British possessions. On the other hand, the Danish fleet, if once launched with a hostile view, might be on our shores without a moment's notice. An intervention to procure, by pacific means, the arrangement desired by Russia, he did not condemn; but to interfere, first by threats, and afterwards by violence, violence inadequate to its object and unsuccessful, was what he did condemn. It was known that the passage of the Dardanelles would be regarded as an act of hostility; at least, it was quite as natural to suppose, that the approach to Copenhagen, the landing of troops, and the investment of that capital, would be received without resistance or a feeling of hostility, as that the appearance in a menacing posture before Constantinople, would be viewed with calmness and indifference. But the estimate of the strength of the castle, and the appointment of the British force, shewed clearly that there was an idea that the object of the expedition was likely to be regarded as hostile, and to be met with resistance. But it was said, the expedition appeared before Constantinople purely for Russian objects. The restoration of the Hospodars was, indeed, a Russian object. But how was this demanded by the British commander? With the alternative of giving up the Turkish fleet! If the fleet had been given up, could the restoration of the Hospodars have been

still insisted on? If not, where was our attention to the interests of Russia? As to the policy of the expedition, Russia ought to have been induced by all means to concentrate her whole force against the most dangerous enemy, Buonaparté. This ought to have been our policy also. Then, as to the force, it was so inadequate to its object, that if sir Thomas Lewis had not come away with the utmost expedition, his passage would have been totally cut off. It was asked, what 5 or 6,000 troops, required by the naval commanders, could have done, when Constantinople had 200,000 men of military age among its inhabitants? They might have destroyed the castle of Abydos by a coup de main, and they might have held the castle of Sestos, where the 200,000 men from Constantinople could not have got at them. But the troops were sent to Alexandria to commit a double breach of alliance, and to incur a double failure.* He did not think that 5,000 men could achieve miracles. He could hardly conceive that 5,000 men could open a communication from Chili to Buenos Ayres, over the highest and most impracticable mountains in the world; but he did think they might have destroyed one small castle by a coup de main, and taken and held another in which no attack could have been made upon them. With regard to the troops that had been ordered to evacuate Alexandria, they had

set

set free a part of the force in Sicily, which was brought to Gibraltar with a view to co-operate in securing the retreat of the royal family of Portugal from Lisbon, though that object was happily effected without the necessity of employing them. Neither he nor his colleagues, he observed, had been forward to take a part in the present discussion. He did not see what practical benefit could result from a censure on persons who were no longer in his majesty's councils. And he thought it would be injurious to have on the journals a resolution reflecting on the honour of the country, He thought, there

fore, he should best do his duty by moving the order of the day.

Mr. Windham considered a treaty as binding only with respect to what was in the purview of that treaty. A friend might become our very worst enemy.

Col. Mark Wood endeavoured to proceed in a speech against the expedition; but the question was so loudly called for, that he was obliged to sit down. The house, however gave way to the reply of Mr. William Taylor.-After which, the question that the other orders be now read, was put and carried without a division.

CHAP.

HE commercial warfare, or the war of passivity and privation (a novelty in the history of the world) in which Great Britain and France were now engaged, was traced in our last volume, to the decrees of the emperor of the French, declaring the whole island of Great Britain to be in a state of blockade. A protecting and selfdefensive system was interposed by our orders in council; and trade began again to flourish; yet there was no measure of administration discussed in the present session that occupied so great a portion of the time and attention of parliament, or occasioned such keen and pertinacious debate, the Baltic expedition alone, perhaps excepted. On both these subjects the members in opposition had the advantage of standing not only on what they maintained to be political expediency, but the plausible ground of justice and the law of nations; though there was not now in fact, any law of nations: or at least any such law in force. Buonaparté, who swayed a sceptre of iron on the continent, acknowledged no law

but that of superior force. It was very generally remarked, that during the present session the opposition to ministry was unusually keen, vigilant, and persevering. The present ministers were not supposed to possess much ability-on the whole, there was allowed to be a superiority of powers, of both rea soning and oratory among their opponents; who, fully sensible of this, seized every opportunity of hang. ing on the skirts of ministers, and distracting and worrying them with incessant debates. Those concerning orders of council possessed very little interest, were universally accounted dry, and at length became tiresome at the time. They cannot appear more interesting now.

The great question to which they refer is to be decided not by arguments, but by facts. Though, therefore, there was scarcely a week when there was not some debate or conversation about French decrees, British orders in council, foreign licences, or American treaties of commerce, it will not be expected that our account of those proceedings

proceedings shall be other than

summary.

House of Commons, Feb. 5.The chancellor of the exchequer having moved, that the orders of his majesty in council respecting neutral trade be referred to the committee of ways and means,

Lord H. Petty said, that as doubts were entertained of the legality of those orders, it was the duty of ministers to have those doubts removed by showing to the house in the first place their necessity, and then by applying for an indemnity bill against the unconstitutional exercise of them. Lord Petty contended that the orders in council violated both the law of nations, and the municipal law of this country, and farther, that to enforce them was a measure of great impolicy.

The boasting decree of Buonaparté, declaring England and its ports to be in a state of blockade, had never been acted upon; nor, as had been declared by the French minister of marine decrees to general Armstrong, the American envoy, was it ever intended to be acted on, with regard to neutrals. It was part of a liberty of the subject that he should have free access to strangers. The orders in council were a violation of Magna

Charta.

Mr. Perceval, in reply, maintained that the late orders in council were founded on the same principle as the order of the 7th of January, 1807, issued by the late ministers, with this difference only, that they were more efficient. The noble lord wished now to discuss the legality of these orders in council, and to reserve the question of policy to another stage of the business.

But as the legality of the measure was in the opinion of the noble lord, as far from being defensible as the policy-the policy might as well be discussed first, and the legality afterwards. The measures now in force were suggested by the propriety of retaliating the aggressions of the enemy. All trade in English goods was prohibited, and all such goods, wherever found, were declared lawful prize. Lord Petty had said, that this was of no moment, as the internal execution of the decree in France was all that was intended. It was rather singular, however, that the first news of the publication of the decree at Berlin was accompanied with an account of its having been most rigorously enforced at Hamburgh. Was this confining the operation of the decree to French territory? In what manner did Buonaparte himself explain the decree in answer to the remonstrance from the merchants of Hamburgh, who stated that a great deal of the goods seized actually belonged to them, and that the measures he was pursuing were pregnant with greater ruin to himself than to his enemy? "To destroy the commerce of the vile English," said he, "in every possible way is my object. I have it in my power; and wish to ruin Hamburgh for that would promote the destruction of English commerce."

The sanctity of every neutral flag was, forsooth, to be most ceremoniously respected at sea: while every principle and every right of neutral territory was to be invaded and violated by land!

Mr. Perceval, on the contrary, maintained, that we had a complete right to retaliate on the enemy his

own

own measures; that if the enemy declared we should have no trade, we had a right to declare that he should have no trade; that if the enemy proclaimed British manufactures and colonial produce good prize, we had a right to declare French manufactures and produce good prize.

With respect to the nature of the retaliation, was it to be confined exactly to the course pursued by the enemy? If the principle of right to retaliate were admitted, it must also be admitted that we had a right to choose our mode of retaliation: otherwise, in many instances, retaliation would only enforce the destruction of the power retaliating. It was an unfounded assertion, that though we had a right to injure the enemy, we had no right to do so by means that would be prejudicial to neutral powers.

The question in the present case, was, is the injury to neutral powers only consequential on measures directed against the enemy, or was the measure originally directed against neutral powers? The conduct of the last administration, in blocking up a whole river, one side of which was occupied by neutral powers, proved that they admitted the justice of this doctrine. It had been contended that we should have waited to see the effect of the French decree on neutral powers; or whether France intended to put it in force. That the decree did not alter the practice of neutral navigation, nor affect the American convention with France, nor alter the existing mode of maritime cap

ture, had been stated by Mons. Decres as his opinion only, his unauthorized opinion, not his know. ledge. If his majesty's present ministers had violated Magna Charta, and the statutes of Edward III, they had been violated by lord Petty himself and his friends. But the fact was, that they had not been violated by either party: for they related to a state of peace, and not of war.

As to the policy of the orders in council, previously to the issuing of the orders of council, France enjoyed, by the assistance of neutrals, as great advantages of trade as we possessed with our triumphant navy. Our navy, indeed, as belligerent, was neutralized, and rendered useless, by neutral ships carrying to France all that was im portant for France to obtain. This had been the case for so long a period, that even prior to the decree of the 21st of November, it might have been matter of delicate inquiry, whether this country ought not to have resorted to the measure of 1756.* But after the decree of the 21st of November, a much stronger measure became necessary. Otherwise French property conveyed in neutral bottoms would have been safe: British property in danger. It had been declared that the French decree was a dead letter, and that it was easily evaded. He was well aware that the certificates of origin gave opportunities, by the assistance of forgery and perjury, for the introduction of our goods into the continent. Such practices, however,

were