Secondly. Misconception, and consequent misrep resentation of his opponents objection. The objection is, "That if we are as dependent upon God for "all our voluntary exercises as a clock or watch "is dependent upon weights or springs for all its "motions, then we are as incapable of moral agency "as these, or any other mere machine," To this he replies, that "It takes for granted, that the only rea66 son why a watch, a clock, or any other mere ma"chine, is not a moral agent, is simply besause it de"pends upon some power out of itself, for all its mo❝tions." He would indeed be a simpleton, who could imagine that self motion alone, would constitute any agent a moral agent, and still much more simple, should he so imagine, of a self moving watch or clock, which would be but to imagine a double absurdity, viz. To ascribe moral agency to a subject, possessed of but one quality essential to a moral agent, whilst wholly destitute of others, no less essential. And to suppose self motion possessed by an agent wholly destitute of soul and spirit, of sensations and affections, of perception, reason, conscience and will; would be to suppose an agent exerting self motion, whilst utterly destitute of every principle of such action. Neither of these despicable absurdities had any place in the foregoing objection; and yet it is the former one of them, that the doctor imagines he has discovered therein. This alone he exposes, pursues and combats. And whilst thus hunting down the fancied objection, the real one remains evaded and unanswered. The actual objection consists in maintaining that

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however otherwise qualified for moral agency, yet, if mankind are as utterly dependent on external agency, from whatever source, for all their acts of will, as a clock or watch is dependent upon weights and springs for all its motions; that the former are as undeserving of rewards and punishments as the latter, or as any other mere machines. The validity of this objection we will now test, by the doctor's own method of trial. Suppose a clock, which hitherto was but senseless "matter, should this moment be so transformed into "mind, as to become endued with as large a portion "of perception, reason, conscience and volition, as any "new-born infant: but yet so, as that all its volitions "are still as wholly dependent on wheels, pendulum, " and weights, as its senseless motions formerly were. "Is this clock now, any more a moral agent than it was "before? Are its volitions now, any moral exercises "or any more worthy of praise or blame, than they

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were before? By no means. But why not? Be"cause, notwithstanding it is now become mind, and "exercises perception, reason, conscience and volition, "yet, being still wholly and absolutely dependent for "all its volitions, on weights, wheels and pendulum, "and consequently totally destitute of self governing 66. power over its own volitions, an attribute essential "to moral agency; it therefore rises only to hold rank "amongst mental, or cogitating machinery." (Retort.)

But we proceed, thirdly, to notice hostility betwixt the doctor's maxim, and manner of reasoning.

His maxim.

"It is impertinent to reason from

matter to mind on this subject."

His manner of reasoning notwithstanding. "As "neither dependence nor independence can make a “machine a mind; so neither dependence, nor inde"pendence, can make a mind a machine.” "For as "matter cannot move, so neither can mind act with. "out a divine agency."

The above inconsistences, as well as many others, into which this celebrated writer has fallen, in his S strenuous opposition to a power in mankind of origin-t ating and effecting their own acts of will; seem prin- N cipally to have arisen from his notion of inertness int mind; whereby his ideas thereon aproximate mind and matter so nearly to each other. Had he not pos sessed too independent a spirit, he might in debating the claim to a self determining power of volition in man, have avoided entangling himself in so many surdities of his own.

ab.

For by availing himself of the bewildering sophistry of Edwards on the will, he might thereby greatly have entangled all such claims by surrounding, obscuring, and overwhelming them, with the formidable jargon of "Motives being determiners of the will." It's "al

ways being determined by the strongest motive.” And "that the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding, &c. &c." But still, what would avail every such attempt to wrest the control of a man's own volitions from himself, in order in all cases to transfer it, into the possession of a power out of himself.

For such transfer reducing mankind into machines, would, according to every true principle of reason, equity, and law, inevitably attach the whole praise and blame, of volitions and actions, so necessitated to the resistless cause, or first, and supreme agent.

Nor is it difficult independently of arguing from consequences, to reply to the Edwardean scheme of subjecting the will invariably to the irresistible control of motives. For, however greatly he may have obscured and perplexed the subject by sophistical and tautological definition, still the subject is itself plain. Motives in themselves, possess no power of domination. They are not determiners, but inducements to volition.

The strength or imbecility of a motive, is not in itself, but is communicated by the man or person, who views it. Place a trinket and wedge of gold before a savage. Place a similar trinket and a like golden wedge before a miser. The trinket will be prized by the one, and despised by the other; the gold disregarded by the one, and adored by the other: and yet both trinkets, and both wedges are equal in themselves; although so unequal as objects of estimation. It therefore is not motives which govern the heart and mind, but the man through his heart and mind who governs the motives.* The reason therefore, why a

* With the foregoing sentiment the following seems strictly to accord. "Wherever the appearances of (things in) the ma"terial world, are expressive to us, of qualities we love, or ad"mire, our minds, instead of being governed by the character

volition is one way, rather than another way, is not in the motives, but in the man, stamping such weight on each motive, as accords with his own heart and mind.

When a motive inducing to action is presented whether through sensation or perception to a man well established in piety and virtue, he will instantly consult his conscience, If the case is of doubtful complexion, conscience will consult reason, reason will summon memory to perform its office; during the deliberation, interest of temporal kind, may duly come into view; but conscience, keeping a steadfast eye upon the obligations of divine law and revelation, will decide according to their demands. The man having forborne volition, and receiving as authoritative the dictate of conscience, now obeys its injunction by an acceptance or rejection of the motive. But if one habituated to evil courses, is solicited by a motive tending to the gratification of some often indulged propension; conscience but too generally is forgotten, its dictates slighted, and its voice suppressed, whilst the predominant passion, assuming dictatorial authority, prescribes to the yielding slave of his own imperious lusts. If the person thus solicited, be such a one as St. James describes, viz. "A double minded man and unstable in all his ways," he probably will consult conscience, convenience, temporal interests, and sensual

"of external objects, are enabled to bestow upon them a charac "ter which (intrinsically) does not belong to them." (Alison on taste.)