their lordships, to come to a resolution stating the importance of preserving the Danish fleet in such a state that it might be eventually restored to Denmark, on the restoration of peace, or sooner, if possible. He said 'eventually,' as it was possible that such a situation of affairs might exist, that to restore the Danish fleet might be giving it to France, and also because he did not wish to bring for ward any motion that might interfere with the prerogative of the crown. He had also used the terms the restoration of peace, or sooner', because circumstances might occur, notwithstanding the continuance of the war, in which the restoration of the fleet might be proper. He should not have brought forward the motion if he had not seen by the votes of the house of commons that the Danish ships had been surveyed, for the purpose of being taken into the British service. To adopt a resolution of the nature proposed, would set us right in the eyes of Europe, and evince our desire to be just. We should have at some period either to restore the fleet or to make compensation for it; and it was better to come at once to a resolution, declaring a decided opinion on the subject. Not all the victories of the ruler of France, nor all his conquests, could give him so much pleasure as to obtain a victory over the honour and integrity of this country. He had, upon consideration, thought it better to propose a resolution of the house, than an address to the throne. His lordship concluded, by moving, "that it was highly important to the honour of this country, that under present circumstances, no measures should

be taken with respect to the ships of war now in the possession of his majesty, in consequence of the capitulation of Copenhagen, that might preclude the eventual restitution of them to the government of Denmark, agreeably to the spirit of the requisition referred to in the proclamation issued on the 16th of August, by the commanders in chief of his majesty's sea and land forces, employed on that occasion; and renewed in their letter of the first of September, to the commander in chief of the forces of his Danish majesty."

Lord Boringdon thought the proposition of the noble viscount of a novel and extraordinary nature, and such as, if adopted, must lead to the most prejudicial consequences. Had such a proposition as this been adopted with respect to the Spanish frigates, would it not have greatly embarrassed the earl of Lauderdale in his negotiations at Paris? Such a proposition could be adopted only on the ground, that the Spanish expedition was wholly unjustifiable, and the house had already decided on both its justice and necessity.

Lord Ellenborough thought, that every consideration of justice and regard for the interests and welfare of the country were in support of the motion of his noble friend.

The lord Chancellor contended, that both by the law of precedent, and by that of the constitution, the present motion must be resisted. The ships we had taken from Holland had not been restored, nor those from Spain, nor those taken at Toulon. But the constitution of the country was decisive upon this point. Captured ships became the property of the crown, and the

present

present motion tended to tie up the hand of the prerogative.

It

Lord Holland contended, that the question did not at all affect the prerogative of the crown. was only, whether that house would resolve, that it was expedient that the government should reserve to itself the power of restoring, even tually, the ships seized by us at Copenhagen to the Danes. He was not inclined at present to enter into any exposition of the shifting, prevaricating testimony that had been resorted to, in vindication of the Baltic expedition. One time Denmark was represented as sincere in her professions of neutrality, but too weak to act up to her intentions. At another, they were told, that as her sincerity was questionable, her means of annoyance were to be feared and provided against. Again, it was pretended, that the sole grounds of the expedition were the secret arrangement of the treaty of Tilsit; and when it was attempted to trace the alleged information to any authentic source, Portugal was at one period brought forward as the informer; and at another, the disaffected Irish. This sort of shifting naturally created suspicion in the mind of every impartial man. Considering the present motion, with a reference to the question of peace, he appealed to the feelings of the noble lords, whether it would not be more for the honour of the country, if they could commence a negotiation, after a voluntary cession on their parts, rather than the subsequent degradation of a forced surrender, exacted by the stipulations of a treaty?

Lord Harrowby opposed the motion of the noble viscount, be

cause, instead of giving them facilities in a negotiation for peace, it would fetter our government, and prevent them from obtaining the terms which they might otherwise secure. The arguments of the noble lords opposite went too far for their purpose; for, if they proved any thing, they proved, not that the Danish fleet should be kept in order, that it might be restored at some subsequent period, but instantly and without delay.

Lord Erskine observed, that we had gone to the Danish shores in an amicable character, and treated with the Danes on an amicable footing. We took them by surprise, when they were lulled into security, and then proposed that they should purchase the temporary protection of a foreign power, by the surrender of their independence as a nation for ever. With respect to the law of precedent, he dissented from his noble and learned friend on the sack. The cases cited by his noble friend, were not, in his opinion, applicable to that before their lordships. There was no obligation whatever, on the part of this country, to restore to revolutionized Holland the ships taken from the stadtholder. With respect to the precedent of Toulon, the Toulon fleet was deposited in our hands on the express condition of its being restored on the restoration of monarchy. And in the treaty of Amiens, there was not one syllable said by France, indicative of any claim to that fleet. But there was nothing for which lord Erskine was more anxious than to show to the world, that what we did was indeed the work of mere necessity; and that this necessity being once at an end, we scorned to enter into any pitiful calculation

of

of turning it to our own advantage.

The earl of Selkirk, though he was a friend to the principle of the Danish expedition, thought it his duty to support the motion before the House.

Lord Redesdale thought, that the original proposition of our commanders to restore the Danish fleet, was completely done away by the subsequent conduct of the Danish government, in rejecting the terms of that proposition, and entering into hostilities with this country. There was no nation in Europe to which Denmark had been so ad verse, for several years back, as to this country. She would have acted hostilely towards us if she could; and our government acted wisely in depriving her of her means. Such a pledge as that for the restoration of those means would, instead of tending to conciliate, serve to produce an opposite effect, as it proposed to concede that before hand, which ought to be left for matter of treaty.

The earl of Darnley conceived it to be peculiarly becoming that house to stand forward, for the purpose of rescuing the national character from the imputation naturally to be affixed upon it, by the Danish expedition.

Lord Mulgrave, to the assertion, that we did not want ships but men, replied by alleging, that we could have men enough at any time, but that we might stand in need of shipping.

Lord Grenville denied, that the house had yet come to any decision on the merits of the Danish expedition; the evidence relative to which had not yet been laid before it. He explained the object of the

motion; it was by no means pro. posed, that the Danish fleet should be restored under any particular circumstances; but merely that, in order to facilitate a reconciliation, and with a view to economy also, it should be kept in such a state as to prevent any obstructions to peace with Denmark, by enabling us to restore it with the least possible expense and difficulty. After deprecating the principle, that a state of war should cancel moral obligations, or that we should shrink from doing justice lest it should lead to loss, he proceeded to comment on the consequences likely to result from the nature of our attack on Copenhagen. So far from destroying, by that attack, the naval resources of Denmark, we had, particularly by the spirit we produced, contributed to promote and extend them. Her ports and arsenals were still remaining, with a vast quantity of naval materials; and any supply she wanted, she could without difficulty obtain. The profit to be derived from our iniquity was, in fact, immaterial, while we had created a spirit, valour, and animosity to fight against us, which must furnish powerful aid to the

ought to be restored to Denmark. The house divided. For lord Sidmouth's motion, 51; against it, 105.

House of Commons, Feb. 25.Mr. Sheridan submitted to the house a proposition, which appeared to him of the first importance. He had hoped, that strong information would have proved the attack on Copenhagen to have been an act of necessity; or that some unequivocal instance of the hostility of Denmark would have been shewn; or lastly, that some argument would have offered some tolerable pretext for their conduct But when he found, that instead of this, they only made an awkward attempt to form something out of all the three; that they first pretended a strong necessity; that on being driven from this ground, they tried to point out a variety of provocations on the part of Denmark; that they then said, it was necessary to do some stout act, which might prove to the world that they could imitate Buonaparté; and that the result of the whole was a total denial of all actual information whatever, he could not disguise the unfavourable impression which had been made upon his mind. The allegation, that granting information was dangerous, was ever on the lips of those whose purposes required conceal ment. Admitting, however, that the granting of information might be sometimes inconvenient, perhaps even dangerous, publicity was the vital principle of our political constitution. Despotic governments had some advantages from that secret lurking manner in which busi ness might be there transacted. The peculiar conveniences enjoyed

by a despotic government were balanced by advantages on the side of freedom ten thousand times greater. This proposition Mr. Sheridan illustrated in a very happy manner. Supposing that a case could be made out against Denmark, the house was without information respecting the real cause of the war with Russia. He took it for granted, that it was not simply the attack upon Copenhagen which had alienated the emperor of Russia from this country. It was owing to something that had occurred posterior to that attack, that he had arranged himself in the list of our enemies; the communication imparted to the court of Petersburgh, of the foul, treacherous, and base proposals that were made after the capitulation of Copenhagen, by ministers to Mr. Rist, the Danish agent in this country, desiring Denmark to submit to any terms they might think proper to dictate, on the pain of having Norway wrested from that kingdom and given to Sweden. If he could trust to the papers, which he held in his hand, purporting to be the substance of a conversation which passed between Mr. Secretary Canning and Mr. Rist, and copies of a correspondence which passed between the courts of Copenhagen and Stockholm, it appeared that, at the very time when ministers were soliciting the mediation of the emperor of Russia between Great Britain and Denmark, they were threatening to despoil Denmark of a part of her territories, and, after having evacuated Zealand, according to the capitulation, to co-operate with a Swedish garrison in again taking possession of it. Flagrant and wicked, as he conceived the first

attack

attack on Copenhagen to have been, to have violated the capitulation would have been still more base and criminal. Mr. Sheridan read the several papers to which he alluded; beginning with Mr. Rist's note to count Bernstorff, containing a communication of five different menaces, if the court of Denmark did not agree to subscribe to certain terms; and ending with a note addressed by baron Fawbe, the Swedish charge d'affaires at the court of Kiel, to count Bernstorff, the Danish minister, declaring, that "Had his Swedish majesty judged it necessary to occupy Zealand with his troops jointly with those of his allies, he should have done it; and the king wishes, that he may never find himself in the case to regret that he had acted other wise."

Mr. Sheridan put the question to the house, whether it would sanction the new system of withholding all information relative to the measures of ministers? If it did, it would be better to decide at once, that the interference of that house was at all times an impediment to the operations of government; that parliament in difficult times was a nuisance; that it was better for the king to prorogue it during pleasure, raise money as he pleases, and make war or peace, when, how, or on what terms he may think proper. He implored ministers to desist from the system of fighting Buonaparté with his own weapons. Let them oppose lenity and moderation to his cruelty and oppression; good faith to his treachery; to his violence and despotism the mildness of the British constitution; and, above all, to his mystery let them oppose publicity. He con

cluded with moving, "That there be laid before the house, as far as the same could be done, without detriment to the public service, copies or extracts of the correspondence which passed after the capitulation of Copenhagen, between his majesty's ministers and the court of Stockholm, relative to the retaining possession of Zealand by a Swedish army, or in concert with his majesty's forces; also for copies or extracts of the correspondence which passed between his majesty's ministers and the Danish charge d'affaires, or his secretary residentiary at the court of London."

Mr. Secretary Canning replied, at great length, to Mr. Sheridan to the most important points in whose speech he answered, that the doctrine of opposing publicity to the secresy with which the enemy conducted his affairs, would be very proper if we were prepared to become the subjects of that enemy; and that no such offer had been made of Norway to Sweden, as had just been alleged. It was true that what had passed between himself and the Danish charge d'affaires, had been reduced to a minute, in the shape of a protocol of a conference; but there was not in it a single word of what the right honourable gentleman had read from the Moniteur. The proposition that had been made to the Danish charge d'affaires, was, either that he should procure full powers to treat, or induce his government to appoint some person with such powers, to treat with a minister to be sent from this country to Copenhagen. This was the whole of the official communication. It would not be contended, that in any conversations he might have had with that gentleman,