stimulated and rewarded: to such a degree of splendor and fortune, we shall raise our country, if we ourselves correspond with the magnificent circumstances that surround us. These are the views, and this is the plan which the junta proposed to itself from the first moment of its installation. Its members, charged with an authority so great, and rendering themselves responsible by entertaining and encouraging hopes so flattering, are nevertheless fully aware of the difficulties they have to conquer in order to realize them, the enormity of the weight that hangs over them, and the dangers to which they are exposed. But they will think their fatigues, and the devotion of their persons to the service of their country well paid, if they succeed in inspiring Spaniards with that confidence without which the public good cannot be secured, and, which the country dares to affirm, it merits, from the rectitude of its principles and the purity of its intentions.

The supreme central junta was acknowledged by the council of Castille, and all the other constituted authorities in the kingdom. The junta, amongst its first acts, appointed a new council of war, consisting of five members, the president of which was general Castanos. The other four members were Don Thomas Morla, the marquis de Castelar, the marquis del Pilacia, and Don Antonio Buerro. In prosecution of their designs it was necessary, in the first place, to attend to the grand spring of government, the finances. Great savings were made from the sup

pression of the expenses of the roy al household, the enormous sums which had been annually devoured by the insatiable avarice and profuse donations of the favourite, and the confiscation of the estates of those unworthy Spaniards who had sided and fled with the usurper from Madrid. These resources sufficed for their first operations without any new taxes on the people. The first efforts of the, junta were directed to the setting in motion all

the troops in Andalusia, Grenada, and Estramadura, as well as the new levies; to the transportation of Dupont's army, agreeably to treaty; and to the furnishing of the English army, that had vanquished Junot, with the means of marching from Portugal to join the Spaniards. In the midst of these cares, they sent envoys to demand succours from Britain. The forces of the pa triots, including now the army of Romana, and the Spanish regi ments that had been confined in hulks of ships by Junót, were divida ed into three, and disposed in such a manner as to form together, to wards the end of October, one grand army. The eastern wing was commanded by general Joseph Palafox; the north-western, by general Blake; the centre, by general Castanos.The number under general Blake was computed at 55,000: that under general Castanos, at 65,000; and that under the orders of general Palafox, at 20,000. General Castanos was commander in chief. Besides these there was a small army in Estramadura, and another in Catalonia. The positions of the French army remained, with some variation,

Variation, on the whole pretty much the same as in August; its right towards the ocean, its left on Arragon, its front on the Ebro. It was strengthened from time to time by reinforcements from France. The design of the Spaniards was, with the right and left wings of their grand army to turn the wings of the French army, whilst Castanos should make a vigorous attack, and break through their centre.

Buonaparté having ordered a levy of 160,000 conscripts, set troops in motion for Spain, and, provided for all that might be demanded by the contingencies of war, set out from Paris for Spain without waiting for an answer to the overture for a negotiation with the British government, in like manner as he had hastened to meet the Prussians, leaving lord Lauderdale to dispute with his ministers about the basis of a negotiation in the autumn of 1806. With his usual celerity, having set out from Rambouillet, October 30th he arrived at Bayonne on the 3rd of November, and on the 5th, accompanied by a reinforcement of 12,000 men, he joined his brother Joseph at Vittoria. In time of peace Buonaparté has proper persons employed to furnish him with the most correct topographical maps of different territories, on a great scale: by which means, being made acquainted by his generals with the relative positions of the opposite armies, he is enabled to give general directions, even at a great distance.The campaign had been opened according to his directions, a few days before his arrival.

It would not serve any purpose either of amusement or instruction to enter into a detail of the means

by which the first military commander in the present, and one of the greatest of any age, at the head of a numerous well equiped, and veteran army, accustomed to conquer, and of which the different divisions were also under the orders of the ablest generals,—it would be idle in the present period of striking events following each other in rapid succession, to detail the steps by which such a commander, with such an army, through the boldness of his tactics, the combination of his movements, and the rapidity of his marches, defeated armies scarcely yet orga nized, chiefly composed of new levies without being properly equipped, without regular supplies of provisions, and extended over too large a space of ground without sufficiently strengthening the line of their communication. Agreeably to the general plan of operations above stated, general Castanos crossed the Ebro at the three points with only a shew of resistance, and he was suffered to push forward detachments, and take possession of Lerin, Viana, Capporoso, and other French posts on the left bank of the Ebro. The French did not oppose his onward course towards Pampeluna, any farther than was necessary to conceal their own plan of operations. Marshal Moncey, the duke of Cornegliano, was directed with the left wing of the French army to advance along the banks of the Alagon and the Ebro, and instead of opposing the passage, by presenting a weak front, to decoy general Castanos across the Ebro. The stratagem having succeeded completely, Marshal Ney, the duke of Elchingen, with his division, passing the line of the

Ebro,

Ebro,anddashing forward withgreat celerity in separatecolumns,took the Spanish posts at Logrono and Colahora, threw the whole country into alarm and confusion, and cut off the communication between the armies respectively under the command of general Blake and general Castanos.

In a series of actions from the 31st of October, the army under general Blake was driven from post to post; from Durango to Guenas; from Guenas to Valmaseda; from Valmaseda to Espinosa. In a strong position there, the Gallician army made a stand, in order to save its magazines and artillery, in vain. After a brave resistance, continued for two days, they were obliged to retreat with precipitation. During the conflict at Espinosa, a detachment was sent against the last retreat of the Gallicians, Ray. nosa. At break of day, 11th of November, they were suddenly attacked on both their right, left, and centre. They were forced to consult their safety by flight; throwing away their arms and colours, and abandoning their artillery. General Blake, with the remains of his broken army, took refuge in Asturias.

What remained of the corps of the marquis of Romana, that had formed part of the Gallician army, fled first to St. Andero, and afterwards to Asturias. The Spaniards were pursued closely by marshal Soult, duke of Dalmatia, the van of whose army entered St. Andero on the 16th. The bishop of St. Andero took refuge in an English frigate.

In the mean time the Estramaduran army, under the command of the count Belvedere, a young man was permitted without oppo忄

sition, by a stratagem similar to that which had drawn general Castanos to the left bank of the Ebro, to advance to Burgos, of which he took possession without resistance. Here the French fell on him with superior numbers and routed his army after a gallant resistance for twelve hours, and almost annihilated it. The count, with the small remains of his army, fled to Lerma, and from thence to Aranda.

The French, having routed and dispersed the armies of the north of Spain, and of Estramadura, next fell on the central army under Castanos; and an engagement ensued at Tudela, 23d November, which fixed the fate of the campaign. It is thus described clearly intelligibly, and, we doubt not in the least, faithfully, in the eleventh bulletin of the grand French army. "On the 22nd of November, at the break of day, the French army began its march.

It took its direction to Calahorra, where on the evening before, were the head quarters of Castanos. Finding that town evacuated, it marched on Alfaro, from whence the enemy had also retreated. On the 23d, at break of day, the general of division, Lefevre, at the head of the cavalry and supported by the division of general Morlat, forming the advanced guard, met with the enemy. He immediately gave information to the duke of Montebello, who found the army of the enemy in seven divisions, consisting of 45,000 men, under arms, with its right before Tudela, and its left occupying a league and an half, a disposition altogether faulty. The Arragonese were on the right, the troops of Valencia and New Castille in the centre, and the three divi

sions of Andalusia, which general Castanos commanded more especially, formed the left. Forty pieces of cannon covered the enemy's line.

"At nine in the morning the columns of the French army began to display themselves with that order, regularity, and coolness, which characterise veteran troops. Situations were chosen for establishing batteries, with sixty pieces of cannon; but the impetuosity of the French troops, and the inquietude of the enemy, did not allow time for this. The Spaniards were already vanquished by the order and movements of the French army. The duke of Montebello caused the centre to be pierced by the division of general Maurice Matthews. The general of division, Lefevre, with his cavalry, immediately passed on the trot through this opening, and by a quarter wheel to the left, enveloped the enemy. The moment when half the enemy's line found itself thus turned and defeated, was that in which general Le Grange attacked the village of Cascante, where the line of Castanos was placed, which did not exhibit a better countenance than the right, but abandoned the field of battle, leaving behind it its artillery, and a great number of prisoners. The cavalry pursued the remains of the enemy's army to Mallen, in the direction of Saragossa, and to Tarragona, in the direction of Agreda. Seven standards, thirty pieces of cannon, twelve colonels, three hundred officers, were taken. Four thousand Spaniards were left dead on the field of battle, or driven into the Ebro. While a part of the fugitives retired to Saragossa, the left wing of the Spanish army

which had been cut off fled in disorder to Tarragona and Agreda. Five thousand Spaniards, all troops of the line, were taken prisoners in the pursuit. No quarter was given to any of the peasants found in arms. This army of 45,000 men has been thus beaten and defeated, without our having had more than 6,000 men engaged. The battle of Burgos had smitten the centre of the enemy, and the battle of Espinosa, the right; the battle of Tudela has struck the left. Victory has thus struck as with a thunderbolt, and dispersed the whole league of the enemy."

By the battle of Tudela the road was laid open to Madrid. On the 29th of November, a division of the French army, under the command of general Victor, duke of Belluno, arrived at the pass of the Sierra Morena, called Puerto. It was defended by 13,000 men of the Spanish army of reserve, under the orders of general San Juan. The Puerto, or narrow neck of land forming the pass, was intersected by a trench, fortified with sixteen pieces of cannon. While a part of the French advanced to the Puerto by the road, with six pieces of artillery, other columns gained the heights on the left. A discharge of musketry and cannon was maintained for some little time on both sides. A charge made by general Montbrun, at the head of the Polish light horse, decided the contest. The Spaniards fled, leaving behind them their artillery and standards; and, as the French Bulletin states, their muskets, but this, from subsequent events, appears not to have been truth.

Advanced parties of the French cavalry appeared on the 1st of De

cember,

cember, before Madrid. At this period, the inhabitants of this city were busily employed in raising palisades, and constructing redoubts, breathing a determined spirit of resistance. The enemy was beaten back from certain gates several times; but on the third, they were in possession of the gate of Alcala; and also ofthe Reteiro, the reduction of which place cost the assailants very dear, in the loss, it was computed, of near 1,000 men in killed and wounded. The junta then hoisted a white flag. The people of Madrid pulled down the flag, and persisted in their design of defending the city; but this enthusiasm soon began to subside, for want of leaders to keep it up and to direct it. And when they learnt for certain that the French were fortifying themselves in the Reteiro,they began to retire to their respective houses.

During the night of December the 3rd, a Spanish officer who had been taken prisoner in the affair of Somosierra,brought a message from general Berthier, summoning for the second time Madrid to surrender. The Marquis of Castellar, captain general of Castille, sent in answer a letter to Berthier,demanding a suspension of hostilities, that he might have time for consulting the superior authorities. But there was no need or use in this. The superior authorities, who appear plainly to have had a secret correspondence with the enemy, had already come to a determination on the subject. Madrid was undoubtedly given up through treachery. When intelligence that the French had forced the passage of the Sierra Morena reached Madrid, a council was held, at which the honourable

Mr. Stuart, the British envoy at Madrid, was present. Don T.Morla took the lead, and expatiated at great length on the hopeless state of affairs; and urged the necessity of immediately capitulating for Madrid. When he sat down, another councillor rose, and reproached Morla for his proposal. He said that this advice was more suited to a minister of Joseph Buonaparté, than to one of king Ferdinand. Two days after this discussion, Don T. Morla, together with the prince of Castel Franco, to whom the defence of the capital had been committed by the supreme junta, sent a dispatch to Sir John Moore, describing theformidable Spanish force that was assembled at Madrid; and pressing him to advance, with all possible expedition to the capital. If Sir John Moore had not possessed, in an extraordinary degree, circumspection, penetration, and firmness, the solicitations of the traitors, and those too of Mr. Hookham Frere,minister plenipotentiary from his Britannic majesty to the supreme junta, but a wretched minister of war, would have thrown him and his little army completely into the hands of the French.

We find many misrepresentations in the Spanish gazettes of that time, and are at a loss in some instances whether to set them down to the account of folly, or a traitorous design to lull the Spaniards, prone to be so lulled, into a state of false security and inaction. After general Blake had officially notified to the central junta, about the middle of October, that the army he had been able to collect amounted to no more than from 22 to 23,000 men; we find it stated in the Madrid gazette of October the 21st, that 70,000 men

had