SDI Program: Hearings Before the Defense Policy Panel and Research and Development Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, First Session, March 26, July 8, and September 15United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Defense Policy Panel, United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Research and Development U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988 - 304 pages |
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... Cooper , Robert , former Director of DARPA : Statement ....... 24 Prepared statement 30 Gerry , Edward , president , W.J. Schafer Associates : Statement ... 244 Prepared statement 253 Statement .... Prepared statement Statement ...
... Cooper , Robert , former Director of DARPA : Statement ....... 24 Prepared statement 30 Gerry , Edward , president , W.J. Schafer Associates : Statement ... 244 Prepared statement 253 Statement .... Prepared statement Statement ...
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... Cooper , who was Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ( DARPA ) at the time that President Reagan announced the creation of the SDI project . He will give us an overview of the major technical chal- lenges facing ...
... Cooper , who was Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ( DARPA ) at the time that President Reagan announced the creation of the SDI project . He will give us an overview of the major technical chal- lenges facing ...
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... Cooper forward , and General Kent . Mr. SPRATT . We will hear from Dr. Cooper first . Thank you for coming and testifying . You can summarize your testimony or you can read it as you prefer . STATEMENT OF ROBERT COOPER , FORMER DIRECTOR ...
... Cooper forward , and General Kent . Mr. SPRATT . We will hear from Dr. Cooper first . Thank you for coming and testifying . You can summarize your testimony or you can read it as you prefer . STATEMENT OF ROBERT COOPER , FORMER DIRECTOR ...
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... COOPER . Let me repeat the essence of that because it really is a peg point in the continuum of what one might be able to do . One could pick a fraction of our force , say 500 of the Minutemen , and by deploying a terminal defense ...
... COOPER . Let me repeat the essence of that because it really is a peg point in the continuum of what one might be able to do . One could pick a fraction of our force , say 500 of the Minutemen , and by deploying a terminal defense ...
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... COOPER . Software problems are a major problem , and there is no question about that . But they are solvable problems at some time in the future . Let me say that if the Federal Aviation Admin- istration had spent $ 3 to $ 6 billion a ...
... COOPER . Software problems are a major problem , and there is no question about that . But they are solvable problems at some time in the future . Let me say that if the Federal Aviation Admin- istration had spent $ 3 to $ 6 billion a ...
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Expressions et termes fréquents
1988 Budget Plan ABM Treaty agree American Physical Society APS Council APS Report architecture arms control arms reduction attack ballistic missile defense battle management believe billion Bloembergen boost phase boosters capability Chairman chemical laser committee conclusions CONGRESS THE LIBRARY COOPER cost countermeasures decision decoys defense system defense-dominant world deploy deterrence directed energy technology directed energy weapons discrimination early deployment effective engineering free electron laser funding goal going HAPPER ICBM interceptors issue KASICH kinetic energy weapons Laboratory LIBRARY OF CONGRESS midcourse National nuclear weapons OLIN panel Patel penetration aids percent physicists political power levels problem program elements question response satellites scientific SDI program SDIO Soviet Union space based space-based SPRATT SPROULL statement Strategic Defense Initiative survival talking target technical Technology of Directed terminal defense testimony Thank things threat tion understand warheads X-ray lasers ZIMMERMAN
Fréquemment cités
Page 53 - What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant US retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?
Page 165 - The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.
Page 83 - Treaty), premature promotion to the demonstrationand-test phase can be very harmful to attainment of any particular goal in strategic defense. A considerable body of evidence has shown that early demonstrations of new technologies have two deleterious effects. First, they tend to freeze the technology being demonstrated before it is fully mature, thus guaranteeing less than full capability. Second, they tend to absorb money from the associated R&D program (because of cost overruns), thus eliminating...
Page 223 - We estimate that even in the best of circumstances, a decade or more of intensive research would be required to provide the technical knowledge needed for an informed decision about the potential effectiveness and survivability of directed energy weapon systems. In addition, the important issues of overall system integration and effectiveness depend critically upon information that, to our knowledge, does not yet exist.
Page 221 - March 23, 1983 where he called upon the US scientific community to develop a system that "... could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they...
Page 54 - Street, NW Washington, DC 20037-1270 A COHERENT PACKAGE—ARMS CONTROL, ZERO BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND STRATEGIC DEFENSES [1] [1] The views and conclusions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The RAND Corporation or any of the agencies sponsoring its research. 54 A COHERENT PACKAGE-ARMS CONTROL, ZERO BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND STRATEGIC DEFENSES The Need for a Batter Focus The debate surrounding the subject "SDI
Page 199 - Schlesinger. [Whereupon, at 11:42 am, the panel adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.] HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL, Washington, DC, Tuesday, May 17, 1988.
Page 207 - DEW over the last two decades, the Study Group finds significant gaps in the scientific and engineering understanding of many issues associated with the development of these technologies. Successful resolution of these issues is critical for the extrapolation to performance levels that would be required in an effective ballistic missile defense system. At present, there is insufficient information to decide whether the required extrapolations can or cannot be achieved. Most crucial elements required...
Page 207 - Research Council. The Report underwent a classification review between September, 1986 and April, 1987. Only minor modifications were required before its public release. The executive summary and 26 major conclusions, based on the technical content of the main body of the Report, have received wide publicity. Our most general finding is formulated as follows: Although substantial progress has been made in many technologies of DEW over the last two decades, the Study Group finds significant gaps in...
Page 201 - Although substantial progress has been made in many technologies of DEW (directed energy weapons) over the last two decades, the Study Group finds significant gaps in the scientific and engineering understanding of many issues associated with the development of these technologies. Successful resolution of these issues is critical for the extrapolation to performance levels that would be required in an effective ballistic missile defense system. At present, there is insufficient information to decide...