Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons: Hearings, Ninety-second Congress, Second Sesssion, on Joint Resolutions ...U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972 - 155 pages |
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Page 7
... operational and under construction when it was signed is not of im- portance , since the construction of even one new ICBM for operational purposes is banned . When we made clear to the Soviet Union that we 7.
... operational and under construction when it was signed is not of im- portance , since the construction of even one new ICBM for operational purposes is banned . When we made clear to the Soviet Union that we 7.
Page 8
... operational modern submarines - Y - class nuclear- powered submarines for the U.S.S.R. has been set at 62. A ceiling for SLBM launchers for the U.S.S.R. has been set at 950 , to include all launchers on nuclear - powered submarines - Y ...
... operational modern submarines - Y - class nuclear- powered submarines for the U.S.S.R. has been set at 62. A ceiling for SLBM launchers for the U.S.S.R. has been set at 950 , to include all launchers on nuclear - powered submarines - Y ...
Page 9
... operational mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agree- ment as inconsistent with the objectives of the agreement . The Interim Agreement provides for the application of the same verification procedures and commitments ...
... operational mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agree- ment as inconsistent with the objectives of the agreement . The Interim Agreement provides for the application of the same verification procedures and commitments ...
Page 45
... operational SLBM submarines will not increase during the period of this agree- ment . We also have an urgent need to keep the development program for the B - 1 bomber on schedule . This program is designed to provide us an option to ...
... operational SLBM submarines will not increase during the period of this agree- ment . We also have an urgent need to keep the development program for the B - 1 bomber on schedule . This program is designed to provide us an option to ...
Page 49
... operational SLBM's and is building at the rate of about 128 per year . They were , therefore , capable of oper- ating about 1,200 SLBM's by 1977. A Soviet maximum of 950 mod- ern launchers is all they are permitted by the undertakings ...
... operational SLBM's and is building at the rate of about 128 per year . They were , therefore , capable of oper- ating about 1,200 SLBM's by 1977. A Soviet maximum of 950 mod- ern launchers is all they are permitted by the undertakings ...
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons: Hearings Before ... United States. Congress. House. Foreign Affairs Affichage du livre entier - 1972 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM interceptor missiles ABM radars ABM Treaty ABM's Admiral MOORER agree ahead allies Ambassador SMITH anti-ballistic missile approval arms control arms limitation Article attack bargaining chip believe BINGHAM bombers capability Chairman MORGAN Chiefs of Staff committee concerned CONGRESS THE LIBRARY consider construction deployed deterrent discussed evacuation FASCELL FRASER FRELINGHUYSEN go forward heavy ICBM ICBM launchers ICBM silo launchers ICBM's important Interim Agreement Joint Chiefs launch LIBRARY OF CONGRES LIBRARY OF CONGRESS LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC MAILLIARD means of verification ment MIRV MONAGAN Moscow National Command Authority national technical means NATO non-ABM nuclear offensive weapons operational Party undertakes position President prohibited question ratification retaliatory Russians SALT agreements SALT II SALT talks Secretary LAIRD Secretary ROGERS Senate SLBM SLBM's Soviet Union Standing Consultative Commission strategic arms strategic offensive arms TELLER test ranges Thank tion Trident U.S. Delegation United warheads Washington WHALEN WOLFF ZABLOCKI
Fréquemment cités
Page 47 - Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and determined to continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 140 - Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Page 140 - ... national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.
Page 139 - The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 141 - Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 137 - To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode...
Page 126 - ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.
Page 143 - The Parties understand that land-based ICBM launchers referred to in the Interim Agreement are understood to be launchers for strategic ballistic missiles capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental US and the northwestern border of the continental USSR.
Page 139 - For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
Page 126 - In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles...