most Americans would agree with this set of foreign policy goals. The defense strategy necessary to support them requires a powerful and secure strategic deterrent, general purpose forces deployed in the regions of the world judged to be most vital to our foreign policy interests, and a mobile force of sufficient strength to protect major U.S. interests elsewhere should they be threatened. Wealth and power potential have gravitated to the two great continental powers: the United States and the USSR. With only two powers of the very first magnitude, and with force and the threat of force still a basic instrument of international politics, the United States has no choice for the foreseeable future but to serve as the main counterweight to the USSR. And there must be no doubt about that fact. How much of the counterweight must be military depends not simply on the existence of another superpower. What matters is whether the other superpower harbors ambitions that conflict with ours and whether it sees force and the threat of force as a major arbiter of disputes. It would be comforting to report, in the case of the United States and the USSR, that there are no conflicts of aspiration and that force is not a factor in their relationship. But the facts speak loudly to the contrary. Since World War II, Soviet ambitions for the most part have run counter to our own. Since World War II, the Soviets have maintained enough military power to protect their own interests and threaten ours. After our pellmell demobilization of 1945 and 1946, and four years of weakness, we in turn felt compelled to build up enough military strength so that, in conjunction with our friends, we could contain Soviet power, deter attack, shield our territories, and bring about a sufficient degree of military stability to allow at least a serious effort to resolve our differences with the USSR by more peaceful processes. The Soviet Union continues to pose the primary political and military challenge to U.S. interests worldwide. It is in our interest to seek ways to avoid confrontations. But there is no doubt that, at least for the foreseeable future, there will be limits to the extent to which our policies converge. As in the past, the Soviet approach to the United States is likely to be characterized by: - Relaxation but not eradication of tension; A probing for targets of opportunity and a readiness to exploit crises when it serves their interests; Avoidance of direct military confrontation, provided that major Soviet interests are not detrimentally affected; - Hard bargaining in negotiations; Expansion of bilateral cooperation but with efforts to prevent a significant opening up of Soviet society; - Strenuous efforts to acquire advanced technology, some of which has significant military applications; - Steady growth in military expenditures, and an effort to enhance their position in the overall balance of military power. On the U.S. side, policy is directed toward seeking to reduce military tensions and the risk of military conflict with the USSR in order to promote general international stability and enhance our security and that of our allies. Several steps to that end are already on the record, and the United States continues to hope that the Vladivostok understanding of 1974 will be translated into an equitable treaty and that the negotiations for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe will move forward. The Department fully supports the President in these efforts, and it is to be hoped that we can achieve equitable arms reductions as well as arms limitation agreements, not only to increase stability and mutual confidence, but also to permit restraint in defense outlays. It would be misleading, however, to pretend that U.S. objectives have been reached. While the existing and proposed strategic arms limitation agreements are important, they do not themselves solve all the problems of strategic stability. Moreover, the current negotiations must still deal with such contentious issues as the status of the Backfire bomber and cruise missiles, MIRV verification, and the definition of heavy missiles before other objectives can be achieved. Negotiations on MBFR afford an opportunity to improve the security situation in Central Europe by achieving a more stable balance at lower levels of forces. But there are also serious potential risks involved which must be avoided. Only by giving these negotiations the most careful consideration and engaging in thorough consultations among the NATO Allies can security in Central Europe be improved and not diminished. The U.S. approach to MBFR takes into account the Soviet threat and the disparities in the existing military situation. Of particular concern are the presence in Central Europe of large numbers of Soviet forces and a Soviet/Warsaw Pact advantage of more than 150,000 ground force personnel and 10,000 tanks, together with the geographic proximity of the USSR. We have advanced proposals for withdrawals of Soviet armored forces and U.S. forces in the first instance and subsequent reductions to a manpower common ceiling between the two sides in Central Europe, together with stabilizing and verification measures. The Warsaw Pact has proposed an agreement which would in effect codify the existing military situation favoring the Soviet Union and her allies in Central Europe. We have recently advanced new initiatives, including a proposal to reduce U.S. nuclear armaments in Central Europe, in an effort to gain Warsaw Pact agreement to our basic objectives. In the conventional competition in Europe, we have seen recent increases in Pact manpower as well as a substantial program of modernization for the forces deployed in Eastern Europe. These steps can in no way be rationalized as responses to Western defense measures in the area. Indeed, the Kremlin appears to see no contradiction between detente and increased military strength. Detente needs to be understood for what it is: a word for the approach we use in relations with nations who are not our friends; who do not share our principles; who we are not sure we can trust; and who have great military power and have shown an inclination to draw on it. We seek to reduce confrontations, to lessen dangers, to put relations on a somewhat less precarious footing, to see if there might not be some interests that we share. But where East and West are concerned, we must not forget that in many of the most basic matters, including the right to individual freedom, we are fundamentally opposed. Detente, in short, begins with an awareness of basic political differences, dangers, and tension. Detente leans heavily on deterrence, and deterrence depends on our having a strong and credible defense posture. President Ford has made this point on a number of occasions by underlining that in strength there is peace; in weakness lies the risk of war. In this period of testing whether a relaxation of tension is sustainable, mutual confidence is bound to develop slowly. Confidence must be based on actions, not hopes. If we are to make real progress in the reduction of tension, we must continue to ensure that the use by the Soviets of their military weight to pursue political gains, ideological acceptance, or crisis advantage remains foreclosed. There must be no misunderstanding on this score. U.S. defense strategy and posture should be responsive to major changes in the international environment, and especially sensitive to fundamental changes in our relationships with other major powers. But we must not delude ourselves into believing that these changes will occur easily or rapidly. Even in this era of accelerated events, it would be a mistake to believe that after our experiences of the last 30 years, Soviet-American relations can suddenly become relaxed and amiable. We may hope to have left behind us the worst crises of the Cold War and entered a period of relative civility, cautious negotiation, and armed stability. But our relations with the USSR have not become so cordial and trusting that we can view the future with equanimity or engage in incremental unilateral arms reductions. - Rather, we should remain strong and vigilant, continue to work toward carefully formulated arms control agreements, accompanied by sound methods of verification, to bring about a reduction in uncertainty about future Soviet military programs. Short of such agreements and to some extent even with them we cannot escape relating defense plans and programs to the capabilities of prospective opponents and the contingencies which might arise in areas of interest to us. b. - Western Europe Although the Soviet challenge has expanded to global magnitude, we cannot disregard the fact that its strongest elements are focused on Western Europe, the region with which the United States has its oldest, strongest and most complex ties. The maintenance of a stable, secure and confident Western Europe is vital to U.S. security. The furtherance of our interests requires a Western Europe that is militarily strong enough and confident enough to discourage attack from the East or to withstand any such attack if it should occur. Western Europe must also be confident of its ability to resist indirect coercion that could be applied by the Soviet Union in lieu of overt attack. Twice during this century, the U.S. has found it necessary to intervene in wars in Western Europe in order to protect American interests and to preserve the civilization from which much of our cultural heritage springs. In the aftermath of World War II, we realized that a strong military deterrent in Central Europe, one that included U.S. forces as well as European forces, was necessary to prevent the eruption of yet another war. In support of this objective we ended our traditional isolation, broke our historic detachment from European politics and joined forces with our European allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Neither the importance of NATO nor the significance of U.S. participation in that alliance has diminished with the passage of the years. First, The U.S. force presence in Europe serves a number of purposes. these deployments help to deter a European war which would inevitably affect our security. Second, they strengthen our ties with our allies and enhance their confidence by providing them with tangible proof of our commitment to their security. Third, they provide a ready, inplace capability to meet aggression, should deterrence fail, and increase the likelihood that, if conflicts erupt, they can be limited and deterrence reestablished. Today, no less than in the past, our military strategy, and hence the structure of our forces, must continue to support the NATO alliance. To do otherwise would be seen by friend and foe as a step toward withdrawal to that outmoded concept of isolation. It would undermine the very strength and confidence that we have in Western Europe, while encouraging the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact allies to exploit any weakness or division among our European allies. Our unwavering support to Western Europe is all the more vital this year in view of the political and economic developments in Europe. It is essential that we continue our current efforts to improve the defensive strength that protects Western Europe. Through further support of programs to achieve greater standardization and rationalization of defense efforts within NATO and by enhancing the combat capability of our forces in NATO (without increasing their total numbers) the United States can demonstrate clearly its continuing commitment. The NATO Alliance is a manifestation of the interdependence of U.S. and Western European security. We should not lose sight of the fact that NATO protects the United States as well as Western Europe. C. Asia At There are some who hold the view that the Soviet Union's growing military power will be affected by the continuing differences between Moscow and Peking. To a degree, that may be the case, although the United States is not seeking to deepen or exploit the differences. the same time, we must recognize that the People's Republic of China, despite its land mass, population, long history, and rich culture, does not possess the capability that the USSR does, and that the USSR has already managed to deploy strong nuclear and non-nuclear forces in the Far East without in any way diminishing its capability to threaten the United States, Western Europe, or the Middle East. - - It will be recalled that in 1970 our adjustment in the U.S. strategic concept for general purpose forces going from the so-called 2 1/2 to the 1 1/2 war strategy took account of divisions between the USSR and the PRC. In subsequent years we reduced our baseline active ground, naval, and tactical air forces to accord with the change in strategic concept. Whatever the original basis for the change in strategy, we have already extracted the maximum amount of prudent savings from the SinoSoviet split, and should now ensure that our forces are adequate to promote our Asian objectives. It would be a mistake to believe that the size of our defense establishment should be any more sensitive than it already has been to this dangerous rivalry. With regard to our general posture in Asia, as President Ford noted this past Pearl Harbor Day: "America, a nation of the Pacific basin, has a vital stake in Asia, and a responsibility to take a leading part in lessening tensions, preventing hostilities, and preserving peace. World stability and our own security depend upon our Asian commitment. The President emphasized six points in a Pacific doctrine that affects force planning. The points were: ་་ But without 1. "American strength is basic to any stable balance of power in the Pacific. We must reach beyond our concern for security. security, there can be neither peace nor progress." 2. "Partnership with Japan is a pillar of our strategy." 3. A major premise "of a new Pacific doctrine is the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, the strengthening of our new ties ..." 4. "A... principle of our Pacific policy is our continuing stake in the stability and security of Southeast Asia." 5. Peace in Asia "depends on a resolution of outstanding political conflicts." We remain committed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula, "as the presence of our forces there attests. In Indochina, "the healing effects of time are required." But if the new regimes "exhibit restraint toward their neighbors and constructive approaches to international problems, we will look to the future rather than the past." 6. Peace in Asia "requires a structure of economic cooperation reflecting the aspirations of all the peoples in the region." This is especially the case since our trade with east Asia "now exceeds our transactions with the European community. America's jobs, currency, and raw materials depend upon ties with the Pacific basin. Our trade with the region is now increasing by more than 30 percent annually reaching $46 billion last year. 11 In sum, as the President stressed, "the United States is a Pacific nation," and he pledged to "continue America's active concern for Asia and our presence in the Asian Pacific region." From our small number of facilities in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Guam, our forces in Asia some 150,000 - in a prompt and measured manner to achieve U.S. goals. - can react Japan, our principal ally in Asia, plays a vital role in maintaining regional stability. Japan's ability to act as a political leader without large armed forces stems directly from the protective umbrella provided to Japan by her security treaty with the United States. Her sense of security is directly related to her confidence in the strength and efficacy of the U.S. security commitment. All the major powers of Asia have interests in the Korean Peninsula where, for over 20 years, the United States has maintained its pledge to South Korea and helped keep peace on the Peninsula. Our ground presence has been tangible evidence of support to the Republic of Korea, a formidable deterrent to North Korean attack, and a factor helpful to dissuading either the PRC or the USSR from condoning or supporting such an attack. Since the Japanese consider the security of South Korea to be intimately related to their own security, U.S. support to South Korea is essential to stability in Northeast Asia. In South Asia U.S. objectives are to encourage peaceful relations among the nations of the area and to discourage superpower competition and confrontation. We are also interested in maintaining free transit through the Indian Ocean route from the Persian Gulf to Japan and the U.S. West Coast. Periodically, we deploy naval forces to the area to support these objectives. d. The Middle East The Middle East is an area of paramount importance to the United States. A renewal of Arab-Israeli hostilities could pose a direct threat to U.S. security, particularly if it resulted in a major power military confrontation or another embargo on oil to the West. Political and military instability within the Gulf area itself, if it were to disrupt the supply of oil, would be damaging to U.S. and allied interests. |