far from assenting to what he has advanced in support of them. He contends, without reserve, that the free actions of men are not within the Divine Prescience; resting his doctrine partly on the assumption, that there are no strict and absolute predictions, in Scripture, of those actions in which men are represented as free and responsible; and partly on the abstract reason, that such actions are in their nature impossible to be certainly foreknown*.

The assumption, which the author here goes upon, is certainly erroneous: inasmuch as there are prophecies in Scripture definitely predicting judicial visitations for voluntary sin, and prophecies including equally the particular sin, and its punishment. The instance which he has selected" of the " punishments which were prophetically denounced "by Moses against the Israelites," instead of being the uncertain and indeterminate prediction which he states it to be, is a conspicuous example of a prophecy absolute as to the event. "The Lord said "unto Moses, Behold, thou shalt sleep with thy "Fathers, and this people will rise up, and

go a

whoring after the gods of the strangers of the land, whither they go to be amongst them, and "will foresake me, and break my covenant, which I "have made with them. Then my anger shall be "kindled against them, &ct." Which declaration

* Warburton, Lect. i. p. 29, &c. &c.

† Deut. xxxi. 16.

of their foreknown sin Moses repeats in the same chapter*. In this instance, therefore, the Divine Prescience comprehended their sin and their punishment. But their sin was optional and free. It was in breach of a condition which they had the power to keep. The other examples, often cited, of the predictions concerning the cruelty of Hazael, the treachery of Judas, the denial of Peter, are only some among many of the same class; viz. definite prophecies of the yet undetermined actions of men. The prophecy of Jonah concerning the destruction of Nineveh is improperly and injudiciously put in comparison with that concerning the fate of the Israelites. For Jonah did not foretell the persevering sin, and the impenitence of Nineveh; but only its destruction. Now the general conditional tenour of the Divine judgments may often, or always, be supposed to leave the hope of a possibility of their recall. But where the obduracy of the sin is included in the matter of the prediction, as it is with regard to the Israelites, that point, upon which the recall of them might be expected, is already foreclosed in the prophecy.

As to the abstract reason," that free actions are impossible, in their nature, to be foreknown," I have already considered it in the former part of this Discourse; and I have only to add, that the author seems, in advancing this objection, to have over

*Deut. v. 31.

looked, or very slightly considered, the distinction which Origen, Clarke*, and others †, had so clearly shewn to exist between certainty, and necessity of things.

Upon each ground of Dr. Pearson's argument, I must be permitted to say, that I think he has scarcely exercised so much care and deliberation in forming his opinions, as the very questionable and startling nature of them required. Many of his positions concerning the Divine Foreknowledge are hazardous in the extreme, and some of them are more than hazardous. He speaks of God as foreseeing the contingent possibilities of things, and being provided with means adapted to them; but not clearly and absolutely foreknowing what in all cases will actually take place in the moral world. Hence, the Fall of Man, and the appointment of the scheme of Redemption, connected with that Fall, are placed among the uncertainties of the Divine Mind, as though God had not an eternal foreknowledge of one, the greatest and most wonderful of his own acts. "Known unto God are all his works "from the beginning." This text, the author properly observes, relates to the works of God, not of man. But since the works of God, in his moral Economy, are in many instances adapted to the

* Demonstrat. of Being and Attributes, vol. i. prop. x. † As Limborch and Episcopius. Limborch, quoted page 383 above. Episcopius, Instit. Theol. Lib. iv. Sect. xvii.

works of his creatures, how can his own works bet foreknown to him, if theirs are not? His declared preordination of his own works of Providence, in judgment and mercy, is one explicit and invincible proof of his perfect foreknowledge of theirs. Whereas, therefore, the candid author intends his opinions to be such only as can be reconciled with Scripture, I think it must be conceded that they are no less repugnant to that authority, than are any of those opinions of the Calvinistic doctrine, the avoidance of which has precipitated his theology into these exceptionable tenets: and it is to be regretted that he should have departed from the wariness and sobriety of Mr. Locke, whose sentiments on this subject he quotes, but only to differ from them. "I own freely," says that excellent philosopher *, "the weakness of my understanding, that, though "it be unquestionable, that there is omnipotence " and omniscience in God, our Maker, and I cannot "have a clearer perception of any thing than that "I am free; yet I cannot make freedom in man "consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in "God, though I am as fully persuaded of both, as of any truths I most firmly assent to."

One remark more I shall offer upon the abstract question under discussion. If we begin our speculation by saying, since God foresees the action

* Locke, vol. iii., p. 487.

and already beholds it, how can it be free, we attempt to look through the immensity of the Divine Mind, and place ourselves on a height far above the level of our faculties. But if we begin from below, by supposing our actions to be free, as we have the best reason to suppose them, then the creed of natural piety, and the conviction of the infinite and unlimited scope of the Divine Intelligence, will more readily help us into an apprehension of the article, and an acquiescence in it. And this is a mode of consideration which I suggest, partly after an idea of Origen, as deserving to be kept in view whilst we attempt to explore this question.

Nor is erroneous opinion in such points as these a thing indifferent. Derogatory notions concerning the attributes of the Supreme Being are unquestionably among the deteriorations of religion. Whilst it is acknowledged that we can have no sufficient, no adequate ideas of the excellency and perfection of his nature, yet the mistakes of a false and an unworthy apprehension of him it seems to be And if our more within our power to avoid. opinions are cultivated, as they ought be, for the purposes of faith, not to be mere matter of discourse; if a sense of the majesty of God and his perfections, is to be a bond and instrument of religion, none of these perfections can be impaired in our opinion of them, without detriment to our essential piety. Whether it be his Justice, his Mercy,