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usual, re-echoed the sentiments of the speech. This motion was seconded by lord Kenyon, who dwelt chiefly on the passage in the speech which related to the emigration of the court of Portugal to the Brazils, and the spirit with which ministers conducted themselves in not surrendering the naval rights of this country to the Americans. The duke of Norfolk was sorry that it would be impossible for him to give his unqualified assent to the address as it stood. The speech from the throne declared, that it was with the deepest reluctance his majesty had found himself compelled to resort to the extremity of force against Denmark. Now the duke, looking in the most careful manner to the speech, did not perceive that it was in the contemplation of his majesty's servants to afford to the house any such information on the subject as should enable them to say that they saw reason for concurring in a declaration that there was a necessity for the measure. He was aware it would be said that every species of discretion should be observed in exposing matters of such delicacy. This principle, and the propriety of acting upon it, in most cases, he was far from disputing; but he thought it was carrying the doctrine too far to desire of that House to express their opinionof the necessity of a measure of so extreme a nature, without the most distant tittle of evidence to justify it. His grace therefore moved, that the clause respecting the expedition to the Baltic, in the address,should be omitted.

The amendment proposed was seconded by lord viscount Sidmouth. The speech referred to the fact of his majesty having

been apprized of the intention of the enemy to combine the powers of the continent in one general confederacy, to be directed either to the entire subjugation of this kingdom, or to the imposing upon his majesty an insecure and inglorious peace; that for this purpose, states, formerly neutral, were to be forced into hostility, and compelled to bring to bear against the different parts of his majesty's dominions, the whole of the naval force of Europe, and specifically the fleets of Portugal and Denmark. If this were really the case, it would be a complete justification of the conduct of this country, not only in our own eyes, but those of the whole world. For the moment a nation meditates hostility against you, that is to be regarded as a declaration of war. But then, to give effect to this justification, some proof of its existence must be adduced. "A hostile disposition," it had been said, on the part of the Danish government towards this country, had manifested itself for the last seven years; and the fact of their having acceded to the views of France, was evident from the immense quantity of stores and ammunition found in their arsenals. Lord S. asked if it was consistent with human reason, or even with the words of the speech itself, in another paragraph, that the court of Denmark should be in amity with France at a time when France was carryingonhostilitiesagainst Russia? or if it could be supposed, that between the period of the battle which preceded the peace of Tilsit, and our attack on Copenhagen, these stores had been collected? Where then were the demonstrations of hostility manifested on the part of Denmark

Denmark against this country? Where were her armies? In Holstein. Where was her fleet? Lying in ordinary. Her armies, so far from being in hostile movement against us, were, to the number of 20,000 men, encamped in Holstein, guarding against the hostile movements of the French. Had they been in Zealand, we might not so easily have been able to congratulate ourselves on the victory we obtained. Her navy, so far from meditating hostilities against us, was surprised, the greater part of it, in a state of complete disrepair. It was said that the French would have seized on Holstein, and from thence might have easily passed over into Zealand. This, his lordship understood, was by no means so easy as was imagined: such a frost seldom occurred as to afford a comfortable passage from the one place to the other: and even when it did so happen, the people of Zealand might break the ice nearest to their own side. And, supposing that the French might thus have got possession of the Danish navy, what use could they have made of it? What had we to dread from the addition of sixteen sail of the line, of such ships as those of Denmark? Even before the battle of Trafalgar we could have had nothing to dread from such an accession of strength to our enemy, far less now. We were told that hostile dispositions, on the part of the northern powers, had begun to show themselves ever since the peace of Tilsit. Why then had we allowed a Russian fleet since that time to pass through the Mediterranean,and three sail of the line belonging to Russia to go unmolested, at the very same time the Danish fleet was seized on? Would it not have

been more magnanimous to have attacked the powerful than the weak? It was known thatthe minds of the inhabitants of Petersburgh were favourable to this country. Our fleet, by presenting itself at a proper time before that capital, might have gained possession of it, and thus, Sweden would have been saved: and Denmark, who was as much, our friend as Russia was our ally, would have been spared. This mode of warfare his lordship objected to, particularly as tending to overturn the lawofnations. It would have been more becoming in Great Britain to oppose our honour and good faith to our enemy's mode of warfare.

The earl of Aberdeen defended the expedition to Copenhagen. Of the law of nations, self-protection. was a principle. Much had been said of the extraordinary and unprecedented nature of this expedition; but there was a precedent for it in the conduct of the late administration towards Turkey. And he did not conceive it to be more probable, that the Turkish fleet should sail into the English channel than the Danish.

Lord Grenville said, that from the commencement of the war in 1793, down to the termination of the illustrious administration of the illustrious Mr. Pitt, in no speech from the throne, at the commencement of a session, were parliament called upon to pledge themselves in support of measures without evidence before them of their necessity,, propriety, or utility. In no case were they called upon to approve of measures before the papers relating to them were produced, whereon a judgment might be formed according to the evidence of the case; yet, in the present instance,

ministers

ministers departing from so salutary a rule, not only called upon parliament to approve of measures which nothing but absolute necessity could justify, and respecting the necessity of which not a tittle of evidence had been produced, but had even called upon them to applaud other mea sures now, respecting which papers were to be produced hereafter. There was on the continent of Europea great reliance on the integrity and justice of the British parlia ment; and it looked with anxiety for the decision of this council on the motives and policy of the expedition to Copenhagen. This had alreadymade animpression throughout the continent unfavourable to this country. How much greater would that impression be, if parliament should give its decision approving of that expedition? And still more if it should do so, without any evidence or information on the subject. Ministers had asserted, that there were secret articles in the treaty of Tilsit affecting the interests of this country, and the French government asserted there were none. Here then was a challenge: and it was incumbent on ministers to prove that there were such arti cles, but this they had not attempted to do; and in the speech from the throne had given up the assertion they had formerly made, of the existence of those secret articles, in his majesty's declaration respecting Russia. That circumstances might exist which would imperatively jus. tify such an expedition as that to Copenhagen, was admitted by the most approved writers on the law of nations. The same writers, how ever, stated the dreadful consequences that would result from the

application of such a doctrine, unless the imperative circumstances were clearly proved and accurately defined. The danger ought to be clearly established, and the inability of the neutral state to defend itself. With respect to the Danish fleet, which it had been said was in a state of preparation, was it not natural when all the powers around her were at war, that she should be in a state of preparation? But if he had not been grossly misinformed, so far from this being the case, the greater part of the Danish ships were laid up in ordinary. It was contended, that because French troops occupied Holstein, Zealand must fall of course, but this was not at all proved: on the contrary, there were between Holstein and Zealand two passages of the sea; the one six, and the other sixteen miles wide, which a French army must cross to invade Zealand, and where they might be met with effect by British or Danish ships. It might as well be said, that England must be conquered by the French because they occupy the continent of France, there being only a channeltwenty-one miles broad between Calais and Dover, as that Zealand must fall if Holstein were occupied by French troops. It had been argued by the noble lord who spoke last, that the expedition to Copenhagen had a precedent in that to Constantinople. Supposing the expedition to Constantinople to have been an instance of bad faith, how is that to justify another instance of bad faith? The fact however was, that the expedition to Turkey was chiefly in conformity with the treaty with Russia, and that its object was not to seize the Turkish fleet,

but

but to enforce the execution of treaties.

With regard to the two propositions maintained by ministers, first, that we should not enter into a negotiation unless the basis thereof should be previously stated; and, secondly, that we should not avail ourselves of the mediation of any power not perfectly impartial, or suspected of partiality to the enemy. Lord G. could not conceive any thing more preposterous. The second proposition was peculiarly untenable, because we do not accept a mediator as an umpire, but merely as a medium of facilitating our communication with the enemy. If the mediator be partial to the enemy, what injury can result to us? We are not bound by his sentiments, and we may avail ourselves of his interposition, by rejecting which we may provoke him to declare against us. Such precisely had been the case with respect to Russia. As to the first proposition there were not in the whole history of this, or any other civilized country, any precedents to be found for sustaining it. With respect to that topic of the speech which related to Portugal, the simple questions were, what we had lost, and what we had gained by the emigration to Portugal? We had lost, as a publication of the enemy had lately stated, two of the most important ports for us on the whole coast of the continent of Europe, Lisbon and Oporto. And with regard to the transmarine possessions of Portugal, he asked what we had obtained, more than what we possessed before, by the presence of the Prince of Brazil in that settlement? How would the Brazils be made more productive for this country, by any other means

than those which would tend to the consummate ruin of our own colonies? In so far as the emigration in question manifested any friendship for us, or as it presented a contrast to the conduct of other princes, it certainly formed a grateful subject for the contemplation of mankind, and of congratulation to that house. But as to the commercial or political advantages to be derived from it to this country, he could not consent to delude his countrymen by holding out such ideas.

In reviewing the dreadful catalogue of evils which surrounded or menaced this country, he believed that the greatest additional calamity for us, and the greatest advantage for France that could be well imagined, would be a war with America. Such, indeed, was the language of ministers themselves. And yet what had been their conduct? Why, at the very time it was most material to avoid such a war, they absolutely altered the law of the land to promote it. Ministers stated, and in that Lord G. agreed with them, that no difficulty or danger could befal the country equal to that of acquiescing in the surrender of our maritime rights. If America put forth such a claim, then a call upon parliament and the country to resist it would be unanimously answered in the affirmative. But America had not asserted any such claim. -The speech, Lord G. observed, studiously separated the two questions involved in our controversy with America, namely, that of the Chesapeak, and that relating to our orders of council. But those questions would not be separated in America, nor yet in discussion here. In examining the orders of council, they were to be considered in three

points of view; first, as affecting our commerce; secondly, the constitution; and lastly, our negotiation with America. When all the papers relative to this important question should be laid before the house, it would be the duty of the house particularly to enquire, whether his majesty's government could constitutionally enact such prohibitions as these orders of council contain; next, whether the time chosen for issuing these orders was not peculiarly exceptionable, as tending so much to inflame the minds of the Americans, already so strongly excited against us: and also, whether we had any right thus to annihilate the whole trade of America: thus to say to that power, as our orders distinctly expressed, "Not a ship of yours shall sail which shall not be subject to confiscation by us, or to conditions which shall subject it to confiscation by the enemy." Lord G. asked, whether such language was reconcileable with any law or usage, or principle of equity? On what grounds could the paragraph in the speech relate to the necessity of the orders in council? The plain interpretation of this paragraph was, "that we had been too long carrying on a most unequal contest of justice against injustice." Could that great man, Mr. Pitt, look down from heaven upon this declaration, how much would he deprecate the sentiment, "that we ought to terminate the unequal contest of justice against injustice?" It was to the principle which sus. tained justice against injustice that we owed our consequence, character, and safety. It was this principle that animated our army and navy, which upheld the spirit of the people, and which, if we should

abandon, we would sink into shame and degradation.

Lord Grenville concluded a long speech, of which we have only given briefly the substance, as all the topics he handled afterwards became subjects of separate discussion, with an earnest representation of the importance and necessity of an inquiry into the state of Ireland, with a view to the adoption of measures calculated to conciliate the popula tion of that country.

Lord Hawkesburyhavingobserved, that ministers could not be expected to point out the precise quarter and channel from which they had received their information respecting the arrangements at Tilsit, said, that even if ministers entertained any doubt of their information respecting what passed at Tilsit, it must long since have vanished. The informationreceived throughthechannel alluded to was corroborated bya variety of other channels wholly unconnected with each other. It was corroborated by the testimony of the government of Portugal, to whom it was proposed to make common cause with the continent against England, and to unite their fleet with that of Spain, of France, and of Denmark, to enable the confederacy to make a general attack on these islands. It was corroborated by the testimony of different persons in Ireland, where all the designs and projects of the enemy were most speedily known, and where it was promised, that the combined fleets of Spain, Portugal, and Denmark, should make a descent on both Ireland and Britain, but the principal one on Ireland.— A wish had been expressed that we had proceeded to Cronstadt, and seized the Russian fleet, leaving the

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