ideas, the association of which cause pleasure, must be either any ideas, or pleasing ideas; that they are not any ideas, will probably be readily admitted, as no one would suppose pleasure to exist in any combination or association of the ideas of a dunghill, a tripe-shop, or an ill-natured, ugly old woman: if, then, they are pleasing ideas, we come to the manifest result, "that pleasing ideas arise from the association of pleasing ideas." 25. It is needless to comment further on this, as it is evident we want something to account for the existence of these latter pleasing ideas, which ne cessarily induces us to think there are some fixed Fixed principles which are as capable of pleasing the organs of sight, as there are that please the organs of taste, smell, and hearing. principles. smell. 25. These latter are, perhaps, founded upon princi- of the ples, not so obvious to our reason, as to our senses. We cannot define what a pleasant smell is, but we know it, and we know, that there are several distinct from one another; we assign an idea to it, but its nature is so occult, or, perhaps, the nature of the organ of smell, that we cannot define it, or give any person an idea of smell in any other way, than by telling him it is like a rose, or a violet, a pig-sty, assafoetida, &c. &c. Perhaps if we had microscopes of inconceivable power, we might find something different in the shape of the particles, which compose a smell: we might find something in the organ of smell, capable of being operated upon in different manners; if we could do that, we might be able to define a smell from its real nature, without having recourse to similies; but we The taste. The hearing. Music. The eye. may as well expect to do this, as to count the inhabitants in the moon, or tell the nature of the spots on the sun. 26. The same observation will apply to the taste of our palates; this is equally hidden, though we are so far certain of its existence, that a good receipt for a dish, and a discerning cook, are both capable of giving a relish to that organ. 27. With regard to hearing, we are nearly as much in the dark, though this has the advantage over taste and smell, that we can classify the different effects on the ear; and though we cannot define them any more than smell and taste, by showing the manner in which they operate upon our nerves, or why a certain order of sounds please, we can by means of the powers of classifying them, talk of the tonic, mediant, dominant, &c.; and by means of an infinite variety of combinations of eight sounds, and their different kinds, and by means also of the rules of music, (which are as well known as the rules of Architecture might be,) we obtain a pleasure for the ear far surpassing either that of the nose or palate. 28. The eye, which is the organ to be pleased by the science, which we are at present about to investigate, has a much larger range for its amusement, than the three organs we have been considering: (not to mention the works of nature) art alone is capable of affording pleasure to the eye by three different, and yet noble sciences, by painting, sculpture, and architecture, besides inferior arts. As in all these so much depends upon harmonious and appropriate composition, and as the theory of Architecture is the very soul of that harmony and propriety, it might be styled the music of intelligent composition. It is the object of these essays to determine what that theory is; and I trust it will be felt, that the beauty of Architecture has its origin in innumerable combinations of parts, which illustrate those different qualities which are capable of producing a rational pleasure in the human mind. With this impression I cannot conceive that the causes of pleasure are to be explained by analogous sympathies. I therefore do not agree with some writers, who imagine, that when Admirawe admire any thing for its beauty, we love it: we love, admire the bust of a beautiful woman without one particle of love. Nobody would question that the greyhound is more beautiful than the mastiff; but if the latter were generously risking his own life to save that of his master, I think it possible we should feel a sympathetic or sensible regard very nearly allied to love for that animal, ugly as it is, much more than for the greyhound. tion is not 29. This feeling would be properly called esteem, nor esteem, I mention this to show that there is even another gradation between admiration and love. When love exists, admiration and esteem must be often ingredients; besides those, it also requires a sympathy peculiar to itself. Thus we admire a hand-ome woman, esteem an amiable one; but we only love that person in whom the form, the intellect, the manner, complexion, character, &c. &c., makes the greatest impression on our own. 30. We cannot always account for attachments fo being formed, as they now and then seem diametri Those who suppose love and admiration the same, have argued themselves into an absur dity. cally opposite to what reason and philosophy would have pointed out; we have, however, reason to think, that sympathy has a great deal to do with it, from the circumstance of all animals uniting with their own species in the brute creation it is probable little more than an animal sympathy, in man both mental and animal; and in the same proportion as man is superior to the brute, so would the refinement and variety in the combination of different kinds of sympathy in man, form a more copious subject for investigation. it 31. Enough, however, has been said here to show, that the admiration of the beautiful is not love, though may sometimes be an ingredient in it. To establish this is necessary, because some writers setting out with this principle, that love and admiration are the same thing, have at length argued themselves into a belief, that there is no such thing as beauty of form, proportion, or any other quality. 32. As the admiration of the beautiful thus arises neither from love, nor the association of ideas, we shall more readily come into the notion, that it arises from a combination of principles, which are founded upon the simplest systems of common sense and feeling; what these are in Architecture, it will be our business now to consider. ance of the second cond chapter of Vitruvius. I HAVE cursorily mentioned the confusion which Importappears in the second chapter of the first book of Vitruvius, and how, in consequence of that confusion, very little importance has been attached to it: there seems, however, to be no doubt, that if it could be satisfactorily explained, very great benefit would arise from it. Had the Latin terms alone remained, such explanation would have been utterly impossible, as very little can be elicited from the comment of Vitruvius ; but fortunately for us, he has given us the terms in the original language of Greece, and it is to be hoped, that upon the investigation of the various sig nifications of their words, the difficulty will be cleared up. The frequent occurrence of Greek words and idioms, throughout the writings of Vitruvius, is very much in proof, how remarkably beholden Architecture was to that nation. The terms used in the second chapter of Vitruvius, and which we have just noticed in the last essay, though their meaning has been lost |