ity. With approval of the President's budget request, this crucial objective also will be sustained.

The defense programs that are before the Congress are needed to preserve the effectiveness of our deterrent, both with and without SALT. Without the current agreements before you, we would be forced to take further measures to protect our deterrent capability. With the agreements, we can continue our programs in prudent fashion as we move into follow-on negotiations in SALT II.

REQUIREMENT FOR TRIDENT AND B-1 BOMBER

Let me briefly summarize the basis of our need for the major programs which are included in the revised defense budget for fiscal year 1973.

We need Trident at the earliest possible date. Last year we made the decision to accelerate Trident as the most appropriate new initiative to preserve the sufficiency of our strategic deterrent for the future.

As you know, Trident is presently planned as a replacement system. It should be noted that our programs will not get the first Trident submarine into operation until after the scheduled expiration date of the Interim Agreement. Even though an increase from the present 41 to 44 boats is permitted, the United States total number of operational SLBM submarines will not increase during the period of this agree

ment.

We also have an urgent need to keep the development program for the B-1 bomber on schedule. This program is designed to provide us an option to deploy the first aircraft in the late 1970's.

THE NCA ABM DEFENSE

With regard to the defense of the National Command Authority (NCA), we can fund the NCA defense in fiscal year 1973 and still reduce the budget request for ABM by $650 million. As I have reported to the Congress, system components originally slated for defense of Minuteman sites will be continued with the objective of using these components at Washington. During fiscal year 1973, we propose to continue studies of NCA defense, continue advanced site preparation, and retain options for specific NCA defense configuration. The actual request on the NCA when these preparations have been made would not be included until the 1974 budget request.

The prototype development program for site defense preserves the option to deploy a terminal defense of U.S. ICBM's should that become necessary. This prototype program is permitted by the treaty and it will provide for earlier availability of developmental hardware, earlier development of software, and earlier test and demonstration.

REVISED SATELLITE BASING PROGRAM

The revised satellite basing program accelerates the funding for improved facilities at our strategic bomber bases and makes these facilities available in a more timely fashion. Our bomber alert force will be able to use inland bases at an earlier time period and existing main operating bases will have added launch facilities sooner than initially planned.

SLCM AND COMMAND/CONTROL SYSTEMS

The development of a submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) system is necessary to assure that we have options for increasing our strength in the future, if the need arises. The funding we are proposing will allow more intensive study of the SLCM system and initiate the development of propulsion and guidance components, some of which may challenge the existing technology. The Soviets, as you know, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, now have significant numbers of SLCM's deployed on nuclear boats and an active production program for the SLCM within the Soviet Union.

The SALT agreements, in my view, underscore the importance of having reliable, effective command, control, and communications systems. We are recommending additional funding in fiscal year 1973 to the Department of Defense to improve the degree of secure communications with the airborne command post; advance our technology using satellite communications; improve the survivability features of data systems, especially those associated with advanced computers; conduct system engineering studies of the worldwide military command and control system. These are all included in the 1973 presentation which has been made to the Armed Services Committee in the House and Senate and to the Appropriations Committees of both the House and the Senate.

We are also requesting moderate increases in funding to move forward with work on improved reentry vehicles for our ballistic missiles.

Clearly, adequate and effective verification capabilities are necessary. We have such capabilities now and are proposing moderate increases in funding to assure that verification of the provisions contained in these agreements will remain adequate in the future. All of these particular items requiring authorization of the Armed Services Committee were included in the bill which was enacted in the House of Representatives as reported from the House Armed Services Committee.

STRONG CONVICTIONS ABOUT SALT AGREEMENTS

I want to repeat what I told the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in testimony last month: We enter these agreements with the following interdependent strong convictions:

Our security will be enhanced.

We have applied brakes to the momentum of Soviet strategic missile deployments.

We have adequate means of verification.

Congress will support, I am confident, the strategic programs we have proposed and will propose.

We have taken the initial steps and have laid a solid foundation for further arms limitation and potential arms reductions in the future.

As you note, we need the help of the Congress, which is a full partner with coequal responsibilities in providing for the defense and the security of our Nation. The executive branch cannot succeed alone.

I urge your support of these agreements and continued support of the programs necessary for the future sufficiency of our forces. With them we can, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, continue to preserve our security and to negotiate successfully from a position of strength as we move into the follow-on negotiations in SALT II in this very important strategic area.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.
Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Admiral Moorer, you may proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, U.S. NAVY, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral MOORER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss with you today the SALT agreements and their interrelationship to our strategic force posture. The Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and our strategic forces have been designed to serve a common purpose-to preserve peace.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff share with all the people of the United States a sincere desire to relieve mankind of the burden and terror of modern weapons. On October 23, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised President Truman that they

*** regard it as of great military importance that further steps *** be promptly and vigorously pressed ** in an effort to forestall a possible race in atomic weapons

At that time the Joint Chiefs of Staff further suggested, as a matter of immediate importance, measures for

** restricting or outlawing the use of atomic weapons and for encouraging the full development of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, recognized in 1945 and still maintain today that a credible strategic deterrent is indispensable to peace. For that reason, no task is more important, from a military standpoint, than that of maintaining and protecting such a force. Our strategic nuclear weapons have but one essential purpose-to deter conflict. The real objectives is that these weapons never be used. Arms control agreements, to be either enduring or effective, must mutually enhance the security of both parties. We must, in order to survive as a Nation, retain the power needed to deter aggression, not as a symbol of national aggrandizement but as an essential shield for the preservation of our security. It is in this context that the treaty, the agreement, and the U.S. strategic posture must be viewed.

JCS REPRESENTED ON SALT DELEGATION

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were officially represented on the SALT delegation and were consulted prior to signature. If we press forward vigorously with our programs designed to protect against a degradation in national security posture, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the deterrent capability of our strategic forces will not be impaired,

that the peace of the world may be enhanced, and that the undertakings will be in the best interests of the United States.

There are two essential ingredients in any analysis of the strategic consequences of these undertakings: first, the relative balance between the U.S.S.R. and the United States projected over the life of the agreement; and second, drawing upon that analysis, a discussion of the essential continuing steps we must take to preserve U.S. security and the stability of international order as we move into the future.

THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

It is necessary that we examine a little of the past in order to understand the present and to put the future in perspective. In discussing the fiscal year 1971 budget with the Congress, Mr. Laird and I both said that the United States no longer had clear superiority in strategic nuclear weapons. In the course of considering our relative military posture during the fiscal year 1972 budget hearings, I reported that the "balance is tenuous." This year my report to the Congress reflected that the balance is turning against us in quantitative terms and that short of an effective agreement on strategic arms limitations, the momentum of the Soviet strategic force buildup would likely carry Soviet forces well beyond the level planned for United States forces in the mid- or late 1970's. This momentum resulted from the fact that the U.S.S.R. has had an active ICBM and SLBM construction and deployment program since the mid-sixties, while in a quantitative sense, the United States remained static-concentrating instead on qualitative improvements. We, therefore, must examine the impact of these agreements on the basis not only of what they freeze, but also upon what they forestall.

I would like now to briefly analyze the strategic military balance and project it into the future in order to describe how the Strategic Arms Limitations (SAL) undertakings affect that balance. I will address specifically those forces affected by the undertakings: ICBM's, SLBM's, and ABM's. In addition, the three general quantitative measures which have been used to summarize the overall strategic military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union-numbers of delivery vehicles, megatons, and warheads-will be discussed.

Turning now to the numbers of United States and Soviet ICBM launchers, the U.S.S.R. is expected to have approximately 1,550 ICBM's on launchers by July 1 of this year. They have been deploying ICBM's at the rate of about 250 per year. Thus, if unconstrained, they could have had by midyear 1977 well over 2,000 such missiles on launchers. The number of ICBM launchers projected for the Soviets under SAL is between 1,600 and 1,400, depending on how many they choose to convert to SLBM's. In the SAL environment, we actually consider the lower number of ICBM launchers to be the more severe threat. The reason for this apparent anomaly is that a lower number of ICBM launchers reflects the phaseout and replacement of older missiles with modern SLBM's. It should be noted, however, that the maximum numbers of ICBM's and SLBM's that the Soviets could have had without the constraints of the undertakings were much in excess of those permitted by the agreement. United States ICBM's as projected in our 5-year defense program would not have increased beyond the current level of 1,054.

SLBM LAUNCHERS

SLBM launchers are the next item of interest. The U.S.S.R. is estimated to have about 580 operational SLBM's and is building at the rate of about 128 per year. They were, therefore, capable of operating about 1,200 SLBM's by 1977. A Soviet maximum of 950 modern launchers is all they are permitted by the undertakings. The U.S. SLBM launcher level will remain constant through 1977, at 656. Although under the agreement we are permitted to build up to 710 SLBM launchers by converting our 54 Titans to SLBM launchers, we cannot deploy our first new Trident submarine until 1978 and, thus, add to our SLBM launcher force.

The total number of intercontinental delivery vehicles projected for the United States and the Soviet Union should now be considered. The 140 U.S.S.R. and 457 U.S. bombers must now be added to the numbers of intercontinental delivery vehicles previously discussed. They are unaffected by the agreement. Approximately 2,100 deployable vehicles are now available to each party. The Soviet Union was expected to overtake us in this measure by mid-1972 and to have over 3,000 delivery vehicles operational by 1977. Under the terms of the undertaking, our best estimates reflect a level of 2,167 United States and 2,499 U.S.S.R. delivery vehicles. This factor, more than any other, points out the significance of interrupting Soviet momentum. Granted, we have a freeze at a ratio of about 2,499 to 2,167 in favor of the Soviet Union, but we have forestalled a 1977 ratio of about 3 to 2 in their favor.

U.S.S.R.: SUPERIOR IN MEGATONNAGE

The U.S.S.R. was already far superior to us in total intercontinental strategic offensive megatonnage. Only in the numbers of strategic offensive warheads was the United States projected to maintain a lead over the Soviet Union during the next 5 years. Even here, the U.S.S.R. has the potential to overtake us. Given the technology which we have every reason to believe the Soviet Union either has or is acquiring, it is anticipated that they will move vigorously into the MIRV's, both in their ICBM's and SLBM's. The considerably greater "throw weight" or payload capacity of the Soviet missile force particularly the SS-9 type missile, is especially adaptable to this task. It is still anticipated that they will considerably narrow our lead in terms of numbers of warheads by the late 1970's. However, the restraint on their deploying more than the 313 SS-9 type missiles now operational or under construction will impact upon this growth. Here we benefit from both what we freeze and what we forestall.

As I have noted on several prior occasions, an objective evaluation of the overall strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union requires consideration of all the factors in the strategic equation delivery vehicles, megatons, and warheads-in an appropriate combination, together with prelaunch survivability, reliability, accuracy, range, and penetrability of enemy defensive systems.