WARHEADS

General BROWN. It is merely the NATO designation for that aircraft.

Senator YOUNG. And SALT is treating this as if it were a cruise missile ?

Secretary RUMSFELD. It is just like calling a Chevrolet a Chevrolet; you pick it out of the air.

Senator HRUSKA. Maybe the names assigned to hurricanes.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, that is better.

Chairman MCCLELLAN. All right. You may proceed.

PROJECTED INVENTORY U.S./U.S.S.R.

(2400 SNDV/1320 MIRV LEVEL)

Secretary RUMSFELD. As this indicates, the chart on the top left is the inventory of warheads and the inventory of megatonnage to the right and the throw-weight showing a widening gap between 1975 and 1985.

SOVIET GROWTH IN STRATEGIC MISSILES IN LAST DECADE

This chart is interesting. Above the horizontal line it shows the U.S. advantage and below the line it shows the Soviet advantage. Now what I have said here is that something has happened during the last 10 to 15 years. This chart, indicates essentially what is taking place with respect to the missile advantage. We can see that the United States has moved from the position of superiority, preponderance-whatever you want to call it-to a position of rough equivalence; and we can see that some begin to move toward Soviet advantage, as indicated. The top one shows total reentry vehicles; the next, total missiles; the next equivalent megatonnage and the final one is throw-weight.

Now note that we are talking only about missiles; the chart does not include the bomber force, the third leg of our Triad, in which we have a clear advantage.

CHANGES IN UNITED STATES AND SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES

If we go to the next chart, the one on the top shows the Soviet Union, the lower part shows the United States. If you look first at the left columns, you see strategic missiles. The Soviets have been busy between 1965 and 1975. If you look below it, you will see that they have been more active than we have.

If you look at military personnel, you can see the Soviets again have been active while the United States has been moving in the other direction.

In tactical aircraft, we again see improvements in the Soviet area. If one looks at tank production, we can see the rough relationship in the size of those bars as to what the situation is.

SUBSTANTIAL DEFENSE CAPABILITY NEEDED

The last point I would make is that we do live in a time of paradoxes, Mr. Chairman, as you indicated in your opening statement. It is a question of how we can have détente and still have the need for a substantial defense capability. We live at a time when hope and peril run side by side. To be just and compassionate we have to be strong, and as you consider the defense budget you will inevitably have to consider the military environments and the facts of the world situation as we find it.

I find the arithmetic not encouraging and the task fundamental. You made a comment, Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement,

that no part of the budget is sacrosanct, that you reserve the right to make reductions as appropriate. The pattern for the past 5 years has been for the United States to reduce Defense budgets. The effect over a period of the past 5, 10, 15 years is that a dramatic shift has been taking place in the world-the Soviet Union moving up in terms of dollars, effort, R. & D. and weapon systems; the United States moving down in terms of level of effort.

We have a policy in this country of saying that we wish to maintain sufficiency or rough equivalence; we do not want to be second to the Soviet Union. As I indicated in my opening statement, the budget we presented says that if we wish to maintain that policy, we have to check the adverse trends we have seen for the last 5, 10, 15 years between the United States and the Soviet Union.

To fail to check them will, in my judgment, give the Soviets, give the rest of the world, and give ourselves the message that we are willing to change our policy, that we no longer will have a policy of desiring to maintain sufficiency and rough equivalence, that we are willing to let those trends continue and move to an inferior status. There is no doubt in my mind but that if we do that, we will inject an instability into the world situation that will have most unfortunate consequences for the United States.

Thank you.

PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET SUPREMACY

Chairman MCCLELLAN. Before we hear General Brown, I want to ask a few questions of the Secretary.

Mr. Secretary, I noted what you have said regarding this country's present strength in comparison to that of the Soviet Union's. You talk about the trends of the past few years and you indicate that those trends must be reversed if we are to keep equally as strong, militarily speaking, as Russia.

In view of what has occurred in the past few years-and if the present trends are not reversed as you suggest and recommend-how long will it be before we will be second to the Soviet Union in aggregate military power?

I think we have to try and establish this from those who are in the best position to know. I think there are honest differences of opinion in this country as to how much military strength we should have and also on the degree or extent of the Soviet threat. There may also be the feeling, based on a misconception, that if anything starts we will have time to build up and get ready. In my judgment, that can't be done today-you are either ready or you will have little or no time to get ready in the case of hostilities.

Drawing on your experts and those associated with you who are in a position to know, give us your best judgment as to how much time we have to stop this trend, or how long will it be before the military strength of the Soviet Union surpasses that of the United States?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, let me answer it in three pieces. No. 1, I think that you are right, there are a variety of different views and there are different ways to measure, but I think most reasonable people who analyze the situation today and who have access to the most confidential information as to the Soviets' capability and knowledge of ours would say that, as of this moment, we have what

we can describe as rough equivalence. When you look at the balances the naval balance, the strategic balance, the NATO Warsaw. Pact balance and net everything out, we can say that, at this moment, we have what we can roughly describe as equivalence. That means that we are better in some areas and they are better in other areas.

The second thing we can say about it is that not any one particular trend, but the weight of all of the trends shown on those charts, indicate that the Soviet Union has been moving from a clearly inferior position, steadily up to the point where they are clearly equivalent to us and, moreover, they have momentum.

Chairman MCCLELLAN. We are now about equal overall?
Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.

We have rough equivalence with the Soviet Union. We are inferior in total number of ground forces. We are superior in other areas. We have rough equivalence but it is the momentum of their movement up that most concerns us. Think of the production base it has required to produce some 1,300 ships in recent years; to produce the improved tactical aircraft; to provide such a dramatic shift in their strategic capability.

We also have momentum, but it is a downward momentum. It is momentum that has for years said we could take $4 to $8 billion out of the defense budget and "they will never miss it." We have seen this massive reordering of priorities. We have arrived at a point today where if you wanted to increase nondefense spending by 10 percent by drawing from the defense budget, you would be taking 30 percent of the defense budget. You could do that three times and there would be no defense budget left.

If we wanted to increase nondefense funding by 30 percent we would have to take almost the whole defense budget, because we are at a $400 billion budget with defense being barely one-quarter of it. Ten years ago it was a lower budget with defense at 50 percent.

U.S./SOVIET MILITARY TRENDS

The final point I would make is this. All of us know that people behave not only on the basis of what is, but on the basis of what they think will be. People all across the globe see these trends. The Soviet Union sees those trends and they are increasingly assessed and reinterpreted all over the world. Neutrals and allies see those trends and they begin anticipating what is going to happen. They begin to key off what they believe will be the situation in 1, 2 or 3 years.

My point is that you don't try to stop a car when it is halfway through the intersection. If we do not arrest the trends, if we do not check them, there will be an appreciation in our country, in terms of our behavior, in the Soviet Union in terms of their aggressiveness, and in the remaining countries of the world about the way things are going. That will inevitably cause instabilities across the globe.

When the lines will actually cross and we will become second, or inferior, or lack sufficiency, or lack rough equivalence, I can't say precisely. People can differ on that.

My point is that unless the trends are checked now, we will begin to suffer the effects of people anticipating when it will happen. That is