NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL Mr. BINGHAM. Dr. Teller, with regard to your expressed fear that the Soviets might engage in nuclear blackmail because you have calculated or you have evidence that they have taken measures such that not more than 4 percent of the population would be killed in a nuclear attack, do you have any historical evidence that would lead you to conclude the Soviets might take action, bearing in mind that even 4 percent of the population would be a very large loss and that in a nuclear chain the Soviet economy would be heavily damaged, if not wiped out? Mr. TELLER. One way in which I might try to answer this question, is this: If the Russians manage to knock out the United States completely to achieve world leadership, to establish a position where they can command slave labor from anywhere in the world, then a loss of 4 percent of their people might conceivably be acceptable. After all, they killed more than 4 percent of their own people in the concentration camps. Also, their economy, with the help they can commandeer from abroad, could be reconstituted in a number of years smaller than was needed after the Second World War. So, this danger might still exist. If, on the other hand, the United States survives the attack, if they will not have accomplished world leadership but lost their industries, then I believe our deterrents might, indeed, suffice to deter them. CALCULATIONS OF LOSS IN NUCLEAR EXCHANGE Mr. BINGHAM. If I follow your argument, you are saying that the Soviet decision in this regard might depend not so much on what they anticipate in terms of destruction of their own economy and destruction of their own people as to what they would anticipate in terms of destruction of the United States; is that correct? Mr. TELLER. I believe their decision is apt to be influenced by both. There is a limit to what losses they are willing to accept. There is also a very serious question of what they can accomplish. If they can accomplish more, if, indeed, they can accomplish unquestioned power over the whole world, they may accept much heavier losses than they are willing to accept otherwise. SOVIETS AS DEFENSE-MINDED Mr. BINGHAM. Just one final question in this regard. Would you agree with the statement frequently made in matters of strategy and military policy that the Russians have been for a long time defense-minded? Mr. TELLER. In the whole history of Russia, they have been defenseminded; they have engaged in aggression against Finland. That, I think, has taught them a lesson. They engaged in what I would call aggression against Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In that case, they took no risk. The Russians will be defense-minded as long as they are very sure to have no risks or else they are very sure that the risks are strictly limited. In that sense, they are defense-minded and that can give us a measure of assurance. But, unless we look to our defenses and very particularly unless we do something to safeguard the lives of our own people, a situation may arise when the Russians can play extremely dangerous games, even engage in aggression and the risk may remain sufficiently limited for them to do so. That is the main reason why I think that measures of civil defense, of sufficient defense, will remain necessary. Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Dr. Teller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. ZABLOCKI. If there are no further questions, the committee will stand adjourned. Thank you, Dr. Teller. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will meet again in this room at 10 a.m. tomorrow, Thursday, in executive session, for the purpose of considering and voting on a resolution expressing approval of the interim SALT agreement on offensive arms. The committee is adjourned. (Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the committee adjourned.) COPIES OF THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SIGNED IN MOSCOW ON MAY 26, 1972 JUNE 13, 1972.-Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed Hon. CARL B. ALBERT, THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, June 13, 1972. DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I transmit herewith copies of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972. Copies of these agreements are also being forwarded to the President of the Senate. I am asking the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty, and an expression of support from both Houses of the Congress for the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms. These agreements, the product of a major effort of this administration, are a significant step into a new era of mutually agreed restraint and arms limitation between the two principal nuclear powers. The provisions of the agreements are explained in detail in the Report of the Secretary of State, which I attach. Their main effect is this: The ABM Treaty limits the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to two designated areas, and at a low level. The Interim Agreement limits the overall level of strategic offensive missile forces. (117) Together the two agreements provide for a more stable strategic balance in the next several years than would be possible if strategic arms competition continued unchecked. This benefits not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but all the nations of the world. The agreements are an important first step in checking the arms race, but only a first step; they do not close off all avenues of strategic competition. Just as the maintenance of a strong strategic posture was an essential element in the success of these negotiations, it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our security and to ensure that more permanent and comprehensive arms limitation agreements can be reached. The defense capabilities of the United States are second to none in the world today. I am determined that they shall remain so. The terms of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement will permit the United States to take the steps we deem necessary to maintain a strategic posture which protects our vital interests and guarantees our continued security. Besides enhancing our national security, these agreements open the opportunity for a new and more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship, characterized by negotiated settlement of differences, rather than by the hostility and confrontation of decades past. These accords offer tangible evidence that mankind need not live forever in the dark shadow of nuclear war. They provide renewed hope that men and nations working together can succeed in building a lasting peace. Because these agreements effectively serve one of this Nation's most cherished purposes-a more secure and peaceful world in which America's security is fully protected I strongly recommend that the House of Representatives support The Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, and that its deliberations be conducted without delay. Sincerely, To the Senate of the United States: RICHARD NIXON. I transmit herewith the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972. Copies of these agreements are also being forwarded to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. I ask the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty, and an expression of support from both Houses of the Congress for the Interim. Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms. These agreements, the product of a major effort of this administration, are a significant step into a new area of mutually agreed restraint and arms limitation between the two principal nuclear powers. The provisions of the agreements are explained in detail in the Report of the Secretary of State, which I attach. Their main effect is this: The ABM Treaty limits the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to two designated areas, and at a low level. The Interim Agreement limits the overall level of strategic offensive missile forces. Together the two agreements provide for a more stable strategic balance in the next several years than would be possible if strategic arms competition continued unchecked. This benefits not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but all the nations of the world. The agreements are an important first step in checking the arms race, but only a first step; they do not close off all avenues of strategic competition. Just as the maintenance of a strong strategic posture was an essential element in the success of these negotiations, it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our security and to ensure that more permanent and comprehensive arms limitation agreements can be reached. The defense capabilities of the United States are second to none in the world today. I am determined that they shall remain so. The terms of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement will permit the United States to take the steps we deem necessary to maintain a strategic posture which protects our vital interests and guarantees our continued security. Besides enhancing our national security, these agreements open the opportunity for a new and more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship, characterized by negotiated settlement of differences, rather than by the hostility and confrontation of decades past. These accords offer tangible evidence that mankind need not live forever in the dark shadow of nuclear war. They provide renewed hope that men and nations working together can succeed in building a lasting peace. Because these agreements effectively serve one of this Nation's most cherished purposes-a more secure and peaceful world in which America's security is fully protected-I strongly recommend that the Senate support them, and that its deliberations be conducted without delay. THE WHITE HOUSE, June 13, 1972. RICHARD NIXON. |