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out endeavouring, in the best manner I am able, to declare publicly the reasons which induced me to give my most ready affent to this question.

THE people have an unquestionable right to frequent new Parliaments by ancient usage; and this usage has been confirmed by feveral laws, which have been progreffively made by our ancestors, as often as they found it neceffary to infift on this effential privilege.

PARLIAMENTS ere generally annual, but never continued longer than three years, tili the remarkable reign of Henry VIII. He, Sir, was a prince of unruly appetites, and of an arbitrary will; he was impatient of every reftraint; the laws of God and man fell equally a facrifice, as they flood in the way of his avarice, or disappointed his ambition: he therefore introduced long Parliaments, because he very well knew, that they would become the proper inftruments of both; and what a flavish obedience they paid to all his measures is fufficiently known.

If we come to the reign of King Charles the Firft, we must acknowledge him to be a prince of a contrary temper; he had certainly an innate love for religion and virtue.. But here lay the misfortune-he was led from his natural difpofition by fycophants and flatterers; they advised him to neglect the calling of frequent new parliaments, and therefore by not taking the constant sense of his people in what he did, he was worked up into fo high a notion of prerogative, that the Commons (in order to restrain it) obtained that independent fatal power, which at last unhappily brought him to his most tragical end, and at the fame time fubverted the whole conftitution. And I hope we shall learn this lesson from it, never to compliment the crown with any new or extravagant powers, nor to deny the people those rights,

which by ancient ufage they are entitled to; but to preferve the just and equal balance, from which they will both derive mutual fecurity, and which, if duly obferved, will render our conftitution the envy and admiration of all the world.

KING CHARLES the Second naturally took a furfeit of Parliaments in his father's time, and was therefore extremely defirous to lay them afide. But this was a scheme impracticable. However, in effect, he did fo: for he obtained a Parliament, which, by its long duration, like an army of veterans, became fo exactly difciplined to his own measures, that they knew no other command but from that perfon who gave them their pay.

THIS was a fafe and most ingenious way of enslaving a nation. It was very well known, that arbitrary power, if it was open and avowed, would never prevail here. The people were therefore amufed with this fpecious form of their ancient conftitution: it exifted, indeed, in their fancy; but like a mere phantom, had no fubitance nor reality in it; for the power, the authority, the dignity of Parliaments were wholly loft. This was that remarkable Parliament which fo justly obtained the opprobrious name of the PENSION PARLIAMENT; and was the model from which, I blieve, fome later Parliaments have been exactly copied.

AT the time of the revolution, the people made a fresh claim of their ancient privileges; and as they had fo lately. experienced the misfortune of long and fervile Parliaments, it was then declared, that they should be held frequently. But, it seems, their full meaning was not understood by this declaration; and therefore, as in every new fettlement the intention of all parties fhould be fpecifically manifefted, the Parliament never ceased struggling with the crown, till the triennial law was obtained; the preamble of it is extremely

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full and ftrong; and in the body of the bill you will find the word declared before enacted, by which I apprehend, that though this law did not immediately take place at the time of the revolution, it was certainly intended as declaratory of their first meaning, and therefore ftands a part of that original contract under which the conftitution was then fettled.. His Majefty's title to the crown is primarily derived from that contract; and if, upon a review, there fhall appear to be any deviations from it, we ought to treat them as fo many injuries done to that title. And I dare fay, that this houfe, which has gone through fo long a feries of fervices to his Majefty, will at laft be willing to revert to thofe original ftated measures of government, to renew and ftrengthen that title.

BUT, Sir, I think the manner in which the feptennial law was first introduced, is a very ftrong reafon why it should be repealed. People, in their fears, have very often recourfe to defperate expedients, which, if not cancelled in feafon, will themfelves prove fatal to that conftitution, which they were meant to fecure. Such is the nature of the feptennial law; it was intended only as a prefervative against a temporary inconvenience: the inconvenience is removed, but the mischievous effects ftill continue; for it not only altered the conftitution of Parliaments, but it extended that fame Parliament beyond its natural duration; and thereforecarries this moft unjust implication with it, That you may at any time ufurp the most indubitable, the most effential privilege of the people I mean that of choofing their own reprefentatives. A precedent of fuch dangerous confequence, of fo fatal a tendency, that I think it would be a reproach to our ftatute-book, if that law was any longer to fubfift, which might record it to pofterity.

THIS is a feafon of virtue and public fpirit. Let us take advantage of it to repeal thofe laws which infringe our li berties, and introduce fuch as may restore the vigour of our ancient conftitution.

HUMAN nature is fo very corrupt, that all obligations lofe their force, unless they are frequently renewed.Long Parliaments become therefore independent of the people, and when they do fo, there always happens a most dangerous dependence elfewhere.

LONG Parliaments give the minifter an opportunity of getting acquaintance with members, of practising his feveral arts to win them into his fchemes.-This must be the work of time.Corruption is of fo bafe a nature, that at first fight it is extremely fhocking.-Hardly any one has fubmitted to it all at once.-His difpofition must be previously understood, the particular bait must be found out with which he is to be allured; and after all, it is not without many ftruggles that he surrenders his virtue.-Indeed, there are fome who will at once plunge themselves into any bafe action, but the generality of mankind are of a more cautious nature, and will proceed only by leifurely degrees. One or two perhaps have deferted their colours the firft campaign, fome have done it a fecond.-But a great many, who have not that eager difpofition to vice, will wait till a third.

For this reafon, fhort Parliaments have been lefs corrupt than long ones; they are obferved, like ftreams of water, always to grow more impure the greater diftance they run from the fountain head,

I AM aware, it may be faid, that frequent new Parliaments will produce frequent new expences, but I think quite the contrary; I am really of opinion, that it will be a proper re

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medy against the evil of bribery at elections, especially as you have provided fo wholesome a law to co operate upon thefe occafions.

BRIBERY at elections, whence did it arife? Not from country gentlemen, for they are fure of being chofen without it; it was, Sir, the invention of wicked and corrupt minifters, who have, from time to time, led weak Princes into fuch deftructive meafures, that they did not dare to rely upon the natural reprefentation of the people.-Long Parliaments, Sir, first introduced bribery, because they were worth purchafing at any rate:-Country gentlemen, who have only their private fortunes to rely upon, and have no mercenary ends to ferve, are unable to oppose it, especially if at any time the public treafure fhall be unfaithfully fquandered away to corrupt their boroughs.-Country gentlemen, indeed, may make fome weak efforts; but as they generally prove unfuccefsful, and the time of a fresh struggle is at fo great a distance, they at last grow faint in the difpute, give up their country for loft, and retire in defpair.-Defpair naturally produces indolence, and that is the proper difpofition for flavery. Minifters of fate underftand this very well, and are therefore unwilling to awaken the nation out of its lethargy, by frequent elections.-They know that the spirit of liberty, like every other virtue of the mind, is to be kept alive only by conftant action; that it is impoffible to enflave this nation, while it is perpetually upon its guard. Let country gentlemen then, by having frequent opportunities of exerting themfelves, be kept warm and active in their contention for the public good : this will raise that zeal and spirit, which will at last get the better of those undue influences, by which the officers of the

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