tion of these principles, or whether it is to continue to give merely lip service to them while in reality destroying them through such restrictive legislation such as the Taft-Hartley Act. The committee bill makes this decision in favor of a genuine return to these announced principles. We firmly believe that the violation by the Taft-Hartley Act of these principles and its extremely disruptive effect upon labor relations has been so overwhelmingly demonstrated by experience under the act that any further postponement of such a decision is unacceptable.

We believe that the objections to the act discussed in detail elsewhere in this report so pervade the entire law of labor relations as embodied in the act that the good cannot be severed from the bad. We believe also that the Wagner Act embodies those principles of a sound laborrelations law to which the Government has pledged itself. We therefore consider that the committee's decision can be effectuated only by completely discarding the Taft-Hartley Act and bringing the Wagner Act back to life.

The committee bill effectuates this decision by repealing the TaftHartley Act completely and reenacting the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The rigid and harmful superstructure grafted upon the Wagner Act by the Taft-Hartley Act is thus removed. The National Labor Relations Board is once more given that flexibility of procedure which is so necessary to an administrative agency and which will enable it to deal effectively once again with the problem of encouraging collective bargaining through a statute consistently designed to achieve it.

AMENDMENT OF THE WAGNER ACT

The committee recognizes, however, that since the passage of the Wagner Act, experience has demonstrated that certain changes need to be made in that act, and certain limited types of conduct regulated. The President has consistently pointed this out in his messages and reports to Congress in the last 3 years. The committee bill incorporates what it considers to be the amendments necessary and desirable at this time. These are to be found in amendments or additions to sections 1, 2 (11) and (12), 3 (a) and (b), 4, 8, and 9 (d) and (e). (a) Board structure

The Wagner Act provided for a Board of only three members. Experience under the act demonstrated that the tremendous volume of work which the Board was called upon to perform by the act led to prolonged delays in bringing cases to a conclusion and in the handling of matters requiring its attention. The Labor Management Relations Act increased the members to five and authorized them to operate in panels of three. Experience under that arrangement shows that, even with the tremendous increase in work load occasioned by the new and complex provisions of that act, the Board was enabled to complete a far greater volume of work each month. The committee believes that the continuation of the larger Board with authority to operate in panels is of the utmost importance to the proper discharge of the responsibilities imposed upon the Board by the bill. We, therfore, have amended section 3 accordingly.

The structure and procedures of the Board are in all other ways returned to those in existence under the original Wagner Act. The

intolerable separation of the Office of General Counsel from the Board, commented on elsewhere in this report, is ended. The discretionary and policy-making powers lodged in the general counsel by the Labor Management Relations Act are thus restored to the Board, where they rightfully belong, and the internal separation of judicial and prosecuting functions can be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, as was the case prior to the Taft-Hartley Act.

(b) Jurisdictional disputes and secondary boycotts

One of the basic defects of the Taft-Hartley Act is its interference with many legitimate union activities through its attempt to regulate what it labels as union "unfair labor practices." As this report elsewhere demonstrates, the committee feels that these proscriptions unjustifiably interfere with legitimate union activities necessary to establish and carry out collective bargaining, which the act is purportedly designed to encourage.

In accordance with the principles which have guided this committee in formulating a labor-relations law, the committee bill approaches the subject of unfair labor practices from the point of view that such a law should proscribe only those employer or union practices which prevent or interfere with free collective bargaining. If an employer is guilty of an unfair labor practice when he deals with a union other than one chosen by the majority of employees to represent them, it should likewise be an unfair labor practice for a union to compel the employer to do so. Likewise, disputes between two or more unions over which one has jurisdiction over the performance of a particular work task do not serve the purpose of promoting free collective bargaining. In such a dispute, economic pressure may be brought upon an employer which will prevent collective bargaining, and the employer will find himself helpless between two disputing unions.

The committee believes that employers and the public should be protected against these types of activities. Declaration of this policy is found in a new paragraph added to section 1 of the Wagner Act by the committee bill. The bill also amends sections 2 (11) and (12), and 8 and 9 (d) and (e) of the Wagner Act to carry out this declaration of policy.

The amendments achieve this by making it an unfair-labor practice for a union to cause or attempt to cause employees to engage in a secondary boycott or a strike for the following purposes:

(1) To compel an employer to bargain with one union (a) if another has been certified by the Board, or (b) if the employer is required by an order of the Board to bargain with another union, or (c) if the employer has a contract with another union and a question of representation cannot appropriately be raised under the act; or

(2) To compel an employer to assign particular work tasks contrary to an award issued by the Board under section 9 (d) of this bill. Beyond this, the committee bill does not go in proscribing union activities. Care has been exercised not to impair union practices which the committee believes are the normal incident of and necessary to the collective-bargaining process. As we have demonstrated elsewhere in this report, the Taft-Hartley Act went far beyond this in the field of jurisdictional disputes and secondary boycotts. The proscription of secondary boycotts in that act amounted to a blanket

prohibition of all forms of secondary union activity. Examination of the administration of this provision of the act shows that it was used, almost without exception, to prohibit resort by unions to legitimate economic sanctions in the protection of wage standards and conditions of work or in the continuation of organizing activity. As we have pointed out, one of the primary effects of the act has been to provide a shield for nonunion employers by isolating them from certain peaceful economic pressures and to encourage so-called neutral employers to subcontract work to nonunion employers.

The committee bill avoids these unwarranted results by avoiding use of the blanket prohibition of all types of secondary boycott such as is contained in the Taft-Hartley Act and specifically defining the types and purposes of those strikes and boycotts that are to be prohibited.

The committee bill also avoids that portion of the Taft-Hartley Act provision banning jurisdictional strikes and boycotts which would render a union virtually helpless to prevent an employer from undermining it by assigning work tasks to unorganized employees. The bill does this by providing that jurisdictional disputes are covered by the bill only when there is a dispute over work tasks between two or more labor organizations. Moreover, the bill reaches the occasional nonneutral employer by making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to assign a work task in accordance with an arbitration award.

The committee believes that a dispute over work tasks between two or more unions can frequently place an employer in a position from which he is powerless to extricate himself. We consider it essential to provide some kind of machinery for settling such disputes peaceably. The bill therefore gives the National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction over these disputes under specified conditions. The Board can take jurisdiction of such a dispute only (1) when it has resulted in or threatens to result in a strike or secondary boycott, and (2) when it affects commerce. Once the Board has taken jurisdiction, it must afford the unions a reasonable opportunity to settle the dispute themselves. If the dispute is not so settled, the Board may, under regulations which the Board would issue, either hear and determine the dispute itself and issue an award or appoint an arbitrator to do so. Certain guides which the Board or arbitrator must follow in making a determination are spelled out in the bill. The employer involved in such a dispute is entitled to be heard.

If it appears to the Board that the dispute is in fact one over representation instead of merely assignment of work tasks, it is to treat the case as a representation case already instituted and proceed accordingly.

(c) Notice of contract termination

The bill also amends section 8 of the Wagner Act to require 30 days' notice to the Conciliation Service of a proposal to terminate or modify any collective-bargaining agreement and makes it an unfair labor practice for either an employer or a union to terminate or modify such an agreement without filing such notice. The committee believes that this is a reasonable requirement which will enable the Service to learn about the possibility of a controversy in time to be able to head it off before it breaks out into economic conflict, thus preventing an open break in bargaining negotiations.

FREEDOM FROM RESTRICTIVE STATE LAWS REGARDING UNION SECURITY AND CHECK-OFF

Section 107 of the bill amends the so-called closed-shop proviso of section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act so as to permit employers subject to the act to make agreements providing for the closed shop or other forms of union security or for the check-off of union dues or other membership obligations notwithstanding the provisions of State laws regulating or prohibiting such subjects of collective bargaining. The references to check-off and to freedom from restrictive State laws were not present in the Wagner Act.

This provision, insofar as it precludes any interference with the national policy by conflicting State laws, is intended to eliminate the subjection of employers and unions in interstate industries to conflicting rules regarding these matters in the different States where they are engaged in activities subject to the act. The need for this provision has been intensified by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, handed down January 3, 1949, in Lincoln Union v. Northwestern (No. 47, October Term, 1948), and companion cases, and March 7, 1949, in Algoma Plywood Co. v. Wis. Labor Relations Board (No. 216, October Term, 1948), in which the Court held that State laws regulating union security were not unconstitutional, and that section 8 (3) of the Wagner Act did not preclude the enforcement of a State labor law, as applied to an interstate employer, making employee referenda a prerequisite to union-security agreements. The Court, in its later decision, made reference to, but did not find it necessary to rely on, the principle that, "in cases of concurrent power over commerce State law remains effective so long as Congress has not manifested an unambiguous purpose that it should be supplanted." It is our desire that section 107 will constitute a manifestation of an "unambiguous purpose" on the part of the Congress to supplant those State laws which seek to regulate or prohibit union-security agreements and check-off provisions in a manner inconsistent with the policy set forth in this provision.

Section 107 will remove the stigma of illegality which now attaches to closed-shop agreements and will restore such agreements and other union-security devices to the processes of collective bargaining. Elsewhere in this report may be found a detailed description of the disruptive effects of the prohibition of the closed shop and the restraints on other forms of union security now contained in the Taft-Hartley amendments to the act. The stabilizing influence of the closed shop in certain industries, notably the garment manufacturing, printing, and construction are also described elsewhere in this report. An impressive tribute to the contribution of union-security agreements to stable industrial relations was made by a representative of an association of employers. In his statement before the committee, Mr. Paul M. Geary, executive vice president, National Electrical Contractors Association, stated:

The foundation of this progress (in labor-management relations) is responsibility on the part of both parties-the employer and the employee. You cannot expect to have a responsible union unless you give it the means of achieving responsibility. That is, the union must have a measure of security. The closed-shop type of contract which has been in effect between labor and management in our industry assures the union of security and gives it an opportunity to concentrate on helping to improve production-the only road to greater benefits for labor, management, and the public alike.

As employers, we feel that legislation outlawing the closed shop impairs the employer's right of contract. If an employer prefers to deal only with a group of men who have sold him their worth and responsibility, should he not be permitted to do so? To ban the closed shop is merely to restrict further the employer's right to bargain and to contract with persons of his own choice.

The question of union security is one which should be left to management and labor to resolve in collective bargaining without the intervention of the Government. That is the purpose of section 107.

The check-off of union dues has a long historical background and was a common practice in industry prior to the enactment of the TaftHartley Act. În 1945 an estimated 51⁄2 million workers were employed under collective-bargaining agreements which provided some form of check-off of union dues. A form of check-offs is now used by the Federal Government in collecting social-security and income taxes from wage and salary earners. Employers have long used the checkoff to collect such obligations as cash advances, company-store bills, rent for company houses, and various others. It is a method to assure the payment of their union obligations by union members which is convenient to workers and unions and represents no hardship on employers. There is no rational ground for the present regulation of the check-off. This subject, like union security, is a legitimate subject of contract and section 107 would restore it to the area of collective bargaining, free from governmental interference.

CONCILIATION SERVICE AND INTERPRETATION OF EXISTING

AGREEMENTS

In line with our justified conviction that the interests of sound government require that the functions of conciliation and mediation be carried on under Cabinet responsibility in the appropriate established Department of Government, rather than through an independent agency as required under the Labor Management Relations Act, the bill will re-create the United States Conciliation Service in the Department of Labor. Such action, without more, however, is not enough. The Labor Management Relations Act failed adequately to insure the most effective conciliation services by ignoring the problem of fostering techniques for settling disputes under existing agreements. Moreover, the law restricts the discretion of the conciliation agency where comparatively minor disputes are concerned. The bill will correct these deficiencies of the present law by emphasizing the function of the Conciliation Service as an aid to collective bargaining and industrial peace and by stressing the need for the Service to assist the parties voluntarily to settle their differences through arbitration as well as through the aid of mediation and conciliation.

moves the present obstacles preventing Federal conciliators from entering disputes of a local character when the parties want their assistance. At the same time it would encourage agreements between the Service and State or local mediation agencies for handling these disputes.

Consistent with the tradition of integrity which has characterized the Conciliation Service since its establishment in 1913, the bill proposes to require impartial and confidential conduct on the part of conciliators. A labor-management advisory committee would be created to assist the Service on questions of policy and administration.