining will no longer be hampered, as it has been for almost 2 years, by the force of the Federal injunction.

It is the committee's view that collective bargaining and injunctions against the use of economic force are diametrical opposites in the field of healthy industrial relations. The former promotes successful relations between management and labor; the latter fosters discord and friction by depriving labor of its power to bargain. In accordance with our desire, therefore, to place primary emphasis upon collective bargaining as a keystone of national labor policy, section 401 of the bill, in effect, provides for the return to the safeguards of the NorrisLaGuardia Act and of the Clayton Act.

Political expenditures

We have already reviewed the application of the political expenditure provision of the Labor-Management Relations Act. For the reasons there set forth, section 402 of the bill reenacts, in effect, section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act in its form prior to the War Labor Disputes Act and the Labor-Management Relations Act.

SECTIONAL ANALYSIS

A detailed analysis of the provisions seriatim, follows:

TITLE I-REPEAL OF LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, AND REENACTMENT OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935

Section 101: This section provides for the repeal of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.

Section 102 reenacts the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 as it existed prior to the enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

Section 103 continues the present National Labor Relations Board as a five-member tribunal instead of the three-member tribunal provided for under section 3 (a) of the Wagner Act. Provision is

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also made for the continuation of the present panel system by an amendment to section 3 (b) of the Wagner Act.

Section 104 (a): This section amends section 4 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 as follows:

(1) The salaries of Board members are increased to $17,500 per year. The salary of a Board member under the Labor Management Relations Act is $12,000 per year.

(2) Language limiting the Board in the selection of its personnel by the Classification Act and other statutes has been deleted as obsolete since all positions have been covered into the competitive classified civil service pursuant to the Ramspeck Act.

(3) Provision is made for the appointment and compensation of arbitrators in jurisdictional dispute cases.

Section 104 (b): This section deletes section 4 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The deleted section provided for the termination of the life of the old National Labor Relations Board established pursuant to Public Resolution No. 44, approved June 19, 1934 (48 Stat. 1183), and reestablished and continued pursuant to the National Industrial Recovery Act.

BAR TO CERTAIN PROCEEDINGS

Section 105: The intent of this section is to set aside the preservative provisions of the General Savings Act of February 25, 1871 (16 Stat. 432), with respect to certain cases arising under the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947. It is designed to bar the National Labor Relations Board and the courts from taking specified action in cases arising under title I of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, unless such action could be taken under the National Labor Relations Act with respect to like cases occurring after the date of passage of the bill.

The Board is also prohibited by this section from issuing complaints based upon any unfair labor practices occurring prior to August 22, 1947, unless charges with respect thereto were pending before the Board on January 1, 1949.

UNJUSTIFIABLE SECONDARY BOYCOTTS AND JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES

The provisions of section 106 of the bill deal entirely with unjustifiable secondary boycotts and jurisdictional disputes. The changes in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 made by this section may be summarized as follows:

Section 106 (a) changes section 1 of the act "Findings and policy" by inserting a new paragraph before the final one. This broadening of the general statement of policy is made necessary by the amendments to section 8 creating remedies for unfair labor practices by labor organizations in the case of unjustifiable secondary boycotts and jurisdictional disputes and creating remedies for an additional unfair labor practice by employers in certain cases involving jurisdictional disputes. Section 106 (b) amends section 2 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 by adding a definition of "secondary boycott" (sec. 2 (11)) and a definition of "jurisdictional dispute" (sec. 2 (12)).

A secondary boycott, as defined in the bill, includes any concerted refusal to handle a particular product or to engage in a strike because

the product has been or is to be manufactured, produced, or distributed by another employer. In other words, economic coercion brought against one employer because he deals with another employer, who is involved in a labor dispute, is defined by the bill as a secondary boycott.

The term "jurisdictional dispute" is limited by the definition to a dispute between two or more labor organizations. Accordingly, it would not apply to a dispute between a union and an unorganized group of employees or to a dispute between an employer and a union over the employer's assignment of work to unorganized employees. The definition thus avoids one of the objectionable features of section 8 (b) (4) (D) of the Taft-Hartley Relations Act which did not require that the dispute be between two labor organizations. This latter section could be used by an employer as a device to undermine a labor organization by transferring work from employees in a trade, craft, or class who were organized to unorganized employees in another trade, craft, or class.

It is intended that the term "jurisdictional dispute" shall include only disputes over the assignment or prospective assignment of a particular work task. This is what is commonly recognized as an essential characteristic of such disputes. Representation cases would thus be excluded from the definition, for such cases involve (where more than one union is seeking recognition) competition between rival unions for the right to be recognized as the statutory bargaining agent of the very same group of employees. They do not involve a dispute over the right to perform particular work tasks. Representation cases are, therefore, more appropriately resolved by an election rather than by arbitration.

Section 106 (c): This section is one of those designed to carry into effect the legislative scheme for resolving jurisdictional disputes. It is intended as one of the later steps in the procedure provided for in the bill and would follow, in the appropriate case, an award made by the National Labor Relations Board or an arbitrator under the proposed amendment to section 9 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (sec. 106 (e)).

The section would amend section 8 of the Wagner Act by making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to assign a particular work task in accordance with an award in jurisdictional dispute case under section 106 (e) of the bill. This unfair labor practice is thus designed to implement such an award and is intended to reach the occasional nonneutral employer whose conduct may cause or prolong a jurisdictional dispute.

Section 106 (d): This section would amend the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 by adding to section 8 of that act provisions for unfair labor practices of labor organizations. These provisions would proscribe secondary boycotts and strikes when used for the purposes (1) of compelling an employer to violate his statutory obligation to bargain with the majority representative of his employees, or (2) to further a jurisdictional dispute.

The first of these situations is covered by the provision making it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to cause or attempt to cause employees to engage in a secondary boycott or a concerted work stoppage in order to compel an employer to violate his statutory