As a result of our current success we are provided a more secure and stable strategic relationship with the U.S.S.R. And, I believe, Mr. Chairman, the security of the United States has been strengthened.

The gains of the United States and the U.S.S.R.-and the worldthrough SALT are achieved without compromising basic security interests.

International security and world order are preserved and strengthened. The threat of nuclear war is dramatically reduced, and the world thus has greater hope for the future.

Mr. Chairman, I urge this committee and the House of Representatives to support the agreements that have been reached in SALT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TIMETABLE FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Secretary, am I correct that questions are to be answered by you and Ambassador Smith?

During the White House briefing on the SALT agreements in June, the President indicated his desire to have congressional action completed by September 1 in order that further negotiations with the Soviets could go forward in October.

Do you at present have concrete plans to resume further arms talks with the Russians in October?

Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, our position is the position that you have just referred to which was stated by the President.

We would like very much to have the agreement approved and the treaty ratified by that time because we would hope to start the second phase of the SALT talks in October. I don't believe a specific date has been set yet but that is our goal, and I think that is the goal of the Soviet Union.

Maybe Ambassador Smith will reply to that.

STATEMENT OF HON. GERARD SMITH, DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Ambassador SMITH. The evidence we have, Mr. Chairman, is that the Soviets are ready to start as soon as we are and the only limiting factor is approval by the Congress of the first product of SALT.

We are doing preliminary planning on a contingency basis in terms of housekeeping and other arrangements abroad, but have not been able to set a date under the present circumstances.

Chairman MORGAN. Ambassador Smith, if it is not possible for Congress to complete its action on the agreements before the August 18 recess for the Republican Convention, what would be the effect on current plans?

Would it be possible to go forward with the talks despite no final action?

Ambassador SMITH. The answer to that question, sir, is how soon after the resumption, presumably after Labor Day, the Congress could act.

I think that we cannot make a commitment for a date to start negotiations until we have the action of the Congress, favorable action, on the first agreements.

Secretary ROGERS. I think, Mr. Chairman, to answer that question, the likelihood of being able to start as early as we would like to is greatly reduced unless this Congress acts by the 18th.

I certainly would want to have the committee and the Congress to act by that time if at all possible. I think it is important now to continue the negotiations, and I think it is also important to indicate to the Soviet Union that the agreements that the President has signed have the support of the Congress and the American people and I think the earlier we do that the better.

Now we would like very much to start these negotiations in October.

DID HASTE AT MOSCOW HURT U.S. POSITION?

Chairman MORGAN. Ambassador Smith, I know you have testified on the other side of the Capitol. I have been reading that certain individuals in the other body have charged that due to the rush to have the SALT agreements signed by the time the President visited Moscow last May, the United States has put itself over a barrel in terms of bargaining its position.

As a result, according to the story the self-imposed deadline led to major concessions by the United States which gravely increased the disadvantages to us in the final agreements.

What is your comment on those charges, Mr. Ambassador?

Ambassador SMITH. My instructions from the President were not to consider that I had any deadline, that we were to negotiate provident agreements and not look at any specific point in time as a deadline.

In fact, that is the way it worked out. The discussions in Moscow were not conducted in a rushed fashion. They were based on a large amount of negotiation that had already taken place, in Helsinski, and I don't believe that they resulted in any concessions because of time

pressure.

I don't believe there were any major concessions in Moscow.

AN ABM SYSTEM FOR WASHINGTON, D.C.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Secretary, there has been a great deal of criticism about the need to build an ABM system around the Capitol. How important do you feel that building this system is to carrying out the SALT agreements?

We know that several weeks ago, it was suggested in the House, Congress might be opposed to the ABM system for Washington and that we should go slow because in the new phase 2 of the negotiations we might realize that this section of the ABM agreement would be

Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, as you will notice in the prepared statement, I indicated we think we should proceed with that ABM construction.

We do think it is important. We think when we make agreements with the Soviet Union that it is clearly intended that they will go ahead as permitted under the agreements and we should, too.

There was no doubt in the minds of the Russians when we talked to them that they were going to proceed within the limits permitted and we feel we should, too.

I think it is important to proceed. I think we should proceed as we would have otherwise proceeded. I don't think we should slow it down or speed it up. I think we should proceed in the way we think serves our national interests but we do think it is important to go ahead with the ABM site at the National Command Authority.

BREZHNEV AS SIGNATORY TO AGREEMENTS

Chairman MORGAN. I have a second question. I notice the President signed the agreements with Chairman Brezhnev, who is general secretary of the Communist Party. Wasn't it unusual that he didn't sign with the Chief of State or the Prime Minister, but signed rather with the general secretary of the Communist Party?

What are your views on that?

Secretary ROGERS. Because we recognize the right of every nation to decide on how it will run its government, and who has the authority, we fully recognize the authority of Chairman Brezhnev to sign these agreements and, of course, we didn't question it.

You undoubtedly noticed that all the other members of the government were there, and those who were not members of the government, the politbureau.

By and large, I think there were 11 or 12 there. It is quite unusual. Some agreements Mr. Kosygin signed, and some agreements Mr. Podgorny signed. Those were decisions by the Soviet Government.

AN ABM SYSTEM FOR WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. MAILLIARD, Mr. Secretary, I think it is pretty obvious the ABM complex around Washington is going to be controversial. In your prepared statement, you emphasized, and then again in response to the chairman, that you think it is important but you have not given us much of a scenario as to why it is important.

Secretary ROGERS. I assume there will be separate hearings on that and I think we should have hearings. I guess there is a provision in the present budget for the acquisition of some land for that purpose; isn't there?

Ambassador SMITH. There are requests for some preliminary planning work.

Secretary ROGERS. I am sure Congress will have full opportunity to go into the details of it but the reasons I think it is important to proceed are the reasons I mentioned in my statement.

Mr. MAILLIARD. As I understand the situation, the Soviet Union in effect has deployed an ABM system around its National Command Authority. We have gotten fairly well along in developing one around one of our main ICBM bases and had started on some others, as I understand it.

Secretary ROGERS. Those we have agreed to abandon.

Mr. MAILLIARD. And we are permitted to build one around Washington, but it seems necessary to explain pretty clearly what advantage it gives us to proceed with the defense of the National Command Authority. Maybe this is not the right time to ask that question.

Secretary ROGERS, I think it is the right time. I don't know that we can go into detail but, one, it protects against an accident or unau

thorized launch and gives us additional time as a result of the radar equipment we have to detect a serious attack.

So, it does have advantages and I think we can explore them more fully at the appropriate time.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

Mr. MAILLIARD. Also in your prepared statement you, a number of times, stressed your confidence in a national technological method of

Secretary ROGERS. Verification.

Mr. MAILLIARD (continuing). Verification. Again, maybe this is not the appropriate time, but it seems to me if we are going to do an intelligent job of trying to sell this whole proposal not only to the Congress but to the public at large, this needs to be expanded on to some extent.

You stress that both in the treaty and the Interim Agreement that it is understood that there is how did you put it?-nonconcealment ? Secretary ROGERS. Yes; no attempt to interfere with detection methods and no concealment of missiles under construction, et cetera.

Let me say this: If the committee wants to, of course, in executive session, we are prepared to go into this matter fully.

I don't believe there is anyone that has any doubts about the detection systems that we now have. We are certain that they provide adequate protection against the violation of the agreements.

We don't say that there might not be a beginning made that we could not detect, but very quickly before it had any substantial meaning it would be detected.

We could also detect if there was any method of interfering with our detection methods.

The Soviets feel the same way. I don't believe that it is a matter of

concern.

OPERATION OF STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Mr. MAILLIARD. If it should happen in the course of these agreements being enforced that we did detect something that gave rise to concern on our part that maybe something was going on that ought not to be, could you tell us a little bit more about how this standing commission is to be constituted and whether it is to meet regularly and whether it is a forum for any complaints, or doubts, or questions.

How is this going to operate?

Secretary ROGERS. I will turn this over to Ambassador Smith.

Let me merely say, the fact that we have this commission is, I think, a very good safeguard. It would provide a method immediately to discuss any such suspicions if the suspicions were verified, if it turned out there was violation, like any other agreement, then it would be subject to cancellation if a party violates it.

I believe that the fact that we have a commission and there is an agreement that we will discuss any such matters together provides adequate protection.

This is one area I don't think we should have any concern about, this question of noncompliance, because I think we will be able to detect any such noncompliance and they will, too.

82-108-72-2

ROLE OF COMMISSION

Ambassador SMITII. To answer specifically your question, sir, about the Standing Consultative Commission, Article XIII of the treaty covers it and lists a number of the functions that this commission will have. The first three directly bear on your question.

One of the functions is to consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous.

The second is to provide on a voluntary basis such information as either party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed.

The third is to consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification.

As for the question you asked about the operation of this commission, we do not yet have a charter for it. I think one of the first things we will want to do in the follow-on negotiations is to work up an agreed charter for this commission.

Personally, I have in mind a body that will meet periodically. I hope that it will not be very large. Perhaps while the SALT negotiations continue, the delegations themselves can be considered as functioning as a standing commission.

But, in time I would think that there might be five or ten officials on both sides, meeting two or three times a year regularly to look into the operations of these agreements.

It is recognized that we can't foresee the future very clearly, and we will want to monitor the operation of these agreements regularly. Mr. MAILLIARD. In the course of agreeing to this commission, at least I can't find anything in here that spells out whether it is going to have a permanent home or a permanent secretariat or whether it is going to meet on an ad hoc basis.

None of these things appear to be spelled out but I would assume you must have had something fairly specific spelled out?

Ambassador SMITH. Yes, sir: that is correct.

That will be spelled out in the charter, and I hope one of the first things we will get to.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Will that commission also have jurisdiction-I have article XIII of the treaty, but does it also have monitoring authority as far as the agreement is concerned?

Ambassador SMITH. No, sir; the commission will have no responsibility to take action. It will be a consultative commission.

Mr. MAILLIARD. But applying both to the treaty and the agreement?
Ambassador SMITH. That is correct.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

At the very outset, Mr. Secretary, I want to underscore your understanding that Ambassador Gerard Smith and his associates had consulted with the subcommittee of this committee.

They have given full and complete regular reports and the consultations with the subcommittee are deeply appreciated, and we are hopeful in the future we will have cooperation with the SALT agreements and negotiations.