Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981-1999Oxford University Press, 9 mars 2000 - 304 pages When the Cold War ended, the world let out a collective sigh of relief as the fear of nuclear confrontation between superpowers appeared to vanish overnight. As we approach the new millennium, however, the proliferation of nuclear weapons to ever more belligerent countries and factions raises alarming new concerns about the threat of nuclear war. In Return to Armageddon, Ronald Powaski assesses the dangers that beset us as we enter an increasingly unstable political world. With the START I and II treaties, completed by George Bush in 1991 and 1993 respectively, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), signed by Bill Clinton in 1996, it seemed as if the nuclear clock had been successfully turned back to a safer hour. But Powaski shows that there is much less reason for optimism than we may like to think. Continued U.S.-Russian cooperation can no longer be assured. To make matters worse, Russia has not ratified the START II Treaty and the U.S. Senate has failed to approve the CTBT. Perhaps even more ominously, the effort to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nonweapon states is threatened by nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan. The nuclear club is growing and its most recent members are increasingly hostile. Indeed, it is becoming ever more difficult to keep track of the expertise and material needed to build nuclear weapons, which almost certainly will find their way into terrorist hands. Accessible, authoritative, and provocative, Return to Armageddon provides both a comprehensive account of the arms control process and a startling reappraisal of the nuclear threat that refuses to go away. |
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... weapons to the nonweapon states of the world . During that year , the Clinton ... no longer be assured for a variety of rea- sons , not the least of which is ... weapon tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998. Not only did their ...
... weapons to the nonweapon states of the world . During that year , the Clinton ... no longer be assured for a variety of rea- sons , not the least of which is ... weapon tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998. Not only did their ...
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... without them the navy's ballistic missile submarines would make that service the ... No doubt , most scientists who engaged in nuclear weapons work con- cluded ... weapon systems . The bomber gap of the mid- 1950s was followed by other ...
... without them the navy's ballistic missile submarines would make that service the ... No doubt , most scientists who engaged in nuclear weapons work con- cluded ... weapon systems . The bomber gap of the mid- 1950s was followed by other ...
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... no matter how potentially effective their opponent's first - strike forces became . Admitting this , it appeared , would have taken much of the force out of the argument that each required additional nuclear weapons ... weapon capable of ...
... no matter how potentially effective their opponent's first - strike forces became . Admitting this , it appeared , would have taken much of the force out of the argument that each required additional nuclear weapons ... weapon capable of ...
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... weapon issue and of policies promul- gated in his name . " As a result , " many of his decisions were compromises ... no more than 210 could be " medium " missiles , like the MX and the Soviet ss - 19 , and no more than 110 could 21 :: The ...
... weapon issue and of policies promul- gated in his name . " As a result , " many of his decisions were compromises ... no more than 210 could be " medium " missiles , like the MX and the Soviet ss - 19 , and no more than 110 could 21 :: The ...
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... weapons , including cruise missiles and other bomber armament , and modest ... weapon systems . The Soviet proposal also would have used launchers as the ... no provision for the limitation of ballistic missile throw weight , thereby ...
... weapons , including cruise missiles and other bomber armament , and modest ... weapon systems . The Soviet proposal also would have used launchers as the ... no provision for the limitation of ballistic missile throw weight , thereby ...
Table des matières
3 | |
14 | |
2 The Reagan AboutFace | 39 |
3 Bush and START I | 83 |
4 Bush and START II | 128 |
5 Clinton START II and the ABM Treaty | 165 |
6 Clinton and Counterproliferation | 205 |
The Enduring Nuclear Threat | 251 |
Afterword | 259 |
Acronyms and Technical Terms | 273 |
Notes | 277 |
Suggested Readings | 297 |
Index | 301 |
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981-1999 Ronald E. Powaski Aucun aperçu disponible - 2003 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
Able Archer 83 ABM Treaty addition administration's agreed agreement ALCMS announced argued Arms Control Today attack Baker ballistic missile defense billion bomb bombers Bush administration Bush's called capability China Clinton administration Congress congressional Control Today 22 cruise missiles CTBT defense system deployed deployment deterrent eliminate fissile material Gorbachev hard-liners Ibid ICBMS India INF Treaty Initiative interceptors Iran Iraq Kazakhstan kilometers land-based launch launchers limits ment military MIRVed Moscow MTCR national missile defense National Security negotiations Nonproliferation nonweapon North Korea nuclear arms race nuclear arsenal nuclear forces nuclear materials nuclear testing nuclear warheads nuclear weapons October Pakistan percent permitted plutonium president proliferation ratified reactors Republican Russian SALT II Senate September Shevardnadze Shultz sides siles SLBMS Soviet Union space-based START II Strategic Defense strategic nuclear summit talks targets Test Ban Treaty THAAD threat tion TMD systems U.S. nuclear Ukraine unilateral United Yeltsin
Fréquemment cités
Page 29 - What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant US retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?
Page 78 - Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Page 56 - Second, a new treaty signed now would provide that if, after 1991, either side should decide to deploy such a system, that side would be obliged to offer a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defense and for eliminating offensive ballistic missiles.
Page 194 - It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense.
Page 55 - Gorbachev advanced publicly a "plan" calling for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the end of the century.
Page 29 - I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.
Page 33 - V prohibits the development and testing of ABM systems or components that are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
Références à ce livre
Ballistic Missile Defense and the Future of American Security: Agendas ... Roger Handberg Aucun aperçu disponible - 2002 |