Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons: Hearings, Ninety-second Congress, Second Sesssion, on Joint Resolutions ...U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972 - 155 pages |
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Page 21
... Trident or the new B - 1 bomber , he would oppose these agreements . That would be in violation of the agreements . It is possible that he is doing this for the internal politics of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ...
... Trident or the new B - 1 bomber , he would oppose these agreements . That would be in violation of the agreements . It is possible that he is doing this for the internal politics of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ...
Page 23
... Trident develop- ment ? For instance , if we went ahead with the long - range missile develop- ment , if we stretched it out from a 7 - year program to a 12 - year pro- gram , for one thing , we don't know what we are building into the ...
... Trident develop- ment ? For instance , if we went ahead with the long - range missile develop- ment , if we stretched it out from a 7 - year program to a 12 - year pro- gram , for one thing , we don't know what we are building into the ...
Page 24
... Trident as opposed to the ABM system . I just wonder , Mr. Smith , what value , in your negotiation , if any , came from the fact that America was building ABM system ? The argument was made that it would contribute to the arms race and ...
... Trident as opposed to the ABM system . I just wonder , Mr. Smith , what value , in your negotiation , if any , came from the fact that America was building ABM system ? The argument was made that it would contribute to the arms race and ...
Page 25
... Trident , maybe the B - 1 , for our security ? Is that going to be an important factor in the second round ? Ambassador SMITH . Speaking personally , I have never been very happy with this concept of a " bargaining chip . " Both major ...
... Trident , maybe the B - 1 , for our security ? Is that going to be an important factor in the second round ? Ambassador SMITH . Speaking personally , I have never been very happy with this concept of a " bargaining chip . " Both major ...
Page 37
... Trident for opera- tion in the 1970's . We have to prepare for the longer range future , and I understand that is the purpose of these new programs . PRESIDENT'S ESTIMATES OF SOVIET FORCES Mr. CULVER . In his press conference in late ...
... Trident for opera- tion in the 1970's . We have to prepare for the longer range future , and I understand that is the purpose of these new programs . PRESIDENT'S ESTIMATES OF SOVIET FORCES Mr. CULVER . In his press conference in late ...
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons: Hearings Before ... United States. Congress. House. Foreign Affairs Affichage du livre entier - 1972 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM interceptor missiles ABM radars ABM Treaty ABM's Admiral MOORER agree ahead allies Ambassador SMITH anti-ballistic missile approval arms control arms limitation Article attack bargaining chip believe BINGHAM bombers capability Chairman MORGAN Chiefs of Staff committee concerned CONGRESS THE LIBRARY consider construction deployed deterrent discussed evacuation FASCELL FRASER FRELINGHUYSEN go forward heavy ICBM ICBM launchers ICBM silo launchers ICBM's important Interim Agreement Joint Chiefs launch LIBRARY OF CONGRES LIBRARY OF CONGRESS LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC MAILLIARD means of verification ment MIRV MONAGAN Moscow National Command Authority national technical means NATO non-ABM nuclear offensive weapons operational Party undertakes position President prohibited question ratification retaliatory Russians SALT agreements SALT II SALT talks Secretary LAIRD Secretary ROGERS Senate SLBM SLBM's Soviet Union Standing Consultative Commission strategic arms strategic offensive arms TELLER test ranges Thank tion Trident U.S. Delegation United warheads Washington WHALEN WOLFF ZABLOCKI
Fréquemment cités
Page 47 - Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and determined to continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 140 - Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Page 140 - ... national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.
Page 139 - The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 141 - Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 137 - To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode...
Page 126 - ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.
Page 143 - The Parties understand that land-based ICBM launchers referred to in the Interim Agreement are understood to be launchers for strategic ballistic missiles capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental US and the northwestern border of the continental USSR.
Page 139 - For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
Page 126 - In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles...