when acting along with Secretiveness, Self-Esteem, Combativeness, and Destructiveness, to produce irony, sarcasm, ridicule, and satire; or, with other intellectual powers, to sparkle in the sallies of wit. Directed toward man, it probably gives a tendency to investigate the real character, instead of resting content with observing appearances or actions, which seems to have been greatly the bent of Sterne's mind, and considerably so of that of Franklin. Taking the direction of religion, it will inquire into the nature and attributes of God, as manifested in creation. Cowper affords an example of this, and Socrates may be also named. In physiology primary or essential function, as distinct from modes of manifestation, and particular actions and directions, will be its aim. To the metaphysician it will impart a strong desire for ascertaining the nature and inherent powers of mind, and of creation in general. Phrenology, being a union of the latter two-the metaphysician and the physiologist-its founders will afford us a suitable illustration. In the bust of Dr. Gall the organ is represented much less developed than in that of Dr. Spurzheim; and the superiority of the latter in discriminating modes of manifestation, and particular directions of the mental powers, from the powers themselves, is familiar to all phrenologists. Perhaps, too, we shall not err in adducing Locke as a negative instance of the faculty. In the portraits of this philosopher Comparison and Causality appear greatly larger than Wit; and his system derives not only ideas, but the mental feelings, from external impressions; but as he was obliged to give the mind a capability of being affected by impressions on the external senses, he endowed it with the faculties of perception, contemplation, memory, comparison, and abstraction, which are in reality but modes of activity, not inherent powers. His grounds for denying the innateness of ideas were their non-manifes*ation, or various modifications in different individuals, from which it would seem that modes of being were to him in lieu of innate powers.

"It has been supposed that the organ of Wit gives a tendency to view everything in a ludicrous light; but if the ideas here proposed concerning its functions prove correct, such a supposition must be untenable; and that it is so, in point of fact, may be shown by reference to nature. The masks of Drs. Cullen, Franklin, and Spurzheim exhibit a greater developement of the organ than do those of Curran, Swift, and Sheridan. And farther, let any one appeal to his own private friends in whom the organ is largely developed, and ask whether they are not oftener pained than pleased by things of opposite and unharmonizing nature brought into unnecessary contact; and, on the other hand, delighted by harmonies between the properties or attributes, whether real or imaginary, of different objects."

"It seems that almost all amusing wit consists in a slight resemblance addressed to the function of one organ, and at the same time a difference to that of another-thus coming still nearer to Mr. Scott's theory of laughter than his own view of wit could do. For, if there were distinct organs to perceive resemblance and difference, each would be similarly excited by the specimens of wit; but if these be modes of activity common to all the intellectual powers, then one of them is agreeably excited by the similarity, and the other jarred by the contrast, producing different states of excitement. We say 'jarred,' because the more any organ is developed, the more are similarities and harmonies between its perceptions sought after; Tune, Colour, and Number, for example."

My own views coincide with those of Dr. Spurzheim, that the organ in question manifests the sentiment of the ludicrous, and that wit consists in any form of intellectual conception combined with this sentiment. If this opinion is adopted, however, another question arises, namely, What are the objects of the sentiment of the ludicrous? We are able to point

eut certain forms, colours, and proportions, which are intrinsically beautiful, and to specify them as the external objects to which Ideality is related. An ingenious friend stated the idea that there are also external objects which, in their own nature, are ludicrous, and which stand in an established relation to the sentiment of gayety. He specified night-caps, the nose, the elbow, a sailor with a wooden leg, and a windmill, as examples. It appears to me that the udicrous is merely a mode of existence, of which almost all natural objects are susceptible, but which is not the sole or necessary characteristic of any of them. The nose, for example, when perfect in form and harmonious in colouring, in relation to the other features, naturally excites the sentiment of the beautiful, and calls up emotions of pleasure and admiration, and not at all any ludicrous feeling: let its proportions, however, or its colour, be changed, so that it shall be too long or too short, too high or too low, too red or too white, and it will instantly excite the sentiment of the ludicrous. There are several other sentiments which possess the characteristic of having no special objects in nature related to them, but of being liable to be excited by certain modes of existence. There is no object, for instance, that, in all its modes of existence, is specially and directly terrible, or instituted apparently for the direct purpose of rousing Cautiousness. A lion in a cage, or the sea in a calm, is not terrible; but both become highly so when lashed into fury, and threatening to devour us. The conclusion which I draw from this view is, that although a sentiment of the ludicrous has been bestowed on us by a benignant Creator, to render us merry and gay, yet there is no object in nature which in itself is essentially and necessarily ludicrous o. absurd. If any part of the human form, for example, or any imperfection or disproportion in its parts, were necessarily ludicrous, he in whom such aberrations occurred would be doubly afflicted-first by the physical inconvenience; and, secondly, by being a natural and inevitable object of merriment to the whole human race, the latter being by far the greater evil of the two. Byron seems to have entertained the notion that some such impression was excited in the minds of spectators by his lame foot, and it rendered him extremely miserable. It would be in vain to attempt to educate a child by precept and example to feel compassion instead of mirth, on seeing an old sailor with a wooden leg, if a maimed man, supplying his defect by art, were necessarily a ludicrous object. But it would be quite possible to do so, if the ludicres be only a mode of existence, and not an inherent quality in objects. By directing the child's attention to the cause of the sailor's imperfection, probably fighting in defence of his country, and to the inconvenience which he suffers from it, he might be rendered an object of interest to Benevolence and Veneration, and thus cxcite feelings of kindliness and respect, instead of those of the ludicrous.

This view explains also why the most acute writers have failed in giving a satisfactory definition of wit. If no object whatever be in its own nature ludicrous, and if every mundane object may assume the ludicrous as one of its modes of existence, it is clear that any definition, or even description of the ludicrous, as a specific entity, must be impossible.

The different degrees of developement of the organ, in different individuals, explains why some men see the ludicrous in objects in which it is not perceived by others-the larger the organ, the greater being the tendency to discover ludicrous appearances.

I agree with Mr. Watson, that some individuals, in whom both Wit and Causality are largely developed, have a great talent for investigating the intrinsic qualities of things, including the primitive functions of the mental faculties and bodily organs, yet are not distinguished for wit; while this analytic capacity is less conspicuously displayed by other persons in whom Causality is large and Wit deficient. The organs of Causality were much

larger than those of Wit in the heads of Dr. Reid and Mr. Dugald Stewart, and neither of them was distinguished for the power of discriminating between primitive faculties, the laws of their operation, and the results of their acting in combination. Mr. Stewart indeed was remarkably deficient in this quality.* Dr. Thomas Brown possessed much more of this discriminating talent, and the organ of Wit was larger in his head. These and several other examples which I have observed, appear to support Mr. Watson's views; but as the essential function of a faculty is most strikingly manifested when its organ is in excess, I have observed the manifestations of several individuals in whom Wit predominated over Causality, and in them I perceived a striking love of the purely ludicrous, with a regardlessness equally of the intrinsic and of all the other philosophical qualities of things. Their great delight was to heap absurd and incongruous ideas together, to extract laughter out of every object, and to enjoy the mirth which their sallies had created. In consequence of *The following sentence, which occurs in the very threshold of his philosophical writings, affords a striking illustration of the remark in the text : Upon a slight attention to the operations of our own mind," says he, "they appear to be so complicated and so infinitely diversified, that it seems to be impossible to reduce them to any general laws. In consequence, however, of a more accurate examination, the prospect clears up; and the phenomena which appeared at first to be too various for our comprehension, are found to be the result of a comparatively small number of simple and uncompounded faculties, or of simple and uncompounded principles of action." It is extremely difficult to comprehend the distinction between "faculties" and "principles of action," which is obviously implied in the terms of this sentence. Mr. Stewart proceeds: "These faculties and principles are the GENERAL LAWS of our constitution, and hold the same place in the philosophy of mind that the general laws we investigate in physics hold in that branch of science."* This is evidently erroneous. The propensity of Destructiveness, for example, is a primitive faculty, and it acts according to certain laws. One of these laws is, that it is excited by injury or provocation; and that it lies dormant when its possessor is gratified. Under certain influences it may become diseased, and then it is a law of its constitution that it becomes extremely vigorous and ungovernable by the other faculties, and that it adds greatly to the energy of muscular action. The propensity itself is a primitive faculty of our nature, and the phenomena which it exhibits take place regularly, and this regularity is metaphorically expressed by saying that it acts according to certain laws, which are called laws of our constitution; but there is a want of discrimination in mistaking the laws which the propensity observes, or its mode of action, for the propensity itself, which Mr. Stewart here obviously does. The same want of penetration is apparent in his remark in regard to the objects of our investigation in physical science. It is true, that, in astronomy, the objects of our investigation are the laws which the principle of gravitation obeys; but in chemistry, which is equally a physical science, the elements and the inherent properties or qualities of substances, whatever these may be, are the ultimate objects of investigation, just as the primitive faculties are in mind. The modes of action of chemical substances, and the laws which they obey, are obviously distinct objects of study from the substances themselves. The mineralogist, for instance, studies the diamond simply as it exists; while the chemist investigates its elements, and its modes of action when exposed to heat and other external influences. Again, it has long been disputed, what caloric is in itself, whether it is a substance, or a state merely arising from certain modes of action in matter. But the laws which it obeys in being radiated, in being reflected, and in being concentrated, are clearly distinct objects of consideration from its substance, and yet Mr. Stewart confounds them. This incapacity to discriminate between primitive faculties and their modes of action runs through almost all his writings. Sometimes he recognises original principles distinctly, as in pp. 367, 371, 372. On other occasions, he loses sight of the distinction between them and modes of action. I shall revert to this subject when treating of association.

* Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 2d edit., p. 10

these observations, I embrace Dr. Spurzheim's view that the sentiment of the ludicrous is the primitive function of the organ. The facts brought forward by Mr. Watson remain to be accounted for, and seem to give plausibility to the idea that there may be a special organ for taking cogaizance of intrinsic qualities.

I do not regard the cases of Curran and Sheridan as attended with much difficulty. In Curran's mask the organs of Eventuality and Comparison are large, while those of Causality and Wit are only full. He had a reputation for wit; but I suspect that he manifested chiefly burlesque humour; for I have searched in vain in his speeches, reported in the Life written by his Son, for proofs of the former quality. I find in his speeches very few of the witty contrasts which distinguish the writings of Sterne, Voltaire, and the Reverend Sidney Smith. He does not display either philosophical profundity or comprehensiveness of mind. I am led by Curran's biography to infer that he possessed a very active temperament, and large Destructiveness, Secretiveness, and Imitation; and that these organs, combined with large Eventuality and Comparison, gave him fertility of invention, copiousness of illustration, savoir-faire, and a command, to a certain extent, of a coarse satirical humour. By dint of these talents he appears to have addressed himself dexterously to the prevailing sympathies of his audience for the time, and to have produced an effect on their minds much greater than the intellectual qualities displayed in his speeches would lead a modern reader to expect.

Sheridan's literary works contain more examples of genuine wit than the remains of Curran. He had a large developement of Individuality, Eventuality, and Comparison, but Causality and Wit were scarcely full. The wit in Sheridan's works is more abundant, and of a higher character, than the organ of the faculty in his head would lead us to expect; but in his biography by Mr. Moore, an instructive light is cast on this apparent anomaly. Much of the wit which sparkles in Sheridan's pages was not his own, but collected in the intellectual circles in London in which he moved, noted down by him when uttered by his friends, and subsequently wrought up into his own productions. His speeches partake much of the general character which distinguishes those of Curran. They are brilliant and clever, adapted to the day and place which gave them birth, but meager in philosophic principles, and also in genuine and underived wit. I cannot, therefore, regard either Sheridan or Curran as witty men, in the same sense of the word in which we pronounce Voltaire and Sterne, and the author of Hudibras, to have been witty. The Reverend Sidney Smith is a living example of a really witty mind. His wit is always pertinent to the object about which he reasons. It is the seasoning to solid argument, and, in fact, is often in itself argument. Sheridan, when he drew on his own resources, manifested Individuality, Eventuality, and Commison in enumerations and descriptions of physical objects and events, and by means of a moderate organ of Wit he tinged them with the ludicrous. Sidney Smith, on the other hand, impregnates the abstract deductions of reason with wit, presenting the strongest arguments in the most ludicrous attire, yet keeping the wit always subordinate to the logic. Causality, combined with a large organ of Wit, appears to me to be indispensable to the manifestation of these qualities.

Some individuals who possess a large developement of Individuality, Eventuality, and Comparison, particularly when Secretiveness and Imitation (which are great elements in the talent for acting) are aiso large, often enjoy a great reputation for wit and drollery among their companions, although in them the organ of the ludicrous is by no means large. Two explanations may be given of this fact. First, the conceptions formed by the faculties here named are palpable and striking; and, if even a mo

derate portion of the ludicrous be infused into them, they produce a great effect on ordinary minds. Secondly, many persons mistake everything for wit which makes them laugh; and, in consequence, dignify with that name mere imitations, and sometimes even absurdities, when uttered with a confident air, as if they had legitimate pretensions to be considered ludicrous. Dr. Spurzheim, in the dissection of the brain, shows that, anatomically Ideality and Wit belong to the same department of convolutions; whence a presumption in his opinion arises that their functions belong to the same class of mental faculties: and as Ideality has been uniformly regarded as a sentiment, Wit may with propriety be placed under the same head. It will be observed, that all these differences relate to the metaphysical analysis of the faculty, and that phrenologists are agreed on the fact, that witty and mirthful manifestations are connected with the organ now under consideration. The organ and its function, therefore, may, to this extent, be regarded as ascertained.

21, IMITATION.

DR. GALL gives the following account of the discovery of this faculty and organ: One day, a friend with whom he was conversing about the form of the head, assured him that his had something peculiar about it, and directed his hand to the superior-anterior region of the skull. This part was elevated in the form of a segment of a sphere; and behind the protuberance there was a transverse depression in the middle of his head. Before that time Dr. Gall had not observed such a conformation. This man had a peculiar talent for imitation. Dr. Gall immediately repaired to the institution for the deaf and dumb, in order to examine the head of a pupil named Casteigner, who only six weeks before had been received into the establishment, and, from his entrance, had attracted notice by his amazing talent for mimicry. On the mardi-gras of the carnival, when a little play was performed at the institution, he had imitated so perfectly the gestures, gait, and looks of the director, inspector, physician, and surgeon of the establishment, and above all of some women, that it was impossible to mistake them. This exhibition was the more amusing, as nothing of the kind was expected from the boy, his education having been totally neglected. Dr. Gall states, that he found the part of the head in question as fully developed in this individual as in his friend Hannibal, just mentioned.

Is the talent for mimicry, then, said Dr. Gall, founded on a particular faculty and organ? He sought every opportunity of multiplying observations. He visited private families, schools, and public places, and everywhere examined the heads of individuals who possessed a distinguished talent for mimicry. At this time Monsieur Marx, secretary to the minister of war, had acquired a great reputation by playing several characters in a private theatre. Dr. Gall found in him the same part of the head swelling out as in Casteigner and Hannibal. In all the other persons whom he examined he found the part in question more or less elevated, in proportion to the talent for imitation which they possessed. It is told of Garrick, says Dr. Gall, that he possessed such an extraordinary talent for mimicry, that, at the court of Louis XV., having seen for a moment the king, the Duke D'Aumont, the Duke D'Orleans, Messrs. D'Aumont, Brissac, and Richelieu, Prince Soubise, &c., he carried off the manner of each of them in his recollection. He invited to supper some friends who had accompanied him to court, and said, "I have seen the court only for an instant, but I shall show you the correctness of my powers of observation and the extent of my memory ;" and placing his friends in two files, he retired from the room, and, on his immediately returning, his