Alexandria. This subject, however, was not brought into discussion as a party measure or a movement of either ministerial or antiministerial tactics; but by a gentleman who appears to have been unconnected with any party. Though the expedition to the Dardanelles was thought by Mr. Canning, and other speakers on his side of the house, an excellent argumentum ad hominem, and had become a kind of standing joke, neither the justice nor the policy of an attack on Copenhagen, could possibly be evinced by the injustice,impolicy, or bad management of the expedition against Constantinople. Still less disposed, it may be presumed, were the late ministers to recal that miserable attempt to the attention of the legislature and the public. Yet they were not altogether displeased that it was brought under review, because it afforded an opportunity of shewing clearly in what it differed from the attack on Copen, hagen, with which ministerialists affected to confound it, in every respect, except its want of success. In the debate of February 8th, the subject of the Baltic expedition, Mr. Whitbread expressed great satisfaction and gladness, that the business of the Dardanelles was soon to come on, when he feared a great source of Mr. Canning's drollery, always laughable, if not always very dignified, would be entirely removed. Other gentlemen expressed, on different occasions, the same sentiment.

on

House of Commons, Feb. 15.Mr. Taylor rose, pursuant to notice, to move for papers necessary to convey a proper understanding of the particulars connected with the expedition to the Dardanelles

and to Alexandria. The frequent references to these transactions in the discussions on the affair of Copenhagen, to which they had been assimilated in principle, rendered a more particular investigation of them necessary. But it was not merely to estimate the right and propriety of these attacks on neutral powers, that the papers he was about to move for ought to be before the house. By these attacks we were involved in a war with Turkey, and no communication whatever had been made to parlia ment on the subject. It was no private or party motive that had induced him to bring forward this motion. He was not connected with any party, and he had communicated with only one or two members on the subject. Having for a short time been resident in Turkey, and conversant with the manners of the people and their political attachments, his attention was naturally engaged by the dispatches of his majesty's ambassador and commanders in the Dardanelles; and with every attention that he was able to give, he could neither discover why the armament went, nor why it had come away. Whatever might be the morality, or the policy of the Copenhagen expedition, it at least afforded a conspicuous example of judicious management, and able execution. When a transaction of that kind was thought by some to call for inquiry, he could not think that a transac tion, in which the character of the navy, the favourite service of the country, was brought in question by ill success, ought to be suffered to pass without investigation. These were the motives which induced him to bring this subject before the [F 2]

house.

house. He would abstain from pronouncing any opinion till the papers, which were to guide his judgment, as well as that of the house, should be properly considered. He would, however, enumerate briefly the circumstances of the transaction. The British fleet appeared at the entrance of the Dardanelles, on the 29th of January, 1807, while the British ambassador was still at Constantinople. The British fleet attacked the castles and forced its passage, burning a Turkish frigate. The British fleet remained twelve days before Constantinople, and then came back the same way, without doing any thing further. This situation was one, in which no British officer would wish to remain, or ought to be suffered to remain, without inquiry. The papers he should move for would tend to show why the British squadron had gone to the Dardanelles, why it had come away, and what had been done there. He moved, that there be laid before the house, a copy of the treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between his majesty and the Ottoman Porte,signed at Constantinople, January 5, 1799, by his majesty's ministers, sir Sidney Smith, and Mr. Spencer Smith; also a copy of any secret article of the said treaty, regulating the passage of the Dardanelles by British ships of war; a copy of a dispatch of lord Elgin, relative to the exchange of the ratifications of the said treaty; a copy of any treaty existing between the Porte and Russia on the 19th January, 1807; copies of the letters of the secretary of state to Mr. Arbuthnot,hismajesty's ambassador at Constantinople at the time of the British squadron's proceeding to

Mr. Secretary Canning, after waiting a few moments to see if any one on the opposition benches, the side of the house most interested in the present question, would rise to deliver his sentiments, considered himself as called on, in consequence of their silence, to state what he thought necessary on the present motion. The motion, as he had observed on a former occasion, was brought forward without his concurrence or knowledge, as had also been stated that night by the honourable mover himself, with whom he had not the honour of an acquaintance. He had no means of ascertaining the nature of, the information he meant to call for, till the honourable gentleman transmitted to him that morning a list of the papers he meant to move for. Having gone over the list, and stated for the satisfaction of the honourable gentleman who had made the motion, how far it was possible and proper to comply with each of the motions, he declared that, for his own part, he saw no ground for instituting an inquiry under the present circumstances. He was not aware of any practical benefit that could arise to the coun try from the investigation proposed. But, after what had been said on

the

the other side of the house, he did not think himself at liberty to dissuade the house from entering into it. A long conversation ensued, about the necessity and propriety of an inquiry on the present subject. The interlocutors were, Mr. T. Grenville, Mr. Wellesley Pole, Mr. Johnstone, Mr. Windham, lord Castlereagh, Mr. Tierney, the chancellor of the exchequer, Mr. Croker, and Mr. Wilberforce. To the second motion, the object of which was, to produce all the papers that might serve to shew the causes that led to our present hostility with the Ottoman Porte,

Mr. Johnstone proposed an amendment, which, after a few words from Mr. Canning, was put thus and carried:

"So far as those causes are connected with the expedition to the Dardanelles."

The other motions, comprehend ing all letters from lord Elgin, Mr. Arbuthnot, sir Sidney Smith, and the admirals Collingwood, Duckworth, and Lewis, were also put and agreed to. In addition to these papers, Mr. Grenville, February 18th, moved, "That there be laid before the house, the substance or extracts of the instructions under which his majesty's minister at the Porte was acting, at any time since the commencement of the present war, with respect to the aid to be given to Russia, in any discussions that might arise between that power and the Porte; and especially so far as relates to the instructions, under which he acted, after the formation of the continental confederacy in the

year 1805."

Mr. Canning agreed with Mr. Grenville, that the production of that paper was necessary, in order

that the house might be enabled to take a clear view of the subject.— The motion was then agreed to.

House of Commons, May 20.Mr. Taylor rose, to move his promised resolutions respecting the expedition to the Dardanelles. In order to prove the injustice of that expedition, he reviewed the nature of the connection between this country and the Porte. The only ground, he maintained, that we had for interference, was, the treaties between Russia, England, and the Porte, the obligations of which treaties had become void by the peace of Amiens. The Russians had only acquired a right to pass from the Black Sea in single ships, for the purpose of throwing supplies into the Ionian republic, which right was to be at an end when that republic should be settled. And it did end when the whole fell into the power of Buonaparté. With regard to the policy of the expedition, he thought it was extremely unwise to alienate from us the minds of the Turks, who had been extremely well disposed to us; the truth of which proposition he proved by reading a variety of documents. By passing the Dardanelles, we had commenced hostilities before negotiation. The attack on the Turkish ships was an useless object; the number of ships not being equal. to the enterprize. And lord Collingwood ought to have been allowed to choose any officer he pleased for conducting the expedition.With respect to the expedition to Alexandria, he had not been able to discover its object and policy, and it had been so mismanaged as to bring disgrace on the British arms. He concluded by moving a resolution, "That his majesty's

flect

fleet under sir J. Duckworth had, on the 20th February, 1807, appeared before Constantinople, and continued there for ten days, without doing any thing. And that it was the opinion of the house, that arrangements had not been made by the then ministry, adequate to the occasion."

Mr. Grenville expressed great satisfaction that the accusations against the late ministers, had at length been made in a manner that rendered them tangible. It was impossible, he said, for any one to read the papers on the table, and to say that either the justice or the policy of interfering in the dispute between Russia and the Porte, was questionable. This right of interference was not founded on the triple alliance of the 5th January only. This treaty respected a long course of negotiation for peace and alliance between Great Britain, the Porte, and Russia. With this object in view, the peace of Jassy had been concluded between Russia and the Porte, under the influ ence of Great Britain. We had, therefore, a right to support Russia, and the late ministry had exercised it in pursuance of that wise policy that had been adopted both by their predecessors and successors, viz. the maintenance of a connection between Russia, the Porte, and this country. They saw the grow ing influence of France, and the decreased influence of this country and Russia with the Porte, and wished to give a check to so unfortunate a change of sentiment. As to the quantum of force sent to the Dardanelles, it was suggested by lord Collingwood. The late ministers took the opinion of some of the first naval characters on the

subject, and all of them agreed that a considerably smaller force than what was dispatched, was considerably more than adequate to the undertaking. They were fully justified, too, in expecting co-operation and assistance from the Russians, by whose fleet our squadron was joined four days afterwards. The situation, however, was such, and so capable of defence, that instead of three sail of the line, which admiral Lewis had at first declared to be sufficient, the same gallant admiral had estimated the force necessary to succeed, at ten sail of the line. Troops were also talked of as being necessary to the success of such an expedition. But he asked the house if it was at all likely that such a body of troops could have been sent as would have been equal to encounter 200,000 men, who had appeared in arms along the coast previously to our ships leaving the Dardanelles? With regard to the expedition and occupation of Alexandria, this was a post of the utmost importance: for though not intended to be used as the first step towards the conquest of Egypt, the capture of it was, in this point of view, an object of the highest importance. Let it not be forgotten, of what moment it was regarded by Buonaparté, no bad judge in those matters. While matters were growing daily and hourly worse and worse at Constantinople, nothing seemed more to be dreaded, than that Alexandria, and probably, in consequence, Egypt, should fall into the hands of the French. The sole object of the expedition was Alexandria, and this was accomplished in a creditable, not a disgraceful manner. If attempts were made to carry the conquest farther,

that

that was done without any instructions from government. There was no scarcity of provisions in Alexandria. One thing only seemed disastrous and unaccountable, namely, the gratuitous abandonment of the place by the present government. They found it taken, and why did they give it up? While the whole military force of the enemy did not exceed 6,000, and the garrison of Alexandria was fully equal to that number, there could be nothing that could render that step a measure of imperious necessity, unless, indeed, it could be said that this was a great waste of the public force, and that it was proper that part of it should be let loose. At the very time when government was treating with the Porte for a state of neutrality, to lay the possession of so important a place at the feet of their opponent, seemed to be an unaccountable mode of proceeding. But what had become of the troops so set at liberty? He believed that, from that moment to the present, they had not been engaged in any enterprise of advantage to the country, and that they had scarcely been heard of.

Mr. Secretary Canning, in reply to Mr. Grenville, said, if any gentleman would but look into the treaty of triple alliance in 1798, he would perceive that the argument of the right honourable gentleman could not be sustained. It referred to the situation and existing circumstances of the contracting parties, all equally at that period at war with France. The treaty contained a stipulation, limiting its operation to eight years; after which it was to undergo a revision, and such alteration as the respective situations of the different countries

might then render necessary. It was so understood in this country ; and the circumstances to which it was applied, were mentioned in the preamble. Could it be asserted, that a treaty negotiated with a view to existing hostilities, in which all the parties were engaged, and followed, not by a joint peace, but by separate pacifications, must necessarily survive? Or that, if it did not, it was necessary to be viewed on the renewal of another war, into which any of the parties might af terwards enter? But this had never been the understanding of any of the parties, nor had the treaty been so acted upon. It had been asserted, that the refusal of the passage of the Dardanelles to the Russians, had given us a right to assume an armed mediation. But as the passage was granted by a subsequent convention, to which this country was not a party, we had no right, in virtue of an anterior treaty, to insist on the fulfilment of that convention, to which we were not a party. The interference at Copenhagen was not more decisive in principle than the forcing the passage of the Dardanelles, and appearing, in a hostile attitude, before Constantinople. Here a force was sent to bombard the capital, not of a neutral, but of a triple ally. If the late ministers could lay upon the table a copy of a treaty of defensive alliance with Denmark, the cases would be parallel, except that the Danish expedition was crowned with success, while the other was attended with defeat and disgrace. It was impossible that the Turkish fleet, passing the Dardanelles, and the Streights of Gib raltar, should attack any of the

British