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Lord Castlereagh, among a great variety of particulars touched on in a long speech, in vindication of the expedition to Copenhagen, gave an account of the various endea vours used by his majesty's government to bring the court of Denmark to an explanation of its views, without effect; and concluded, that the crown prince, in the whole of his conduct, had secretly favoured the views of France. He denied, that Denmark was competent to defend itself against the power of France. As to the assertion, that we ought to have remained in Copenhagen, government had given that question every discussion; and the naval and military officers being consulted on the occasion, were of opinion, that it would require a larger force to keep possession of Zealand than this country could spare; and much greater than was then in Zealand. The question, also, had been put to the first naval authorities, whether the island could be surrounded by our vessels, so as to prevent an invasion on the part of the French. The report of Admiral Keith was, that on the Jutland side there were seven or eight forts, in which might be collected to the amount of sixty thousand men; that, if the ninety pendants which were then flying round Zealand were to occupy the Belt, they must be five miles distant from each other; and that, as some of these might be driven from their stations the French could on that occasion send over their forces in the small craft, of which there was a sufficient number along the shores of Jutland.

Mr. Lushington defended the expedition on the usual grounds. On the topic of the law of nations,

he said, the sentimental system of gentlemen on the other side of the house, embraced all nations but their own. Their disquisitions might be well enough calculated for the amusement of schools; but they were not fitted for the events of real life, or a state of ferocious war.-On a division of the house, there appeared for Mr. Ponsonby's motion 108. Against it 253.

House of Lords, Feb. 8.-The duke of Norfolk called the attention of their lordships to the important subject, on which he had moved them to be summoned. The expedition to Copenhagen was a measure which deeply affected the character of the country; and, in order that they might come to a true judgment of it, it was material that they should be furnished with all that body of information, to which ministers had, on a former night, alluded, but which was not regularly on their table. Violence of an extraordinary kind had been used, and great scandal had been incurred both to the government and the nation, from which nothing but clear evidence of an imperious necessity could acquit them: an evidence not to be afforded but by the examination of papers. He would so word his motion, as to steer clear of all difficulty and danger of disclosure; and he should even have no objection to alter the words, if it should be thought any inconveniency could arise from it as it now stood to any of the agents of ministers, or to the state. The duke moved for," the substance of all the communications that had been made to ministers in the course of the last year with respect to the state of the Danish navy, of any apparent increase thereof, or of any

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steps taken to prepare the same for sea; the proclamation and correspondence of our commanders at Copenhagen; and the substance of all the secret communications respecting the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit."

A long and animated debate ensued, in which the arguments on both sides of the question, which have already been laid before our readers, were urged, with additional circumstances, and placed in a great variety of points of view.

The duke of Norfolk's motion was supported by lord Hutchinson, lord Erskine, lord Buckinghamshire, the earl of Moira, the earl of Jersey, the earl of St. Vincent, earl Grey, lord Darnley, and lord Sidmouth. It was opposed by the marquis Wellesley, lord Boring. don, lord Harrowby, lord Limerick, lord Hawkesbury, and lord Mulgrave.

The marquis of Wellesley, who immediately rose up when the duke of Norfolk sat down, took a survey of all the objections that had been urged against the expedition. He maintained, that the facts and circumstances already before the house, were abundantly sufficient to enable the house to form a judg. ment on the justice and policy of the measure; that it was the design of Buonaparté to employ the resources of Denmark among the other naval means which he meditated to wield against the maritime superiority of Great Britain. As it was the interest, so it was in the power of Buonaparté to accomplish this design, either by fraud and intrigue, or by open force and violence. In proof of this assertion, he entered into a minute detail of the navigation of the Belt. The

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possibility of crossing the Belt in the ordinary season of the year, in spite of the utmost vigilance of our cruizers, was confirmed by the fact, that several bodies of the enemy's troops actually got over into Zea. land, during the operations exerted to prevent it. And, as to the design of Buonaparté, who could doubt it? Had he hesitated, in his usual abrupt tone and manner, to inquire of the ministers of Portugal and Denmark, whether they had transmitted to their respective courts, his instructions, that their fleets should be equipped, and ready to unite with him in crushing the maritime despotism of England, and with that view to declare war, in concert with him, against England by the 1st of September? But it was said Denmark could defend herself. Could Denmark defend Zealand after she was deprived of Holstein, from whence she drew provisions for the support of her insular dominions?-Nor was it the policy only of Denmark, that inclined her to lean towards France. Her commercial interests gave her the same bias, for they were founded on the principles of the armed neutrality. It might also be said, that the accession of the Danish fleet to the naval means of France, could not have created any serious danger to the safety of this country.

But there was a wide difference between the present state of affairs, and that previous to the glorious battle of Trafalgar. Then almost all the great powers of the continent were in arms against France. But when the expedition was sent against Copenhagen, the whole of the continent was subdued, and subdued not merely for the purpose of conquest, but the [D] subjugation

subjugation of England, through the downfal of her naval supremacy. The necessity of the measure, he considered as clear. It only remained to inquire, whether the principles on which it was undertaken and executed, were contrary to the law of nations, as laid down and acted on in old times, before the bond by which it had united all civilized nations was burst by the French revolution. The first right that grew out of that law, as well as of the law of nature, was the right of security: a right which could not be limited by any of the rights of neutrality; but, it seemed, on account of the expedition to Copenhagen, a general cry was raised against England. The voice of Europe was said to condemn us. Was the voice of Europe now free? Or did any power or individual on the continent venture to breathe a sentiment hostile to the views of Buonaparté? He implored their lordships not, in the bosom of present security, to look back on past dangers, with a view to censure those by whose services they had been avoided, lest future ministers, in cases of similar urgency and danger, should be deterred from emulating the present glorious example, under the apprehension of being stigmatized as the violators of neutral rights, and the imitators of the injustice of the enemy.

Lord Hutchinson was of opinion that even supposing the French to have been in possession of Holstein and Jutland, still Zealand might have been defended with effect against the French arms. Hav. ing been employed on a very important mission, which gave him an opportunity of having some conversations with the emperor of Rus

sia; from these conversations, of which he gave a circumstantial account to the house, he was convinced, that the emperor was sincere in his desire to mediate, if possible, a peace between this country and France: but at all events, lord Hutchinson believed that the relations of peace and amity might then have been preserved between Great Britain and Russia. He had never said, nor did he now mean to say, that if the attack on Copenhagen had never been made, there would have been no war with Russia; but he would say, that the result of that expedition did materially change the relations between Great Britain and Russia, and give rise to sentiments of a very hostile nature, at the court of Petersburgh. the last interview he had with the emperor, which was on the 4th of September, his imperial majesty closed the conversation, by repeating with much emphasis, that he would have satisfaction for Denmark. Lord W. had treated lightly the opinion expressed in Europe respecting the expedition to Copenhagen; but that opinion was highly unfavourable to this country: nor had that expedition, as he conceived, been justified by the arguments used by the noble lord.

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Lord Erskine expressed his satisfaction, that lord W. had endeavoured to rest his arguments on the law of nations, and not on the monstrous doctrine, that the law of nations was at an end, and that we were justified in resorting to any measure that might suit our convenience. This was copying that conduct of revolutionary France, which was the origin of the war with that country. He had rather that France had taken the fleet, and that we

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had met it boldly on the ocean. If ministers said, they had information to prove the necessity of the expedition in question, he, as a member of that house in the exercise of his parliamentary duty, had a right to say, that no such information existed. He was perfectly aware, that in public law, provision was made for a case of necessity, but then the necessity must be made clearly manifest.

Lord Borringdon did not see on what ground the noble lords on the other side of the house, could condemn the expedition to Copenhagen, without also condemning the expedition to Constantinople, and the instructions alleged to have been issued in 1806, to a squadron sent to the Tagus.

The earl of Buckinghamshire, shewed by dates, that the expedition against Copenhagen had actually sailed before there was a possibility of any account, even of the existence of the treaty of Tilsit, being received in this country. Even if the constant practice of parliament did not warrant the expectation of official documents being laid upon the table, the attack of a power in perfect amity with us, against whom no act of hostility had been alleged, was in itself so questionable a proceeding, that it called for every explanation that could be possibly prodced in its justification. Under circumstances somewhat similar, what was the conduct of the great king of Prussia? During the seven years war he had suddenly marched an army into Saxony, and taken possession of Dresden, the capital of the elector. But he had not felt, that he had done enough to satisfy the world, by declaring, that he had

procured copies of the treaty entered into by the elector of Saxony, then king of Poland, for the partition of his dominions; for, having afterwards obtained possession of the original treaty, he published it at every court in Europe, in order to render his justification complete. In opposition to what had fallen from his noble friend, the marquis of Wellesley, respecting the practicability of an army equal to the capture of such a place as Copenhagen, passing the Belt from Holstein to Zealand, he opposed the opinion of the highest naval authority (lord St. Vincent) in this or any other country. And upon that authority he would venture to assert, that so far from cruizers not being able to keep their station in the Belt in ordinary seasons, the anchorage was perfectly good; and that by placing gun-boats upon the coast, ready to put off, any armament, unsupported by a superior force, might be effectually resisted. He was aware, that during the late attack on the isle of Zealand, some few vessels had got over, notwithstanding the vigilance of our cruizers; but the number was so small as to furnish an argument in favour of his statement rather than against it. His noble friend had stated, that Buonaparté had declared at his levee, that the fleets of both Portugal and Denmark should be united against this country. But had he succeeded in the case of Portugal? And he was persuaded, that he would have equally failed in that of Denmark, though the custody of their own ships had been left to the Danes themselves. The idea of a northern confederacy combining all the naval force of the Baltic, had indeed been held out

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to the country, to magnify the danger which the measure adopted was intended to avert; whilst the real fact was, that of this supposed combination of naval force, Sweden was with us, the Baltic fleet of Russia completely in our power, and therefore the Danish fleet, even if at the disposal of France, which was at least questionable, the only danger against which we had to provide. But this was thought so great and imminent as to justify measures, which, but for the French revolution, would be without precedent. Why, his lordship asked, under the circumstances of danger under which alone our conduct towards Denmark was defended, were the Russian ships of war that passed through our fleet in the Baltic and the Russian squadron in the Mediterranean, suffered to escape? By taking possession of the latter, we should have facilitated the negotiation then depending with the Turks; and with such an instrument in our hand, we might have trusted to the mediation of the court of Petersburgh, whilst at the same time, by a strong naval force in the Baltic, we should have protected, and enabled Denmark to maintain her neutrality, kept open the Sound, and thus effectually have disappointed the expectations Buonaparté had formed, from the influence he had gained over the emperor of Russia. But above all, we should have avoided the abandonment of those sacred principles of justice and honour, by which the conduct of our government had been so advantageously contrasted with that of France.

Lord Harrowby contended, that if we had not seized the Danish

fleet, the Danes would have taken the first opportunity of entering into the maritime confederacy against this country, as in the former instance, which led to one of the greatest naval achievements recorded in our annals. It was impossible to suppose that Buonaparté, after having annihilated the armies of the continent, would have suffered isolated Denmark to retain her independence. We had trusted to the declaration of Denmark too long. Her conduct had not merited such confidence. She had not made preparations for her defence, nor shewn any inclination to resistance. It was only when the English and Hanoverians were advancing to the rescue of the north, that she had assembled her troops in Holstein. He was surprised to find such horror expressed at the expedition to Copenhagen, by those who had approved that against Constantinople. He could conceive that a person might condemn both; but he could scarcely think it possible for one to approve the attack on Constantinople, where there was no obvious necessity, and condemn that against Copenhagen, which was so necessary for our security. This country had been acting on such grounds, as would justify an individual in aggression. The enemy had departed from the law of nations, and we, consequently, were not bound to adhere to it. If we

had adhered to the principles of the noble lords, on the other side, in the late disturbances in Ireland, we should have been going to law with the rebels, whilst they were going to war with us.

* 1801.

The Earl of Moira said, that of the hostile intentions of the present ruler

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