an Irish porter to a warehouse, who forgot, when sober, what he had done when drunk; but, being drunk, again recollected the transactions of his former state of intoxication. One one occasion, being drunk, he had lost a parcel of some value, and in his sober moments could give no account of it. Next time he was intoxicated he recollected that he had left the parcel at a certain house, and there being no address on it, it had remained there safe, and was obtained on his calling for it. The same phenomena present themselves in the state of somnambulism, produced by animal magnetism. In the works on this subject it is mentioned, and the fact has been confirmed to me by a very intelligent friend who has observed it in Paris, that a person who is magnetized so as to produce the magnetic sleep termed somnambulism, acquires, like the girl in Aberdeen, a new consciousness and memory; he does not recollect the transactions of his ordinary state of existence, but acquires the power of speaking and of thinking in his induced state of abstraction from the external world. When this state has subsided, all that passed in it is obliterated from the memory, while the recollection of ordinary events is restored. If the magnetic state be recalled, memory of the circumstances which formerly happened in that state is restored; and thus the individuals may be said to live in a state of divided consciousness. In this country the doctrine of animal magnetism is treated with the same contempt which was formerly poured on Phrenology. I am wholly unacquainted with its merits; but several eminent French physicians entertain a favourable opinion of them, and the circumstance now stated, of alternating memory and forgetfulness, not only is mentioned in the books on this subject which I have consulted, but has been certitied to me as true by a gentleman whose understanding is too acute to allow me to believe that he was deceived, and whose honour is too high to admit of his deceiving others. These facts cannot at present be accounted for in a satisfactory way; but, by communicating a knowledge of their existence, attention will be drawn to them, and future observations and reflection may ultimately throw light upon the subject.

Mr. Hewett Watson has published a valuable essay on the peculiarities of memory, in the 29th number of The Phrenological Journal. It is unphilosophical, he remarks, to use such phrases as a good memory or a great memory, these expressions being susceptible of very different interpretations. With the view of drawing the attention of phrenologists to the necessity of exactness in their descriptions, he specifies some of the principal varieties of memory, throwing out at the same time suggestions as to the conditions on which they depend. "For the more easy illustration," says he, "it will be convenient to distinguish the varieties of memory in two leading subdivisions, which may be termed 'Simple Me mory,' and 'Memory by Association.' Simple memory is that wherein the idea of a sound, colour, object, or event appears to recur directly and spontaneously; as for instance, having once seen a house or a tree, and the idea or mental impression returning afterward, we are then said to remember it. Memory depending on association is indirect, and may be exemplified by the fact, that we can scarce think of the summer sky, or the roses that bloom beneath it, without immediately remembering the concave form and blue tint of the former, or the peculiar shape and blushing dyes of the latter. The inseparable connexion that comes to be established between the arbitrary sounds and shapes used in speech and writing, and various mental ideas, so that the mere sound or sight of a word * See Mr. Colquhoun's translation of the Report of the Committee of the Royal Academy of Sciences on Animal Magnetism; Georget, De la Physi ologie du Systeme Nerveux, tome i., p. 267; and The Cyclopedia of Practical Medicine, article SOMNAMBULISM. † Vol. vii., p. 212.

inevitably recalls its appropriate idea, is another familiar illustration of -memory by association. Such associations vary from the closest possible approximation with simple memory to the most remote, incongruous, and artificial associations that exist.

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"To commence with Simple Memory. One of the most striking varieties entitled to be ranked in this division, is that wherein an individual is capable of remembering a great number of ideas, whether they be chiefly of shapes, sounds, objects, colours, or whatever else. The remembrance of them may be lasting or transitory; it may be orderly or without arrangement; the individual may be rapid or slow in reproducing impressions previously formed. Such a memory, in short, may be indefinitely varied in every other respect, excepting that named as its distinguishing mark, viz., the multiplicity of ideas remembered. I have seen several individuals exhibiting a memory of this kind, but varying greatly among themselves in the duration, clearness, readiness, and other peculiarities of the ideas remembered. It is this variety which is commonly meant by the frequent expressions a good' or 'a great memory,' although by no means invariably so. It appears essential to attaining a first rank in most departments of science and literature, and is the variety which led Gall to the discovery of the intellectual organs, the condition on which it depends seeming to be large organic developement. They who take in and remember the greatest number of ideas at once, whether the same ideas be remembered for a long period, or be shortly supplanted by others, have, cæteris paribus, the largest organic developement. I have observed in botanists, having Language and Individuality but moderately developed, the power of remembering for a long period, and with accuracy, a limited number of plants, their names and peculiar distinctive characteristics, as, for instance, those of a particular garden, district, or country; but, on expanding their range of observation, they forget the former, apparently from a difficulty of retaining a multiplicity of ideas in a small orgar. Others, on the contrary, will write systems embracing the whole of the vegetable kingdom, which implies an amount of individual knowledge almost incomprehensible to a small developement. The mask of Sir James Smith, whose principal botanical skill lay in a knowledge of the various names which botanists and others had, at different periods, applied to the same plant, shows Language to have been large, and, in consequence, he remembered many names. Individuality and Form are both well developed, but these two organs I have seen relatively superior in some of the best specific botanists of Britain, who remember the plants themselves better than their names. This variety of memory would be appropriately distinguished by the epithet extensive. As, however, it depends essentially on large organic developement, which scarcely any person possesses in every faculty, this memory is more or less partial, that is, limited in respect to the kind of ideas remembered; so that, in order to characterize it with precision, it would be necessary to say, an extensive memory of words, of colour, of sounds, or whatever else it might happen to be. Many persons inistake the limit in kind for one of degree only, and lament in general terms their deficiency of memory, when in reality they possess an extensive memory for one range of ideas combined with a limited memory for another; the deficiency, being most felt by the inconvenience it occasions, is taken as the general criterion. Exercise seems to have less influence on this variety than it has over others presently to be mentioned, probably more influencing the direction than the quantity of ideas remembered. Linnæus, Sheridan, Newton, Johnson, Cuvier, and Sir Edward Coke may furnish examples of the extensive memory, and that chiefly in one particular range or direction.

"A second variety of memory is that of men who are capable o

remembering what they see, hear, or du during a very long period; thoix mental impressions appear to bid defiance to time, and to bear its daily attritions almost without change. Whether the subjects remembered be few or many, and of whatever kind or nature, still mental images of them once formed remain deep and distinct. Individuals endowed with this variety of memory in its highest degree, will often converse nearly as easily and correctly of occurrences years gone by, as others do of those which happened but a week before. There are boys who will learn their school tasks with ease and rapidity, but just as easily and rapidly forget them ; the lesson which was perfect last week, is to-day a dim and scarce perceptible outline of something that has once been, but is now almost effaced from the soft-moulded tablets of memory.

"On the other hand, we may find some of their school-fellows, whose tasks are the same, whose instructions are scarce in the slightest degree different, yet in this respect attended with the most dissimilar results. The task of last week or month is nearly as fresh in memory as though it had been learned but yesterday, and they wonder how others can forget so quickly, while these in turn are astonished that such retentiveness of memory can exist in any one. It seems yet an unsolved problem on what organic peculiarity this depends. That it is not attributable to size, or at least to size alone, every day's experience must assure us; and all that can at present be suggested in regard to it is, that quality rather than quantity of brain is the condition whereon it is dependent. It seems to be almost invariably accompanied by a degree of slowness in action, a want of that rapidity in the flow of ideas characteristic of the next variety to be mentioned. The slowness and tenacity may perhaps depend on the same peculiarity in the composition or quality of brain, the retentiveness of former ideas being connected with the slowness in acquiring new ones. On reading this to the Phrenological Society, a case was mentioned of a gentleman who, after learning to repeat long passages in a short space of time, found that he very soon forgot them, and that, when acquired with more slowness, they were long remembered.* It would appear from this, that the slowness in acquiring ideas is an antecedent to retentiveness; we are scarcely authorized to say a cause, for both the one and the other may, and most likely do, depend on some (general or temporary) constitutional condition checking rapidity. The epithet retenlive would pretty correctly designate this variety of memory, and distinguish it from the former, with which it may or may not be combined. I have noticed it in men with a limited, as well as in those who possess an extensive, memory; but, cæteris paribus, it seems most marked in such individuals as engage in the smallest variety of pursuits; whether it is an effect or a cause of uniformity in taste and pursuit may admit of doubt. The inhabitants of the country seem to remember with more tenacity than such as live in large towns; and certainly they are more apt to imbibe ideas with slowness and deliberation. Joined with an extensive memory, it constitutes the man of knowledge, and is therefore an essential element in forming a scientific character, but will scarcely make a witty or showy one. Joseph Hume, Julius Cæsar, and perhaps Napoleon, may he cited as examples of it.

"A third variety of Simple Memory is characterized by the rapidity with which previous ideas are reproduced in the mind. One after another, or one dozen after another dozen, previous thoughts and impressions are renewed, and come floating athwart the mental eye in perpetual change

• Dr. Abercrombie, in his work on the Intellectual Powers, p. 100, mentions the case of an actor who, on an einergency, committed his part to memory with surprising quickness, but in a very short time completely forgot it. Those parts, on the other hand, which he learned with slowness and delibe ration, were accurately retained for many years.

ability and succession. They may arise in a regular, connected, and sys tematic series, or be poured forth in the most mixed and heterogeneous assemblages, like the multitudinous olla podrida of a masquerade, or the endlessly varied hues and objects of an extensive landscape. Rapidity of ideas is the essential character of this modification. Whether such ideas be correct or erroneous, limited or general, connected or disordered, seems to be determined by other conditions different from those on which depends the mere quickness of their reproduction...... Large Language and Individuality, with great rapidity, tend to promote punning and that style of wit designated as 'good things,' apropos remarks,'' clever hits,' &c., which I have seen greatly manifested when the organ called Wit has been of very moderate developement. It is perhaps this rapidity of memory occurring in cases of deficient developement of Concentrativeness that causes what is commonly termed 'far-fetched wit,' or that conjunction of widely dissimilar and unrelated ideas called up by rapidity unrestrained by concentrated action....... Rapidity of memory is probably influential in determining to the production of poetry, being evinced in the variety of its imagery, and what one of the fraternity has well exemplified in the expression thronging fancies.'......Rapidity in excess, implying a perpetual transition of ideas, incapacitates for science; hence we rarely, if ever, find first rank in science and poetry, or science and wit, in the same person. Intermediate gradations may unite both in nearly equal degree. In noticing the former variety, I had suggested the rarity, if not incompatibility, of the rapid and the retentive memories coexisting in a great degree; but was informed, on reading the remark, that Professor Mezzofante, of Bologna, combines both rapidity and retentiveness of verbal memory. The nervous temperament seems instrumental in giving this quality of brain, or perhaps might, with more correctness, be regarded as the effect; but it is certainly not peculiar to the dark varieties of that temperament: some of the most striking examples of rapid memory I have met with occur in persons of light complexion. An appropriate mode of distinguishing this modification of memory from those previously mentioned, would be by attaching to it the epithet ranid. Miss Pratt, quoted in the phrenological works as an example of large Individuality, may be cited as an instance of rapid combined with extensive memory of objects

and occurrences.

Nearly allied to, but by no means always coexistent with, the rapid memory is readiness of memory, or the power of immediately directing it to any given subject. There are men of considerable rapidity and diversity of ideas, who, if suddenly asked the simplest question concerning any matter not just then occupying their thoughts, find great difficulty in turning the current of their ideas into a new channel, or opening a new spring. They thus seem, both to themselves and others, to be remarkably deficient in memory. Inequality of developement probably tends to increase this peculiar defect, but it appears to me that Concentrativeness and Secretiveness, one or both, are also concerned......I have but few observations on the developement of individuals whose memory presents this modification, but it seems in perfection when large Secretiveness, Concentrativeness, and the anterior lobe, especially Individuality, are combined with rapidity, and to be proportionally injured by the abduction of any one of these requisites. I have seen an instance of this promptness of memory in a case where the knowing organs, particularly Individuality and Eventuality, with Secretiveness, were large, Concentrativeness and the reflecting organs rather above moderate, with a medium degree of rapidity and retentiveness of memory. The epithet ready or prompt may designate this variety of memory, which probably occurred in Burke, Pitt, Curran, and Sheridan.

"To the preceding peculiarities of memory there yet remains to be added another, which, from its influence over memory, by association, may be viewed as the transition and connecting link between the two artificial divisions here made. I mean partial memory, or that limited to particular ranges of ideas. The connexion between partial memory and proportionate developement of the cerebral organs is so completely one of the foundation-stones of Phrenology, that it must be quite unnecessary to say anything about it here; but we must never lose sight of the fact, that partial memory, dependent on this cause, is exhibited only in the nature of the ideas, as those of colour in contradistinction to shape, or shape in opposition to dimensions, and not merely in the peculiar direction."

JUDGMENT, in the metaphysical sense, belongs to the REFLECTING faculties alone. The knowing faculties, however, may also be said to judge; the faculty of Tune, for example, may be agreeably or disagreebly affected, and in this way may judge of sounds; but Judgment, in the proper acceptation of the word, is a perception of adaptation, of relation, of fitness, or of the connexion between means and an end, and belongs entirely to the reflecting powers. These, as well as the knowing faculties, have Perception, Memory, and Imagination. Causality, for example, perceives the relation of cause and effect, and also remembers and imagines that relation, just as Locality perceives, remembers, and imagines the relative position of objects. Hence, Judgment is the decision of the reflecting faculties upon the feelings furnished by the propensities and sentiments, and upon the ideas furnished by the whole intellectual faculties. This I conceive to be the strictly phrenological analysis of Judgment; but this term, in the popular sense, has a more extensive signification. It is a common observation to say of an individual, that he possesses an acute or even profound intellect, but that he is destitute of judgment. This apparent paradox may be explained in two ways. First: by "an acute or profound intellect" is frequently meant a great, but limited, talent, which would refer to some of the knowing faculties. Thus, a person may be distinguished for ability in mathematics or painting, and not be eminent for reflection or judgment, in the stricter sense. There is, however, a second explanation, which is preferable. To judge of the line of conduct proper to be followed in the affairs of life, it is necessary to feel correctly as well as to reason deeply; or rather, it is more necessary to feel rightly than to reflect. Hence, if an individual possess very powerful reflecting faculties, such as Lord Bacon enjoyed, and be deficient in Conscientiousness, as his lordship seems to have been, he is like a fine ship wanting a helm, liable to be carried from her course by every wind and current. The reflecting faculties give the power of thinking profoundly, but Conscientiousness and the other sentiments are necessary to furnish correct feeling, by which practical conduct may be regulated. Indeed, Lord Bacon affords a striking example, how poor an endowment intellect-even the most transcendent-is, when not accompanied by upright sentiments. That mind which embraced, in one comprehensive grasp, the whole circle of the sciences, and pointed out, with a surprising sagacity, the modes in which they might best be cultivated-that mind, in short, which anticipated the progress of the human understanding by a century and a halfpossessed so little judgment, so little of sound and practical sense, as to become the accuser, and even defamer, of Essex, his early patron and friend; to pollute the seat of justice by corruption and bribery; and to stoop to the basest flattery of a weak king, all for the gratification of a contemptible ambition. Never was delusion more complete. He fell into an abyss of degradation from which he never ascended; and to this day the darkness of his moral reputation forms a lamentable contrast to the brilliancy of his intellectual fame. There was here the most evident