service, but in coming to this decision, it was necessary to make a distinction between the merits of the ministers who planned, and of the navy and army who performed the expedition. The justice and policy of the expedition would come under consideration at another time. The question now be fore the house simply was, whether the service was of such a nature as to rank it among those instances of distinguished and successful exertions for which any vote of thanks of that house had been recorded, and in his opinion it did not come under that description of service by which the rules of national gratitude ought to be governed, nor was at all of that nature to which they ought to be applied. He conceived that the only fit occasion for the two houses of parliament to pass a vote of thanks for the services of either the army or navy, was, the achievement of some exploit which afforded matter of general and unmixed joy and exultation: when, for example, it was bestowed in consequence of a victory obtained over the first troops in the world, and over legions which had arrogated to themselves the title of invincible, not with superior numbers, but with a force not even equal to that of the enemy, there was no man who did not feel a pride and glory in joining in it. But in circumstances like the present, in which one ostensible part of the expedition had been entrust ed to an officer who could plead in his own behalf only the approbation of a self-created tribunal, in opposition to a sentence of condemnation lately passed upon him by one legally constituted, and who, in his fortune had exemplified the

old adage. old adage." that when the king loses the knave wins," and when by the admission of the noble lord himself, the service was of such a nature that even its success must be contemplated with pain, he was far from thinking it a proper occasion for the legislature to bestow what ought always to be accounted the highest honour, and a reward paramount to every other. He was willing to allow that the army and navy had done every thing that could be either required or expected of them, and that their services might rank with a case of either a gallant defence or a successful retreat; but he denied that they possessed those ingredients which alone could entitle them to a vote of legislative thanks. Mr. Windham adverted to the title conferred on admiral Gambier, which did not record the nature or character of the service for which it had been granted, as in the instances of lord Nelson and lord Duncan, where the title was borrowed from the respective scenes of their achievements. Nor had he heard of any medals being distributed on the present as on former occasions. He then replied to that part of the noble lord's speech in which he had described the high state of preparation of the Danish ships, at the same time that he claimed credit for the vast activity in putting those ships in a state for being brought off, Either his premises must be false, or the inference he attempted to draw from them unfounded. In the same inconsistent strain the noble lord had asserted the force sent against Copenhagen to be so for midable as to make resistance unavailing, while, with the same breath, he called upon the house to pass a

vote of thanks, founded on the skill, bravery, and enterprise of the officers employed in a service where no such talents and qualities were wanted. It was incumbent on a British house of commons, particularly in times like the present, to assert its dignity, and to maintain the credit attached to its opinion of what constitutes a great national exploit. Neither did he conceive, from what he knew of the two noble lords who were embarked in the expedition, that they would think the present worthy to be ranked among the achievements of their former life. There was nothing in the name of Copenhagen, (which signifies literally a harbour of merchants) calculated to call forth the energies of a soldier, the son of a soldier, and the father of a soldier, like lord Cathcart, whose former services were well known, and with justice highly appreciated. And the very circumstance of admiral Gambier's having advantageously distinguished himself as captain in the glorious action of the first of June, was sufficient of itself to make him set, comparatively, but a small value on his services on the present occasion.

a

Mr. Windham next drew the attention of the house to the conduct of ministers in moving such a resolution, the effect of which was, not indeed to increase the taxes on the people, but what was still a more serious evil, if the people could only be brought to understand it, to diminish the great fund of honour, the best incentive to honourable exertions, and what was worse still, not only to apply it injudiciously, but to destroy the value of the whole capital. Granting that an improvident pension was bad, be

cause it was squandering away the public money; still, though one pension was granted improperly, the next was not the worse on that account. But when honour was once depreciated, its value was altogether lost. It was not difficult, however, to perceive the object ministers had in view, in thus heaping rewards on those who had a part in the service. It was to give it a fictitious value, and an importance in the eyes of the public that did not belong to it. Mr. Windham concluded, with solemnly protesting against this misapplication of the sacred deposit committed to the house, of dealing out with fairness and impartiality expressions of the public gratitude to those who were employed in its service.

Mr. Brand, after adverting to the alleged weakness of Denmark to defend herself, had she been attacked by France, conceived that it would be altogether inconsistent to pass a vote of thanks for a service which derives its principal importance from the degree of resist ance which those employed in it had

to encounter.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer thought, that if Mr. W.'s objections to giving thanks in certain cases were admitted, they would be very prejudicial to the service. Mr. W. had admitted, that it was highly meritorious, by a judicious retreat, to secure the safety of an army or a navy; but that the house had never contemplated such a service as a proper object of their thanks. The righthonourable gentleman seemed to have forgotten the case of admiral Cornwallis, who had received the thanks of parliament, not for a victory, but a retreat, "for the ability, judgment

and

and bravery which he had displayed in the presence of a superior fleet of the enemy." He mentioned other instances in which the house of commons had voted their thanks, which were of a different description from that to which Mr. W. was desirous of confining it.-Mr. Tierney shewed that the precedents cited by Mr. Perceval were not applicable to the present case. cases were by no means parallel. The motion for thanks to lord Cathcart being read from the chair, the house divided.-For the motion 100; against it 19. After which, motions for thanks to lord Gambier, &c. &c. the same as those in the house of peers, were agreed to.

The

Mr. Ponsonby rose to move for such papers as his majesty's ministers were disposed to lay before the house relative to the expedition to Copenhagen. The house would thus learn what papers they were not disposed to grant; and thus a subject of unmixed debate would come before the house. He was sorry to say, that from a communication he had had with the secretary for foreign affairs, he could not call for more papers than what he should now move for. He should first move, that an humble address be presented for copies of the proclamations issued by the commanders of his majesty's naval and military forces, while before Copenhagen; and also copies or extracts of the communications with the Danish government, touching the surrender of the Danish fleet by capitulation. Secondly, that there be laid before the house, copies of the articles of capitulation concluded between the commanders of his majesty's naval and military forces, or either of them, and the officers commanding

his Danish majesty's forces in the island of Zealand: and thirdly, for the substance of such information as had been received from his majesty's naval officers, and the officers of the dock yards, with respect to the state and condition of the Danish ships at the time of their surrender or subsequently to their arrival in British ports.

House of Commons, February 3, -Mr. Ponsonby, pursuant to notice of a motion respecting the expedi tion to Copenhagen,stated its object. He proposed to consider this subject in the three distinct relations of Denmark, Russia, and France; to ascertain the disposition of the Danish government towards this country, for some time previous to the attack on Copenhagen; to be enabled to decide whether immediately after the treaty of Tilsit, Russia had entirely abandoned herself to the councils of France; and with respect to France, to ascertain what means France had to compel Denmark to depart from her system of neutrality; and especially how far France could have succeeded in any attempts to annoy us in the Baltic. In either case it was his object to ascertain the means of France. It was idle to talk of the disposition of France; but her means he took to be in this case, as doubtful as her disposition was unquestionable. As a justification of the expedition, it was insinuated that Denmark was unable to defend her own neutrality. One of the resolutions therefore he should submit to the house, would be for copies of all communications between this country and the Danish government at the close of the last war, wherein the Danish government avows, as its apology for de

parting

was

parting from its neutrality, its inability to resist the operation of external influence. With regard to the disposition of Denmark previous to hostilities, the object of his resolutions would be, to put the house in possession of all reports made to the government of this country, relative to all attempts on the part of Denmark to increase her naval power, to supply her arsenals, to equip her navy, to man the fleet, for instance, which we subsequently seized on. It was a well known practice in the Danish marine, that every seaman obliged, on entering into the Danish service, to inscribe his name in a book, to state also the name of the vessel in which he embarks, to particularise the destination, and to state on what service bound. Therefore, Denmark would find extreme difficulty in secretly increasing her naval force. Still more difficult if not impossible, would it be, for that power to raise a considerable fleet in a short time. For it was not there as in England, where there constantly abounds such an immense population of seamen, and where a mighty naval power could be suddenly called into action, not only by resorting to the great resources immediately in our power, but by the compulsive operation of an impressment, throwing at once into the hands of the executive government a power that might, on the instant, be wielded with effect. Mr. P. therefore contended, that if Denmark projected such designs against this country as had been alleged, she must have proceeded to the necessary preparations, and that if she had entered on such preparations, she must have betrayed somedemonstrations of them long before my

lord Gambier arrived in the Sound. The house was in possession of the evidence offered in proof of the hostile intentions of Denmark to wards this country; that is no evidence whatever: precisely as much he believed as ministers themselves had. But what was the evidence on the other side? When vague rumour first excited the alarm of the Danish captains, they made a formal application to the Danish consul, wishing to ascertain whether the alarm excited by the report of an intended expedition was well or ill founded. The Danish consul applied in their behalf to the council of commerce, an institution which formed a part of the Danish government. What was the answer to the Danish consul? That there was not the slightest ground for apprehension on the part of the Danish captains. And at this period of Denmark's unsuspecting confidence in us, there was no less a number than three hundred Danish ships in our harbours. Supposing Denmark willing, though unable to preserve her neutrality, no man, who had read the law of nations, or any cases at all, would pretend to justify an attack upon a neutral power merely because it was weak, unless upon the principle of self-preservation. But how was this to be made out? By proving the absolute determina. tion of France to seize on the Danish fleet, for the purpose of directing that force against us; and also by proving the incompetency of Denmark to defend herself against such an attempt on the part of France; by proving too, her indisposition to resist such an attempt, and particularly the certainty of her yielding to superior force; in all which cases we were without even the

shadow

shadow of a circumstantial proof. As to the means of France for compelling Denmark to take a part in the maritime confederation against this country, in what circumstances did those two powers appear to the world in relation to each other? A considerable part of the Danish force was encamped in Holstein not very far from the same place where the French troops had assumed a menacing position. -What were the most considerable territorial possessions of Denmark, on what is called the continent of Europe? Holstein, Jutland, Norway; but above all, the Danish isles, in one of which was her capital. And was it likely that with such means, she would have suddenly compromised her independence as a nation? What would have been her answer to any proposal on the part of France, compelling her to enter into hostility with this country?" You have no right to compel me; but if I must be compelled to depart from my system of neutrality, and to make a choice, I will prefer friendship with England, because she can secure to me what you can never take from me; whereas war with England would expose me to many dangers from which her friendship can protect me." But it might be objected, why did not Denmark accept our proffered treaty? Because we made no proposal that it was possible for an independent nation to accept.Mr. Ponsonby returning from this digression to the disposition of Denmark, asked what were the means of France to compel Denmark to act against England. He had heard a great deal about armies marching over the Baltic, and had made much inquiry on the subject. He

had read many books upon it; and he was warranted in saying, that an army had not passed over the Baltic upon the ice for the last hundred and fifty years. Cold was not now what it then was. The coldness of a climate was not always regulated by its latitude. There were a variety of local causes that might in a given time sensibly ameliorate the natural coldness of a country; such, for instance, as cutting down forests, draining morasses, exposing a country to open air, &c. &c. But even admitting the practicability of the French passing over the ice; were they to encounter no obstacle from the thirty-five thousand men, that were then encamped in Holstein, when those thirty-five thousand men were brought to co-operate with the thirty thousand that lord Castlereagh had told them, the other night, were in the island of Zealand? Could the French, supposing them,against all probability, to have got into Zealand, have made the slightest stand against the united efforts of the armies of Sweden, Denmark, and England?

As to the conduct of Russia, sub. sequent to the treaty of Tilsit, and how far that conduct justified the suspicion of her joining the supposed marine confederacy against this country; when the news of the treaty of Tilsit first arrived, we heard of nothing but immediate hostilities on the part of Russia: and yet the Russian fleet was suffered to roam through the sea at its pleasure, while that of Denmark, in professed neutrality, was attacked and seized on. That the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit were not the primary cause of the Danish expedition, he inferred from a minute and accurate review of

the