§ 1411. Smuggling. (1) Offense. A person is guilty of smuggling if he: (a) knowingly evades examination by the government of an object being introduced into the United States; (b) knowingly deceives or makes a false statement with intent to deceive the government as to a matter material to the purpose of an examination by the government of an object being introduced into the United States; (c) knowingly evades assessment or payment when due of the customs duty upon an object being introduced into the United States; (d) knowingly introduces an object into the United States the introduction of which is prohibited, whether absolutely or conditionally, pursuant to a federal statute; or (e) receives, conceals, buys, sells or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment or sale of an object the assessment or payment of the duty upon which, in fact, is being or has been evaded or the introduction of which, in fact, is prohibited, absolutely or conditionally, pursuant to a federal statute, knowing that the object was unlawfully introduced into the United States. (2) Grading. Smuggling is a Class C felony if: (a) the value of the object exceeds $500; (b) the duty which would have been due on the object exceeds $100; (c) the object is being or was introduced for use in a business; or (d) the actor knows that introduction is prohibited, whether absolutely or conditionally, because objects of that class may cause or be used to cause bodily injury or property damage. Otherwise smuggling is a Class A misdemeanor. Notwithstanding the grading provided in this subsection, if the statute prohibiting introduction of an object, or a related statute, provides lesser grading for the same conduct, the lesser grading applies. (3) Definitions. In this section: (a) "introduces" and variants thereof mean importing or transporting or bringing into, or landing in, the United States from outside the United States or from customs custody or control; (b) “object” includes any article, goods, wares and merchandise and an animate as well as inanimate thing; (c) "United States" does not include the Virgin Islands, 389-626-71—12 American Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman (4) Determining Value and Duty. The value of an object shall be its highest value, determined by any reasonable standard, regardless of its value for purposes of determining the amount of duty owing, if any. Smugglings committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct may be charged as one offense, and the value of, or the duty owing on, the objects introduced may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense. (5) Charging Smuggling. An indictment or information charging smuggling under this section which fairly apprises the defendant of the nature of the charges against him shall not be deemed insufficient because it fails to specify a particular category of smuggling. The defendant may be found guilty of smuggling under such an indictment or information if his conduct falls under any of the paragraphs of subsection (1), so long as the conduct proved is sufficiently related to the conduct charged that the accused is not unfairly surprised by the case he must meet. Comment This section essentially carries forward the provisions of the existing smuggling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 545, and replaces a number of other sections with overlapping prohibitions against various schemes to defeat enforcement of the customs laws. The principal substantive change is that the overly broad "knowingly import . . . merchandise contrary to law," which literally makes felonious all kinds of trivial violations, is replaced by the proscriptions of evasion of duty and examination and introduction of contraband. The judgment is that any violations of customs laws which are not embraced by subsection (1) should be treated as regulatory offenses or misdemeanors. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1)—evasion of examination and deception of customs officers-will cover most forms of smuggling. Significantly, proof as to the reasons for frustrating customs enforcement is not required; whether the purpose of the evasion of examination or deception is to evade duty or introduce a forbidden object-or a mistaken belief that such a purpose will be accomplished thereby is irrelevant. Paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) are largely "mopping-up" provisions, covering any misbehavior accompanied by a purpose to evade duty or introduce contraband. They would cover, for example, unlawful removal of goods from customs custody, after examination by customs officials has taken place. See 18 U.S.C. § 549, dealing with removing goods from customs custody, a provision which can thus be eliminated, since the general theft provisions will cover the balance of the conduct prohibited thereby. The single concept of introduction into the United States is sub stituted in place of the variety of characterizations in existing law: "smuggles", "clandestinely introduces", "brings in", "imports”, used in 18 U.S.C. § 549, and terms such as not presenting for inspection, unlading, landing, etc.. used in other statutes or in regulations. The proposed Code would make attempted smuggling an offense for the first time in federal law. Litigation over whether preparatory acts are criminal would focus on whether such acts are substantial steps under the attempt provision (§ 1001) towards evasion of examination rather than whether they themselves constitute "smuggling" or "importation" or "bringing in", as is presently the case. Steps designed to frustrate examination, such as by concealment under a false bottom in a container, would constitute attempted evasion, if an examination does not actually take place. Section 1411 does not continue the provision in 18 U.S.C. § 545 that possession of smuggled goods warrants conviction unless "explained to the satisfaction of the jury." Under the definitions of the Code, the provision, if preserved, would constitute a "prima facie case." It is rejected because, although possession, depending on the circumstances, could constitute a prima facie case, it should not constitute one in all cases. The definition of "object" in subsection 3 (c) is intended to avoid the kind of litigation which has arisen with respect to the word "merchandise" in existing 18 U.S.C. § 545 (psittacine bird?). Existing policy with respect to various island possessions is carried forward in the definition of "United States" in subsection 3 (d). Smuggling under 18 U.S.C. § 545 is now punishable by up to five years in prison, and since that provision embraces all bringing in of merchandise contrary to law, it permits felony treatment of a wide variety of technical violations. Section 545 makes no distinction based upon the nature of the article introduced, although other statutes prohibiting certain importations do. Felony penalties for all smuggling are not retained although it may be argued that the Bureau of Customs needs broad discretion for effective enforcement and that deterrent value of felony penalties is necessary in the enforcement scheme. In fact, official policies of the Bureau of Customs tend to ameliorate the harsh provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 545. Minor tourist smuggling is dealt with by permitting payment of the duty or by confiscation of the contraband. Civil penalties and forfeitures are also used. Section 1411 distinguishes between conduct deserving of felony treatment and that for which misdemeanor treatment would be appropriate. Most tourists seem to know how the Bureau exercises its discretion. With realistic penalties, misdemeanor prosecutions of tourists might be undertaken and respect for the law increased. The bases proposed for discriminating between felonious and nonfelonious smuggling-value, amount of duty and business use-are expected to draw the line roughly between professionals and amateurs, profiteers and users, big cheats and little cheats. Subsection 2(d) grades as a felony knowing importation of dangerous contraband, e.g., diseased animals. The deference to the provision for a lesser penalty in another statute is based on the theory that such grading, which has taken into account the nature of a specific object, is more discriminat ing. This principal may have general applicability and might be considered for inclusion in the general sentencing provisions. Subsections (4) and (5) are adapted from provisions proposed for the theft offenses under the Code (§§ 1735 (7), 1731(2)). Subsection (5) should not only aid in economizing on language in an indictment but also should prove to be of substantive value in cases in which it develops that the defendant was a receiver of the object rather than the person or an accomplice of the person on whom the requirements of examination, declaration, and payment of duty are imposed. Chapter 15. Civil Rights and Elections PROTECTION OF FEDERAL RIGHTS GENERALLY § 1501. Conspiracy Against Rights of Citizens. A person is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor: (a) if he conspires with another to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of, or because of his having so exercised, any right or privilege secured to him by the constitution or laws of the United States; or (b) if, with intent to prevent or hinder another's free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, he goes on such other's premises with another or others or goes in disguise on the highway with another or others. Comment See Comment to § 1502, infra. § 1502. Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law. A person is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor if, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom, he intentionally subjects any inhabitant of any state: (a) to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States; or (b) to different punishments, pains or penalties on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens. Comment Sections 1501 and 1502 preserve post-Civil War civil rights legislation presently embodied in 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. Present sections have been carried forward virtually without change because, as written, they were regarded as the basic provisions to which the specific provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (carried forward by subsequent sections of this Chapter) were complementary. The sections are also important because their generality affords opportunity for continued case-by-case development of the civil rights law. "Willfully" in present § 242 has been changed, however, to "intentionally" in Code § 1502 to adopt the culpability requirement articulated in Screws v. United |