is the notion, that injuries ought to be punished; and that it is a vicious negligence, or want of resolution, not to punish them; that it is a failure in duty to our injured friends, or to the public. To this notion, or principle, the reason urged for omitting to punish whilst your enemy is in great distress, is a full answer. It is as much as to say, supposing there was this necessity for retribution which you affirm, yet your behaving with common_humanity does not prevent its taking place : the Deity is the best able to punish justly, as he knows the whole of each case, and has no prejudices or partialities, and is no respecter of persons.-You may think it fortunate to have this declared from authority, as it may save your attempting a task for which you are not perfectly qualified. Relieving your enemy in extreme distress does not prevent your punishing him afterwards, if your conscience dictates that punishment is necessary; it only prevents your greedily seizing a bad opportunity of avenging yourself, when punishment would be most ungenerous, cruel, cowardly, and disgraceful. You may safely pass by such an occasion, and commit your cause him that judgeth righteously". There is no circumstance which can more clearly mark out the dif ference between malevolent revenge and public-spirited punishment, than your treatment of an enemy who is in want of the necessaries of life'.

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And indeed it appears somewhat strange, that one text of scripture should occasion difficulties, when another of like import occasions none. "Vengeance is

mine, I will repay saith the Lord". This means the same as that which we are considering; and they are joined together by "Therefore". What though the words of that taken from the book of Proverbs sound as if man was the punisher, the judge, and the executioner, in heaping the coals of fire, no one who thinks for a moment, can suppose that he is so in reality: the Deity must heap the coals of fire, though in consequence of human actions. Both texts mean, Be not rash, be not cruel, be not afraid that vice and injury will escape with impunity; do you act humanely to your necessitous brother, whether he happens to be friend or enemy; God will do the rest'.

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We have already hinted, that a man, who loved to gratify his resentment more than to promote justice, might make the propriety of punishing a pretence for indulging rancour; and a person might deceive himself, and imagine he was aiming at what was right, whilst he was really following a faulty propensity; but the declaration that God will do himself justice is as much against these abuses, as against a sincere belief of that propriety of avenging one's self, to which they pretend. Indeed, whatever destroys a principle, must of course destroy all pretences and imaginations which are built upon it.

Should not the motive of heaping coals of fire be admitted, according to our sense, in any other way, they might as an argument ad hominem; or as an argument addressed to a particular man, drawn from his own principles or concessions. It would be orderly and legitimate reasoning to say to any man; your desire is to punish such a person because he has injured you; on your own principles I recommend it to you to do him good; this will be the way, if he continues in the character which you are aiming to punish, to have him more severely punished than you can punish him': in an argument of this sort we are not supposed to approve of every thing; our end or design is, only to bring a particular man to right conduct, or right opinion, in a particular instance. Nor does the Holy Scripture disdain the use of such an argument. The Lord who leaves the Talents to be improved by his servants, grounds the blame and punishment of the slothful one on concessions made by him, though not recognized as just and true. "Out of thine own mouth will I judge "thee, thou wicked servant. Thou knewest that I

was an austere man" and so forth, Luke xix. 22. compare Matt. xxv. 26. why didst thou not act accordingly? Here the severity is not supposed to be justly imputed to the Lord; but the slothful servant had deserved all the consequences which would have followed from its being real; and the Lord argues upon that supposition, though not approved. In our present question, the result of this method of arguing would be; do good, be humane; if you cannot be so upon principles perfectly kind, be so upon your own'. And

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many men may be prevailed upon to do their duty by such imperfect reasoning, who are deaf to solid and rational argumentation.

Nor will our Interpretation be invalidated by the opinion that it contradicts the scope of the Apostle's exhortation, as it inculcates revenge rather than forgiveness; to me it does not appear to do this. The whole of the passage before us consists of arguments and motives for treating an enemy with kindness; if the sense ascribed to any part was really inconsistent with this end, it could not be admitted: but according to what has now been observed, the argument or inducement of heaping coals of fire, in the sense of punishing, is of great use in removing a difficulty, which really prevails to a great extent, and which is often used as a pretext for unkind and unmerciful behaviour. I mean the idea, that we ought to do justice, to shew our abhorrence of injury, to resent all affronts offered to our friends.

Whatever argument. tends to remove a difficulty standing in the way of any duty, must be considered as affording an inducement to the performance of that duty.

40. And as we attain to our sense by fair interpretation, we need not be deterred, from establishing it by any consequences which seem to attend it. It has been apprehended, that if we allow coals of fire to mean punishment, men may do good actions with malicious intentions, or expectations this sounds like something very bad; but let a man come to action, and all danger must vanish. If a man sees his enemy in distress, only let him give relief, the rest is safe enough. Perhaps a man who is desirous to do his duty, may begin to give relief before he is perfectly reconciled, in heart and affection; but his beneficence will soon generate benevolence, he that acts kindly will soon be kind. (Part v. 24. Part vi. 29.) But suppose this not to be the effect, for a man may relieve an enemy in necessity without ceasing to consider him as an enemy, yet in the act of relieving necessity, I am much inclined to say, that I defy a man to have the principle, or to act from the

motive, of increasing the punishment which is to be inflicted by the Deity. It seems to me a thing impossible. At least a man must want common sense to do good from such a principle. He must entertain the absurd and impious imagination, that the Deity will act under his direction, and execute any sentence which he thinks fit to pronounce. Can any man of common sense run into the extreme folly of supposing that God will punish because a revengeful man intends or expects that He will ?

We may say, generally, that God will punish an ungrateful man; but when we come to the cases of particular men, we cannot say what will be the divine judgment. And so a benefactor may have the general belief of God's punishing ingratitude, without the least persuasion that a particular man will be punished for ingratitude to him: or without the least thought about the matter; though if the thought of punishment due to the man's ingratitude does occur, he cannot do better than commit himself to God, recollecting either this expression of Solomon and St. Paul, or any other to the same effect; Vengeance is mine"- "the Lord re"ward him according to his work"." God is a righ"teous judge".

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Suppose you were thus advised, in any case, Use your enemy handsomely; then if he behaves ill, the world will take your part, and the indignation of all men will be against him';-or, you will bring the indignation of all spectators upon your adversary by kind behaviour;' would your adviser understand that he was exhorting you to do good with a malicious intention ?-Still, if our reasoning failed to convince any one, that doing kind actions with a malicious intention is not to be feared in practice, we might maintain, that relieving an enemy in distress, must do good; must be useful and beneficial, even though it could be attended with some hope that our enemy might be punished: and the main end of a rule of conduct is to do good.

One evil consequence before mentioned of admitting the sense of the Apostle to be, relieve your enemy, for

in so doing you will increase his punishment, is this; that though it may do good to the distressed, it vitiates the mind; gives it a wrong turn. But suppose two men ; one relieves his enemy in distress, trusting to God to punish that enemy if he abuses the lenity shewn him; the other declines relieving his enemy, lest he should occasion his being punished; which of these two is to be the object of our imitation? surely the man who does the act of mercy: and is not his mind in a better state than that of his neighbour? Nay his mind is in a better state after such an an act of mercy, performed with such a thought, or sentiment, than it was before. There is no need therefore that the mind should be vitiated by the motive of Solomon and St. Paul; if it is, the corruption or depravation is as much a fault in this instance as in any other. A man is told, that he must not be cruel to his enemy in distress; that is the principal matter; he may be kind and merciful on many different motives; one is here specified, which is often wanted; be not reluctant in doing acts of kindness for fear of ingratitude: ingratitude will surely be punished as it deserves.

He who stands in need of this motive may use it; but no man is commanded to use it. A man is commanded to do the duty, but the motive is only added as an encouragement: or, more strictly, to remove a discouragement. If any one, therefore, finds his mind vitiated by his feeling of this incitement, let him set it entirely aside: If he relieves his enemy without it, there is no reason to question his obedience being accepted. We are glad of the encouragement to get over all our difficulties in doing good. It often happens, that men dwell upon an incidental circumstance so as to neglect the principal business: the chief design of scripture (in what we are now treating) is, to hinder men from avenging themselves; let that be secured; and latitude may be allowed to weak minds, as to particular modes, or particular principles of action; such as will only be used in the beginnings of Virtue.

We have supposed a person of a scrupulous conscience to be afraid of doing good to his enemy lest he