Pagina-afbeeldingen
PDF
ePub

on which these relations depended, he must be in possession of the correspondence which had taken place between our own government and the governments of foreign nations. It was right in ministers to assume an attitude of dignity, worthy of the character and resources of the country. Whether a prolongation of the war with France, or the commencement of hostilities with other powers was the only alternative left us, he was not in possession of information sufficient to form an opinion. The house, he asserted, was equally destitute of information on the question relative to America and neutral nations. There was another subject of much importance, which might have been intro duced into the speech, namely, the present state of Ireland. As to the affair of Copenhagen, he would on a future occasion move for the production of necessary documents, so that it might, at least, be fairly brought into discussion.

1

Mr. Milnes, after an eulogy on the present administration, observ ⚫ed that it would indeed have been impolitic to adopt any measure by which the character of the country might be affected, if the powers of Europe retainedtheirindependence, if the government of Denmark had been free to follow that course which its honour and interest dictated. But there was not a power on the continent which could have resisted the mandates of the enemy. It was the first duty of ministers to act upon the necessity of the case, and it was equally their duty to use their discretion in judging of that necessity. And if, in acting upon this they were to err at all, it was best that they should err upon the side of public security. If Denmark

had been really worse disposed to-wards this country than she was, could she have pursued any other course than that precisely which she had followed? The extraordinary concentration of French troops on the frontiers of Holstein, the submission of Denmark to the decrees of France, and her remonstrances against our maritime rights, together with her active and formidable naval equipments, were sufficient evidences of her submission to Buonaparté.-Was Buonaparte's system, that "all Europe should be devoted, excepting Denmark?" With a large navy, with a more extended commerce, and with the keys of the Baltic in her hand, would he have allowed her to remain as a monument of reproach to the vassalage of surrounding countries, and to have broken the continuity of the chain which binds every country of Europe? It was the declared opinion of a noble lord (Milton) that the expedition should be condemned, because the crown prince was in Holstein, and his forces unprepared for action. Strange as that sentiment might ap-. pear to his mind, it excited no surprise. It was a doctrine of the school of which the noble lord was a disciple, or perhaps the leader. And when a noble lord (Petty) announced, that their motto was"Nos Rebus Servamus Secundis;" or that they would never afford any assistance to friends till they were in a condition not to want it, he could not but think the advice of the noble lord perfectly natural, that we should never resist an enemy till he should be in a condition to despise our resistance. As to peace Buonaparté would certainly, in his terms, wish to question our

maritime

maritime supremacy, a patrimony entailed upon us, and therefore not a matter of negotiation, ministers would judge how far a peace was promising under such auspices. Were Buonaparté to abdicate his throne, and to depose all his minion princes; were he to restore to France her legal government, and to Europe her balance of power, they would not, in his mind, be equivalents for the sacrifice of our command at sea. We had seen the original principles of revolutionary devastation settled into a savage tyranny, which had armed, by its menaces or corruption, the rest of Europe against us. We saw that it had a leader pledged to our ruin, who, after exhausting the other sources of his malignity, renounced at length that commercial law which mitigated the war to both, and con. Iverted into the instruments of his hostility the want and misery of his own people. We saw, however, that in this spirit of destruction, disengaged from all its other objects, and concentrated on the downfal of thissingle country, he had not advanced one single step towards it; that the time was still to come, when the glories of the great nation were to burst on Britain, and when, execrating the oligarchy of our constitution, we were to become happy in the monarchy he was to give us. In the mean time, he declared us blockaded, not by the presence and assault of his navies, and the consequent destruction of our commercial strength, but by shutting the gates against his own shipping. Seeing all this, and reflecting how far the predictions of Buonaparté had been fulfilled, and on whom this species of warfare pressed heaviest, the whole nation キ

[ocr errors]

might learn a lesson of encouragement and of admonition: to bear what they had so steadily borne, and to command success by deserving it.

Mr. Whitbread said, that if there was no other justification of the attack on Denmark than what had been given that evening, he had no hesitation in declaring it base and treacherous. He declared, that he would rather have seen the fleet of Denmark in forced hostilities against us, manned by her sailors, acting under compulsion, than he would, after what had happened, see them moored in our own ports. In addition to the inveterate animo sity of Denmark, to which this act had given rise, had it not also been the means of cutting off our communication with the continent, as well as of throwing Denmark into the hands of France? But we were told it would be dangerous to grant the information desired. To whom would it be dangerous? To ministers? He verily believed they had none to give. To those who gave them the information on which they acted? This he could not well conceive, since they had asserted their being in possession of it; and it was not very material, after avowing this fact, whether they imparted the substance of the information, or not. As to the fact in question itself, we had assertion against assertion: the assertion of the crown prince of Denmark on the one hand, and an assertion which ministers had put into the mouth of their sovereign on the other. And, for his own part he had no hesitation in saying that he credit gave to the former in preference to the latter.

Mr. Whitbread here adverted

to

to expressions used by the noble lord who moved the address highly derogatory to the courage of the crown prince, and such certainly as never ought to have been applied to any man, who, like him, had been tried, or indeed to any man who was untried. He saw, however, with regret and sorrow, that it was quite the fashion to deal out sarcasms, and sometimes abuse on those powers who, in consequence of the pressure of circumstances had been compelled to abandon our cause. He was far from thinking that the emperor Alexander had deserted us in a moment of despondency and alarm as had been stated, and was persuaded that he had been forced to the step he took by the necessity of the case. As to the emigration from Portugal, it was brought about by the menacing proclamation of Buonaparté, and the approach of a French army to Lisbon, not, in any degree by the dexterity and address of ministers, and their agent, lord Strangford, as had been given out.-Of our relations with Vienna and Petersburgh, he would forbear to speak till the promised papers were on the table; butifthe principles of common sense were applied to the present conjuncture, a more favourable opportunity for negotiating a peace with France could not be hoped for.

Mr. Secretary Canning was surprised, that Mr. Ponsonby should have required a day's preparation to marshal his arguments or opinions on the matter of the address; to deliver his sentiments upon topics on which the public mind had long since formed a decided opinion. For the discussion of these, he had stated, as an additional ground of delay, the necessity

of communications respecting the intercourse between his majesty's ministers and the courts of Austria and Russia.-These powers were not in a situation to mediate impartially. If this fact should be proved by the notes to be produced, he hoped for Mr. P's approbation of ministers, in not consenting to treat till they should know upon what basis; a question that had occupied three months in the late negotiation. As to the expedition to Copenhagen, it was possible that Mr. P. might move for some in-formation that might be produced safely. But if he should move for the secret information on which that expedition was undertaken, as far as his judgment went, he believed he would never have ocular conviction. Was it possible, that a time when there was no capital on the continent where the power of Buonaparté could not drag the offender against him to execution, should be fixed on for divulging the sources of secret intelligence? Was this country to say to the agents who served it from fidelity, or from less worthy motives, " You shall serve us but once, and your life shall be the forfeit?"-What had happened to Portugal was sufficient to convince every fair thinking man of the truth of the information respecting Denmark: for the communications from the Portugueze government related as well to the Danish as the Portuguese navy. In the expedition to Copenhagen the present ministers had the example of those before them. was only necessary to apply to Denmark the principle they had applied to Portugal: to threaten and coerce secret enemies, or at least suspicious neutrals, instead of old

It

and

and faithful allies. It was remarkable that while the application of force at Copenhagen was condemn ed by the gentlemen opposite, the non-application of it at Lisbon was censured no less severely. But so it would have been if the force had been applied at Lisbon and negotiation at Copenhagen. The Danish navy would have been lost by foolish confidence, and Portugal outraged by unprincipled and impolitic violence.

With respect to the late supposed negotiation for peace, Mr. C.declared that no tangible overture had been made either by the French or Austrian government. With respect to the late orders of council retaliating the restrictions of the French government on our commerce, he maintained our right to go as far as France, and make France feel, in the effects of her own injustice, that we could hope to bring her to more reasonable conduct. The vigour of the British navy, when put forth with a determination which the moderate spirit of our government had hitherto restrained, would prove equal to cope with the power that the tyrant of France had established at land. It would appear, that if he combined all the powers of the continent to oppress us, the combination would but increase our strength and energy, and make us triumph under our oppression.

Lord H. Petty contended, that the principles of right and wrong were to be considered in politics as well as philosophy, and on these men were to reason in general till a particular case was made out. It was a singular instance to be in a state of war with a power against which there were no documents to

prove a hostile act. Lord Petty regretted very much that there should be so little in the speech about the temporary policy respecting Denmark, and nothing at all about the permanent policy respecting Ireland.

Mr. Bathurst contended, that all the danger that would arise from a communication of the particulars of the intelligence required, had been incurred already. He was surprised that those who had examined whether Portugal could be defended against France, had not also inquired into the practicability of defending Zealand, and whether the Danes were able and disposed to defend themselves.

Mr. Windham put the question, if it was reasonable to call upon the country to approve of a proceeding in its nature involving the national character, without alleging one instance in proof of either the justice or policy of the measure? As to the question of right, he was willing to wait for the justification of ministers, and should, for the sake of the country, be most happy to find it satisfactory. But as to the policy, he could only say, that he would rather Buonaparté were now in possession of the Danish fleet by the means to which he must have resorted in the seizure of it, than that England should have got it in the way she did. The ships would be rotten when the effervescence of national feeling would live in the remembrance of national injury.— To this observation,

The Chancellor of the Exchequer replied, that certainly the captured ships would be rotten some time or other, but not in the ensuing spring; not at a period

when

when they might be employed in conveying French troops to Ireland, not when they were to be employed in excluding us from the Baltic, and furthering the designs of the enemy. Colonel Montague Matthew expressed, in strong terms,his mistrust of a set of ministers who had come into office with an avowed hostility against four millions of his majesty's subjects in Ireland.

The question was then carried without a division, and the house adjourned.

House of Commons, Friday, Jan. 22.-Lord Hamilton brought up the report of the address to his majesty.

Mr. Macdonald said, that the armament of the Danes could not be considered as hostile, because the preparations in their harbours could not have been begun in the interval between the treaty of Tilsit and the sailing of the expedition; and as to the dispositions of the Danes, their arming exhibited rather a jealousy of the designs of France than of those of Great

Britain.

Mr. Fuller was only sorry that ministers had not seized every bird that hovered about the transactions at Tilsit. Whatever the other side, of the house might say about the allegations of crown princes, or half crown princes, we ought to believe our own ministers.

Mr. Herbert was of opinion, that the present ministers had, by their expedition, disgraced the country, without either necessity or ability. Yet he would not oppose the address, though he would not promise his support of the measures to which it related.

Mr.Eden required an explanation

[ocr errors]

of one part of the speech. The treaty of Tilsit was signed on the 7th of July; intelligence, and a copy of it reached this country on the 8th of August only, and yet, on the 26th of July, the orders had been given to admiral Gambier to sail from the Downs.

Mr. Pym expressed his opinion that our advantages from peace would be equal to, if not greater, than that of our enemies. It was impossible for him, on the evidence before the house, to approve of the expedition to Denmark.

Mr. York said, that he would ask any man acquainted with public business, whether the nature of our government was not such that the government of the country could not proceed if it did not act upon grounds which could not, consistently with the interests of the country, be made public? He was old enough to remember the American war, and he could state from opportunities which he had had of personally knowing the fact, that in consequence of the production of the papers, relative to the sailing of the Toulon fleet, on the motion of a gentleman of very high talents, now no more (Mr. Fox), the French had been enabled to cut off a source of intelligence which this country had possessed in Holland since the days of queen Anne. He would give credit to government for their having received intelligence of the secret articles of Tilsit. There was enough on the face of such papers to enable the enemy to trace the source from whence they might have been received. On the secret articles of Tilsit he would rest his foot, and give his approbation to the measure

« VorigeDoorgaan »