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goodwill of Europe to take a more substantial form than mere good wishes. A purely defensive attitude, although it would have justified the assumption of the martyr's role, would not only have given England time to concentrate in overwhelming force, but would have destroyed all hope of an Afrikander revolt. Execution, however, has fallen for below conception. With the one exception of the general distribution of their forces at the outset that is to say, 25,000 on the northern frontier of Natal, 8,000 in the Free State, and 10,000 watching the natives, the Portuguese, and in reserve their strategy has been that beloved by the amateur, civilised or savage, without experience of the practical difficulties of war. It was well known in the first year of the American Civil War, and under the titles of the anaconda policy,' the 'surround,' or the 'corral,' it was preached in the columns of nearly every Northern newspaper, until Lee and Stonewall Jackson, by crushing the converging armies in succession, exposed its inherent weakness. in Natal the invasion had not been a week in progress before the coils of the anaconda had been severely bruised, and it might well be supposed that after Talana Hill, Elandslaagte, and Reitfontein, it would have vanished from the field. The Boers have not learnt the superiority of concentration over dispersion. At Estcourt, at Enslin's Farm, and at Gras Pan they employed small detachments when they might have employed considerable forces; and on the Free State frontier, instead of massing for a vigorous effect against one or other of the exposed points-Mafeking, Kimberley, Orange River, De Aar, or Naauwpoort-they have frittered away their strength by undertaking two sieges and an incursion into Cape Colony. Nor have they made as much use as they might have done of their superior mobility. Dr. Leyds's visit to the Creusot workshops, where the great guns were manufactured, will prove in the long run to have been a bad day for the Boer cause. Instead of luring the English into the open, riding round their flanks, and gradually wearing them out, President Kruger's generals have allowed their ponies to eat their heads off. No marshal of Louis XIV. ever sat down before a bastioned fortress with more deliberation than Cronje and Joubert displayed before rude earthworks, or showed more reluctance to force the fighting. Putting vain trust in their heavy ordnance, weapons of which they hardly understood the use, they have not made the most of their fine mounted riflemen, the instrument to which they owe their military prestige. We

do not for a moment believe that even if they had been commanded by a Sheridan or a Skobeleff they could have ridden into Durban or Capetown. The difficulty of supply and the absence of information, under which they are evidently labouring, would have prevented such far-reaching movements. But a Sheridan or a Skobeleff, where time was allimportant, would have wasted no time in sieges, of which the issue was at best uncertain, and for which the republican troops, both by training and tradition, were quite unfitted, and their ponies of no use whatever. Nor would they have suffered themselves to be tied fast to the railway. The establishment of a double line of supply, affording an alternative route for advance and for retreat, does not appear to have presented any insuperable difficulty. If Cronje has been able to maintain 6,000 or 7,000 men for nearly two months before Mafeking and Kimberley, 100 miles and more from the railway, surely Joubert should have been able to establish magazines along the road which leads from Dundee to Helpmakaar, and across the Tugela Drift to Weenen. Had he done this he might have used his superior mobility to some purpose. As soon as the arrival of reinforcements was reported at Estcourt and Pietermaritzburg he might, like Napoleon at Mantua, have raised the siege, and, moving rapidly by his alternative line, have attacked the relieving column, as soon as it began its march, with his full strength. Cronje, too, when Lord Methuen advanced from the Orange River, might have left a detachment to watch Kimberley, and massed his whole force against his more formidable enemy; not, however, merely standing across his line of march, but wearing him gradually down, as Sheridan wore down the Confederates in the last retreat to Appomattox.

Again, in dealing with the railways Boer action has been very apathetic. Their leaders, it is needless to say, appreciated the importance of this means of supply. In fact, they appreciated it too highly, for not only do they appear to have believed the maintenance of the main lines as of more importance than a decisive victory, but they gave their enemy credit for the same obtuseness. In Natal, for instance, directly General Joubert determined to besiege Ladysmith, he should have destroyed or occupied the railway as far south as the vicinity of Pietermaritzburg. Had he done so he could have delayed the relieving column, and have gained time in which to exhaust Sir George White's power of resistance. But because he in

tended to use the line, after the fall of Ladysmith, for the conveyance both of supplies and his heavy guns, he made no serious attempt to cut it until the head of the relieving column was strongly posted at Estcourt. Yet he might have been certain that, if Ladysmith fell, the line would be destroyed, and his advance on Pietermaritzburg would be just as much embarrassed as if he had destroyed it himself. A decisive victory over Sir George White was his main object, and he should have sacrificed everything to attain it. It is probable, moreover, that there are many engineers and mechanics in the Boer forces, and that an efficient reconstruction corps might easily have been raised. In Cape Colony, too, the same apathy is to be observed. Although the Boers lay between Orange River Station and Kimberley for nearly six weeks, Lord Methuen found the line as far as the Modder River practically intact, and even during his advance, although he was weak in mounted troops, the Boer raiding parties showed little enterprise. Of course, unless viaducts or tunnels are blown up, it is impossible to stop the traffic for more than a few days at most. But in war every hour is of value.

It might be said, on the other hand, that if the Boers have done little to disturb the lines of supply and communication, the British have done less. Yet there are at least eight regiments of cavalry at the front, besides a large force of mounted infantry, regular and colonial. But the peculiar characteristic of the South African war is that cavalry is comparatively powerless. Mounted riflemen-that is, men who can both ride and shoot, who carry the weapon of the infantry, but are just as mobile as the best cavalry-have treated our splendid squadrons with contempt. Before the war cavalry was all the cry. The Boers, it was said, would never stand if their rear was threatened, and their ponies exposed to capture. The cavalry, however, has never been able to get round the enemy's flank, except when he was in inferior numbers, and then, except at Elandslaagte, his rifles have held them at arm's length. Under other conditions-that is, when the cavalry was the stronger, as at Pepworth's Hill-the protection of its own flanks and rear has given the cavalry as much as it could do. It is true that the ground has generally been far more favourable for the cat-like Boer cob than the heavier and less agile troop-horse; but the opinion seems justified that a mounted force of the Boer type, every where except in the most open country, is more effective for all purposes of war than ordinary European

cavalry. Equal mobility and superior armament are bound to tell. Shock action, unless the enemy be surprised or demoralised, is worse than useless against the rifle; and, except for shock action, European cavalry is ill adapted. Dismounted duties are unpopular, both with officers and men, and they are seldom thoroughly taught; and even if they were, men armed only with a carbine feel themselves at a disadvantage when pitted against men armed with rifles. It is true that in the War of Secession the infantry was sometimes defeated at their own game by the cavalry, but in those cases almost invariably the cavalry had the better weapon. Sheridan's horse during the last year of the war was very nearly as efficient on foot as the best of the Confederate infantry, but the volume of fire of Sheridan's repeating carbines was far greater than that of an equal number of Confederate muzzle-loaders. Nevertheless, although superior in fighting power to ordinary cavalry, just as all infantry is superior, the Boer mounted riflemen in one respect are decidedly inferior to cavalry and infantry. They are comparatively weak in attack, either mounted or dismounted. They are neither armed nor trained to charge on horseback; and on foot they are always hampered, not only by an instinctive reluctance to go far from their ponies, but by the very nature of their habitual tactics. They act by fire, and by fire alone; by fire delivered from an unexpected quarter and enfilading or enveloping the enemy's flank. But surprise by fire and envelopment are their only idea of tactics. They go no further. Their trust is in the rifle, and the rifle alone. Cold steel has no place in their armoury, and they are so far from regarding a resolute advance to close quarters as the bridge by which the assailant passes to the rout and annihilation of an enemy already shaken that they do not even carry bayonets. Now, however effective such tactics may be against a force in the open with an exposed line of retreat, they are not much to be dreaded by a force entrenched, with its supplies close at hand and well protected, unless the mounted riflemen are accompanied by a decidedly superior artillery. Even then it is very doubtful whether good troops, with a secure line of retreat, can be driven from a favourable position, except by the deadly fire at close quarters. They may be shaken by fire at ranges over 400500 yards, but they will not become thoroughly demoralised. It has generally been assumed that modern changes and improved armaments have added vastly to the defensive power

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of troops holding a position. It is to be remarked, however, that the present infantry formations are much less vulnerable than the comparatively heavy masses of the Franco-German and Russo-Turkish wars. In our own army, moreover, and in India especially, much attention has been paid to skirmishing and the reduction of losses by offering the very smallest target to the enemy's fire. The importance of these tactics have been driven home by the campaigns of the North-West Frontier; and the regimental officers in South Africa, discarding the dense and regular lines of Aldershot and Salisbury, at once deployed their men at wide intervals, encouraged them to make use of all natural cover, to imitate the Boers in invisibility. But the best cover which the infantry has found has been given by the accurate fire and the fine tactics of the artillery. If on many occasions ground over which a frontal attack appeared absolute madness has been passed over with less loss than might have been expected; if strong kopjes have been stormed at the bayonet's point without the attacking lines being swept away by magazine-fire and machine-guns ; if the Boer marksmen have been so shaken and demoralised that their fire, except at close quarters, has been comparatively innocuous, it is in great part due to the admirable discipline, splendid practice, and the fine tactics of the artillery. We do not believe that the Boer of to-day judges distance less accurately or aims less correctly than the generation of Laing's Nek and the Ingogo. His shooting at ranges over 600 yards was not worth much even in those days; at closer ranges, to judge from the number of officers who have fallen, it is still most effective. But under an incessant hail of shrapnel, bursting with invariable precision, and covering the length and depth of a position, all but the most daring marksmen lose their nerve, and only thoroughly well-disciplined infantry will hold their ground. The discipline of the Boers, except under the most favourable conditions, has never been proof against the fire of the British batteries, backed by the irresistible dash of the line of skirmishers. As to the defensive tactics of the Boers, they know well how to conceal themselves, and how to construct breast works, and they have often reserved their fire to close ranges with great effect. But on two occasions only-at Pepworth's Hill and Magersfontein-have they made use of a counterstroke. It is by such means that a better-trained enemy would seek to prevent the advance of the attacking infantry to close