Thus religion, natural and revealed, go hand in hand; and as the object of both is the same, to separate them is an absurdity; since it matters not how we discover the will of God, if we only do discover it. Of the modern scheme of thus uniting ethics with Christianity, Hume and others have complained. But have the complainants been able to make any thing of morality without such union? The ninth section of Hume's Treatise on the Principles of Morals contains the practical application of his system. Let any one read it, and say whether the motives there proposed are sufficiently "violent" to correct the bad passions of our nature. If not, the reader will see, with us, the necessity of stronger motives. But this is not the present question. For if Christianity be true, there is a state of future rewards and punishments; and such motives cannot be neglected; least of all by a Christian moralist, who should leave to those who reject the Scriptures, to build up, if they can, morality without their aid.

Where the Scriptures are silent or dubious, we must resort to the light of nature. The method of discovering the will of God by the light of nature, is only to inquire into the tendency of any act to promote or diminish general happiness. For as this rule rests on the presumption that the Creator wishes the happiness of his creatures, such actions as promote such wishes must be agreeable to him; and vice

versa.

The rea

On this presumption our whole system rests. sons, therefore, on which it rests, must be explained.

CHAP. V.THE DIVINE BENEVOLENCE.

When God created mankind, he wished either their happiness or their misery, or he was unconcerned about both. Had he wished the misery of man, he would have made all the present sources of pleasure sources of pain. Had he 34 What is mentioned as an absurdity? Why?

35 Do those moral treatises which discard the Scriptures prove to be effectual?

36 But can a Christian moralist neglect them?

37 When must we resort to the light of nature?

38 How shall we discover the will of God by that?

39 Upon what presumption does this rule rest?

40 What may be said to be the mind of the Creator when he made man?

41 Suppose he had wished the misery of man?

been indifferent to the happiness or misery of man, the capabilities for pleasure and pain must have been the result of accident; for all design is, by the supposition, excluded. But as accident could not have fitted all objects to the senses, so that the one should impart and the other receive uniformly corresponding impressions, the supposition of accident must be excluded. Consequently, God must, when he createdman, have wished his happiness, and made provision accordingly.

Again, contrivance proves design; and the tendency of the contrivance indicates the intention of the designer. The world abounds with contrivances directed to purposes of good. But though evil exists, it is not the design of the contrivance. Teeth are contrived for the purpose of eating, yet they ache; but their aching is not the design of the contrivance, but incidental to it. Even, for the sake of argument. we will admit it is a proof of defective contrivance. So, in the case of human instruments, a sickle is contrived to reap corn; and though from its form it occasionally cuts the reaper's fingers, such is not the design of it, but an accident from its use. On the other hand, instruments of torture are contrived with the design of giving pain. Nothing similar to this is found in the works of God. No anatomist, for instance, ever discovered any organ in the body, whose design could be shown to be only the infliction of pain; nor does he, if he meets with a part whose use he knows not, even suspect that its design is to annoy. Since, then, contrivances indicate that God designed man's happiness, and as there are no proofs of any change in such design; we must in reason believe in its continuance.

Although a view of universal nature is apt to bewilder the mind, there is, however, always one bright spot in the prospect, on which the eye rests with complacency; and thus a

42 Suppose he had been indifferent? Is this reasonable? 43 What follows from rejecting these two suppositions?

44 What other argument is there?

45 What is the purpose of the divine contrivances?

46 Is evil one of their designs?

Give an illustration.

47 What is said of human instruments when intended for good, and when intended for torture?

48 What is said of the anatomist?

49 What conclusion follows from this?

50 Does the eye judge best when looking upon a whole prospect or on a single spot in it? What is compared to this?

single example will produce a conviction which many united would fail to effect. To me it seems that the benevolence of the Deity is more clearly seen in the pleasures of children than in any thing else. The pleasures of grown persons are the result of their own seeking, by the cultivation of talents aided by accidental circumstances; but those of a healthy infant are so evidently furnished by the hand of another, that the sight of a child at play affords to me sensible evidence of the intentional benevolence of the Deity.

Having thus proved that the Creator wished and still wishes the happiness of his creatures, we proceed to investigate the rule built upon such fact, that "the method of knowing God's will as shown by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of any act to promote or diminish general happiness."

CHAP. VI.-UTILITY.

Actions, then, are to be estimated by their tendency.* Whatever is expedient is right; and the utility of a moral rule constitutes its obligation.

[Dr. Dewar remarks on this assertion, "Though we admit that utility be the rule by which the Deity conducts his government, it is a rule utterly unsuited to man. How can he, with his limited faculties, and with his comparative ignorance of the nature and qualities of beings, and the tendency of actions, be capable of making expediency the law of his conduct? It is only for Him who sees the end from the beginning, to know all the consequences of a single action, and to determine the way in which the good of that

51 What example was most evident to Dr. Paley? 52 What is proved from the foregoing?

53 What rule is built upon this fact?

54 How are actions to be estimated?

55 What constitutes the obligation of a moral rule? 56 What does Dr. Dewar say of utility? Why?

Actions in the abstract are right or wrong, according to their tendency; the agent is virtuous or vicious, according to his design. Thus, if the question be, Whether to relieve common beggars be right or wrong, we inquire into the tendency of such a conduct to public advantage or inconvenience. If the question be, Whether, a man, remarkable for this sort of bounty, is virtuous for that reason, we inquire into his design, whether his liberality springs from charity or from ostentation. Our concern is with actions in the abstract.

universe which he has formed shall be secured."-Book iii. chap. 6.]

[But Mr. Dymond well says, "It may easily be shown that regard to utility is recommended or enforced in the expression of the divine will. That will requires the exercise of pure and universal benevolence; which benevolence is exercised in consulting the interests, the welfare, and the happiness of mankind. It is the use of reason to discover what is useful and expedient for these ends; and to say that to consult utility is right, is almost the same to say it is right to exercise our understandings. It is obvious that in this view, a reference to expediency is consistent with the will of God; and in conforming to it, so long as we hold it in subordination to his laws, we perform his will."]

[It is plain that Dr. Paley, in this part of the work, really intended to teach that utility was subordinate to the Scriptures; as in chapter iv. he says, "Where the instructions are clear and positive, there is an end to all deliberation." Whether the same opinion is manifested in the succeeding part of his work is another question.]

But to the maxim of utility, it may be objected, that many acts which are useful in themselves are decidedly not right. For instance, it might be useful that a possessor of a great estate, who abuses the influence of his property, should be murdered, and a better owner put in his place; it might be useful to rob a miser, and to give his money to the poor, whose quantity of pleasure by such acquisition would be greater than the pain of the miser from his loss; it might be useful to obtain political power through perjury, with the view to advance the good of the state. Must we, then, justify assassination, plunder, and perjury, on the ground of utility? or must we give up our principle that utility is right? Neither is necessary. The true answer is, that such acts,

57 What does Mr. Dymond say to this rule?

58 What is required by the will of God?

59 How do we find what is expedient for these ends }

60 What follows from this?

61 What is his conclusion upon this subject?

62 Is not this the intention of Dr. Paley?

63 What objection may be urged against the doctrine of utility? Give some examples.

64 What question is asked from these examples! What is its true

answer?

though in appearance useful, are really not useful; and on that account alone are wrong.

The consequences of actions are twofold, particular and general. The former refers to the mischief produced by an action, taken singly; the latter to the mischief produced by the violation of a rule generally useful.

Thus, for instance, the particular mischief produced by the murder would be the loss of life, as dear to a bad as to a good man; while the general mischief produced, is the violation of the law against murder.

Hence, although in such murder the particular good might outweigh the particular evil, yet it would not be useful, because it would produce a general mischief; and so of the cases of robbery and perjury above stated.

But as this decision presupposes the necessity of general rules in morals, such necessity must be demonstrated.

CHAP. VII.THE NECESSITY OF GENERAL RULES.

Acts of the same kind cannot be partly permitted and partly forbidden. They must all be embraced under one general law; and the evidence, which proves that the universal permission of them is injurious, is the ground of the law which forbids them all.

Thus, in the case of the murder before spoken of, should the assassin say he killed the rich rascal, because he thought his life pernicious; such a plea, if admitted in this case, must be admitted in all similar cases. And the consequence would be general mischief, by putting the life of any man in the power of his neighbor.

The necessity, then, of general rules in human government is apparent. But must the Deity also regulate future rewards and punishments by general rules? Yes. Because, as every government, whether human or divine, intends to

65 How many classes of consequences result from actions, and what are they? 66 Describe the particular. Describe the general.

67 What is the particular bad consequence of murder? 68 What are its general mischiefs?

69 Which class of consequences determines the morality of an act? 70 Upon what is this decision founded?

71 What is said of all acts that have a common tendency?

72 What follows from proving the pernicious effects of permitting all of them? Give an example.

73 What is rendered apparent by this?

74 Will this necessity extend to the divine government? Why?