intruding themselves into our mind; and of our having strong desires which we forbear to indulge. In such expressions the our and we seem to mean the principle of personal identity; and the evil thoughts and desires appear to be regarded as affections of that principle, originating in sources distinct from it, and different from one another.

The more general opinion of philosophers is, that the mind is a simple and indivisible substance, and that the several faculties are merely diffe. rent states of it. Such is the light in which the subject is viewed by Dr. Gall. "In my opinion," says he, "there exists but one single principle, which sees, feels, tastes, hears, touches, thinks, and wills. But in order that this principle may become capable of perceiving light and sound-of feeling, tasting, and touching-and of manifesting the different kinds of thought and propensity-it requires the aid of various material instruments, without which the exercise of all these faculties would be impossible."* This view is espoused also by my excellent friend, the Rev. Dr. David Welsh, Professor of Church History in the University of Edinburgh, who successfully shows that it is consistent with the phrenological doctrine of a plurality of organs. "The leading doctrine of Phrenology," says he, ❝is, that different portions or organs of the brain are connected with the primitive feelings of the mind. The truth of this position can obvi ously be ascertained only by observation. But taking it for granted that it is true, it may be asked how it can be reconciled with the great principle to which so frequent reference has been made, that the powers, thoughts, and feelings of the mind are not different from the mind, but merely the mind itself existing in different states?

"It requires but little reflection to be satisfied that the introduction of cerebral organs does not in any degree affect Dr. Brown's leading principle. The cerebral organs are not the mind-nor is any state of these organs the mind. The mind we believe to be a simple and indivisible substance. And the only difference that the doctrines of Phrenology introduce in regard to Dr. Brown's principle is, that, instead of the feelings and thoughts being merely the relations of the simple substance mind to its own former states or to external objects, they are the relations of the simple substance mind to certain portions of the encephalon.

"In looking upon any object-as snow-we have the notion of a certain colour. Now, the notion is not in the snow, but in the mind. That is, the notion of colour is the mind existing in a certain relation to an external object. But it is allowed on all hands, that there is an intervening step between the snow and the mind: there is an affection of the optic nerve. The notion of colour, then, is the mind existing in a certain relation to the optic nerve. It will be conceded that this does not alter the question as to the simplicity of the mind. And if this is conceded, it is abundantly obvious that another step in the process might be conceived without taking away from the simplicity of the immaterial part, and that, instead of an affection of the optic nerve being the immediate antecedent of the notion of colour, it might be a particular portion of the encephalon. As the notion of colour, upon this supposition, is a relation of the mind to the organ of colour, it follows that, if that organ were changed in any respect, the state of the mind would also be changed. Thus, if it were larger, or of a finer structure, or more active, the perception of colour would be more delicate, or quick, or pleasing. The same remarks might be extended to all the organs. Where the organ of Causality is large, as in the case of Dr. Brown himself, then there will be a tendency to reason; which tendency is a state of the mind in relation to a material organ, which state would have been different had the organ been different. "A multitude of organs may all be affecting the mind at the same *Sur les Fonctions du Cerveau, i., 243.

instant, and in that case a variety of feelings will be experienced. But still the mind is simple, and it is only its relations to these different organs that are complex.

"When we say, then, that when we have any power, as, for example, of reasoning, we are not to suppose that the power is different from the mind. There is a material organ which is separate from the mind, but the perception of relation is a state wholly mental. One state of the organ may give the perception of relation, another the desire to perceive or discover it; but the perception and desire are both attributes, not of matter, but of mind. The effect of the organ being large or small, active or inactive, in different individuals, or upon the same individual at different times, is the subject to which I alluded in the chapter on Cause and Effect, as that which Dr. Brown had not considered."*

Dr. Caldwell, again, argues strongly in favour of the singleness of the power of the mind. "We do not believe," says he, "that, in a separate or insulated capacity, the mind either does or can possess a number of distinct faculties, but that it is as single in its power as it is in its substance. It is a quickening and operative principle, essential to all the mental faculties, but does not by any means possess them itself. It is no more made up of parts, in relation to power, than in relation to substance. In both respects it is one and indivisible.

"To advocate a proposition the opposite of this is, to contend that the mind, like the body, is compound. To be single in essence and multiplex in power, implies a contradiction. Conformably to the present arrangement of creation, we consider such a case impossible. In support of a belief the reverse of this, no evidence presents itself, either primitive or analogical. On the contrary, all attainable evidence is against it.

"We can conceive of but one possible way in which the human mind, single in its essence, can be tributary to the existence of a multiplicity of faculties. That is, by being united to a system of organs, instead of a single one, and serving as the spring of action to the whole. In this case the multiplicity of the organs, each different in structure from the other, although acting from the same principle and impulse, will secure, in the result, the requisite variety. For every organ must necessarily act in a manner corresponding with its specific structure.

For

"We cannot, therefore, withhold an expression of our deliberate belief, that the doctrine of the perfect unity of the human mind, both in substance and power, constitutes, most certainly, that foundation of the science of Phrenology that nothing can shake, and which the progress of time and improvements in knowledge will only render more stable and secure. if it be true that the mind, as a unit, possesses but unity of power, it follows, of necessity, that the multiplicity of power manifested in the functions of the mental faculties must arise from a multiplex system of cerebral organs, acting in conjunction with the mind.Ӡ

It is not necessary, in studying Phrenology, to decide which of these views is the correct interpretation of nature; because the effects of the organs on the mind are the same, whichever of them be adopted. If the mind consists of an aggregate of powers, then each acts by means of a particular organ, and is manifested with a degree of energy varying with its size. Viewed as one simple substance, capable of existing in a variety of states, it enters into each state by means of a separate organ: when the organs are spontaneouly active, they induce their relative states; without their influence, these cannot take place: when they are large,

Welsh's Life of Dr. Thomas Brown, p. 521

Preliminary Discourse in answer to Lord Jeffrey's Criticism on Phrenology in the 88th No. of the Edinburgh Review, prefixed to Dr. Caldwell's Elements of Phrenology, 2d edit., p. 16.

WHAT IS MIND BY ITSELF?-DIVISION OF THE FACULTIES. 105

the states are excited vigorously; when they are small, these exist feebly. The reader may therefore adopt whichever theory appears to himself preferable. Without meaning to deny that the latter view appears to me the more plausible, I shall, in the following pages, treat of the faculties as distinct mental powers, connected with separate organs; because, by doing so, I shall be able to bring out the doctrine more simply and luminously, than by considering them as merely particular states of the general power-the Mind: and this language, moreover, is correct even on what seems to be the true hypothesis; because, according to this view, when the organ of Causality, for example, is largely possessed, the individual is capable of reasoning logically and acutely-of which mental act he is incapable when that organ is greatly deficient. The word faculty or power, therefore, is used to express the quality possesed in the one case, and not in the other, and which is legitimately designated and universally recognised by either of these terms.

"It has occurred to me," continues Dr. Welsh," that another difficulty of a metaphysical nature may suggest itself in regard to the principles of Phrenology. It may be asked, What is the soul when deprived of the cerebral organs? But the system of Dr. Brown affords us no more light upon this point than the system of Dr. Gall. Indeed, a passage which I have quoted from his Lectures shows that he considered that those who engaged in such inquiries were ignorant of the limits of our faculties. It is only experience that can teach us in what state the soul exists when separated from the body. And in this sense the precept of the poet holds equally in a scientific and in a religious point of view,

'Wait the great teacher Death, and God adore.'"

DIVISION OF THE FACULTIES.

DR. SPURZHEIM divides the faculties into two orders, FEELINGS and INTELLECT, or affective and intellectual faculties. The feelings are subdivided by him into two genera, denominated PROPENSITIES and SENTIMENTS. He applies the name propensities to indicate internal impulses, which invite only to certain actions; and sentiments to designate other feelings, not limited to inclination alone, but which have an emotion of a peculiar kind superadded. Acquisitiveness, for example, is a mere impulse to acquire; Veneration gives a tendency to worship, accompanied by a particular emotion, which latter quality is the reason of its being denominated a sentiment.

The second order of faculties makes us acquainted with objects which exist, and their qualities and relations; they are called INTELLECTUAL. These are subdivided by Dr. Spurzheim into four genera. The first includes the external senses and voluntary motion; the second those internal powers which perceive existence, or make man and animals acquainted with external objects and their physical qualities; and the third the powers which perceive the relations of external objects. These three genera are named perceptive faculties. The fourth genus comprises the faculties which act on all the other powers-which compare, judge, and discriminate these are named reflective faculties.

:

The names of the faculties employed in this work are, with few exceptions, those suggested by Dr. Spurzheim. To designate propensity, he adds to a root or fundamental word the termination ive, as indicating the quality of producing; the termination ness denotes the abstract state, as Destructiveness. The termination ous characterizes a sentiment, as cautious, conscientious. To these is added ness, to express the abstract nality, as Cautiousness, Conscientiousness. The names of the intel

lectual faculties are easily understood, and do not here require any parti cular explanation.

Considerable difficulty attends the arrangement of the faculties and organs. In the first and second editions of this work they were arranged and numbered according to the order adopted in Dr. Spurzheim's Physiognomical System, published in 1815. The principle of that arrangement was, as far as possible, philosophical. The organs common to man and the lower animals were treated of first, beginning with the lowest, and ascending. Next come the organs of the sentiments peculiar to man; and, lastly, the organs of intellect. Since 1815, the great divisions of this classification have been retained, but repeated alterations have been made by Dr. Spurzheim in the arrangement of the details. It appears impossible to arrive at a correct classification until all the organs, and also the primitive faculty or ultimate function of each, shall be definitely ascertained, which is not at present the case. Till this end shall be accomplished, every interim arrangement will be in danger of being overturned by subsequent discoveries. In the meantime, however, for the sake of uniformity, I shall adopt the arrangement followed by Dr. Spurzheim in the third edition of his Phrenology, published in 1825.* During his visit to Edinburgh, in 1828, he demonstrated the anatomy of the brain, and traced out the connexion between the organs in a manner so clear and satisfactory, that the basis of his arrangement appeared founded in nature. Dr. Gall seems not to have adopted any philosophical principle of classification; but it is proper that his names and order should be known. I shall, therefore, add a table of these to the present work.†

In the case of many of the organs, observations have been made to such an extent, that the functions are held to be ascertained; and in regard to others, where the observations have been fewer, the functions are stated as probable. There is no difference of opinion among phrenologists in regard to the kind of manifestations which accompany the organs set down as established; their differences touch only the result of the metaphysical analysis of the feelings and intellectual powers, and the order of their arrangement.

I shall notice briefly the history of the discovery of each organ, and state a few cases in illustration of its function: but the reader is respectfully informed, that I do not pretend to bring forward the evidence on which Phrenology is founded. I beg leave to refer those readers who are fond of perusing cases, to Dr. Gall's work, in six volumes, entitled Sur les Fonctions du Cerveau, &c.; to Dr. Spurzheim's work, Phrenology; to the Transactions of the Phrenological Society; to The Phrenological Journal and Miscellany; and to the Journal de la Société Phrénologique de Paris. Those persons who desire philosophical conviction are requested to resort directly to nature, which is always within their reach; for WELL-GROUNDED CONVICTION CAN BE OBTAINED ONLY BY PERSONAL

OBSERVATION.

NATURAL LANGUAGE OF THE FACULTIES

DRS. GALL and Spurzheim have investigated the laws which determine the natural language of the individual faculties, and their exposition of them is highly interesting and instructive. The leading principle is, that the motions are always in the direction of the seat of the organs. Self-Esteem, for instance, produces an attitude in which the head and * See Objections to Dr. Spurzheim's classification of the faculties, in the Appendix, No. II. † Appendix, No. III. See Gall, Sur les Fonctions du Cerveau, v., 440, and Spurzheim's Phyn nomical System, London, 1815, p. 398.

body are held high, and reclining backward; Firmness gives erectness and stiffness to the person; Cautiousness carries the head backward and to the side, Veneration upward and forward, and so on. Each organ, when predominantly powerful and active, produces these motions and attitudes. It also gives a peculiar expression to the voice and features: thus Destructiveness communicates to the voice a hard ringing quality, and to the countenance a dark harsh expression; while Love of Approbation gives a flattering and pleasing tone to the voice, and gracious smiles to the face. The modes of expression attached to each faculty, being natural, are universal, and are understood in all countries and all ages. They are the foundations of pantomime, and also of expression in painting and sculpture. The knowledge of them renders Physiognomy scientific; without this knowledge, it is a mere empirical art, leading as often to erroneous as to sound conclusions.

ORDER I.-FEELINGS.

GENUS I.-PROPENSITIES.

THE faculties falling under this genus do not form ideas nor procure knowledge; their sole function is, to produce a propensity of a specific kind. These faculties are common to man with the lower animals

1.-AMATIVENESS.

THE Cerebellum (A A, fig. 2, p. 74) is the organ of this propensity,* and is situated between the mastoid process on each side and the projecting point in the middle of the transverse ridge of the occipital bone. The size is indicated during life by the thickness of the neck at these parts, or between the ears, and by the extension of the inferior surface of the occipital bone backward. In some individuals the lobes of the cerebellum descend or droop, increasing the downward convexity of the occipital bone, rather than increasing its expansion between the ears. In such cases the projection may be felt by the hand, if pressed firmly on the neck. The subjoined cuts show the appearances presented by the living head when the organ is moderate and large.

n

There is nearly half an inch of space between the cerebellum and the commencement of the posterior lobe of the brain, at the insertion of thie tentorium.

ley

The tentorium is a strong membrane, which separates the cerebellim from the brain; in animals which leap, as the cat and tiger, the separat eris produced by a thin plate of bone. The cerebellum is, however, cose nected with the brain; for its fibres originate in the corpora restiformica from which also the organs of other animal propensities arise. Certan. fibres originating in that source, after passing through the optic thalami, expand into the organs of Philoprogenitiveness, Adhesiveness, Combative

Partes genitales, sive testes hominibus et fœminis uterus, propensionem ad venerem excitare nequeunt. Nam in pueris veneris stimulus seminis secretioni sæpè antecedit. Plures eunuchi, quanquam testibus privati, hane incilnationem conservant. Sunt etiam fœminæ quæ sine utero natæ, hunc stimulum manifestant. Hinc quidam ex doctrinæ nostræ inimicis, harum rerum minimè inscii, seminis præsentiam in sanguine contendunt, et hanc causam sufficientem existimant. Attamen argumenta hujus generis verâ physiologiâ longè absunt, et vix citatione digna videntur. Nonnulli etiam hujus inclinationis causam in liquore prostatico quærunt; sed in senibus aliquandò fluidi prostatici secretio, sine ullâ veneris inclinatione, copiosissima est. Spurzheim's Phrenology, p. 128. + See Note on p. 79.