III. In every question of doubtful conduct, we are bound to take the safe side.

Suppose, for instance, that it were doubtful, in the mind of a reasoner, whether suicide be lawful or not; still a man ought not to commit it, because he can have no doubt that it is lawful to let it alone. This, it is replied, is only the prudent side of the question, and does not touch the legality of the act. We assert, on the contrary, that the act is not lawful to the reasoner, so long as he may have any doubts of its legality. This is the decision of St. Paul* on a similar case; and with that we may rest contended :-"I know that there is nothing unclean of itself; but to him that esteemeth it unclean, to him it is unclean. Happy is he that condemneth not himself in that thing which he alloweth."

231 What is the third general observation? Give an example. 232 Whose decision have we upon such subjects?

*Rom. xiv. 14, and also 22, 23.

State it.

E

BOOK II.

MORAL OBLIGATIONS.

CHAP. I. THE QUESTION, WHY IS A MAN OBLIGED?

CONSIDERED.

66

THE reasons assigned for this obligation, although various, ultimately coincide, whether founded on right," or "the fitness of things," or "a conformity with reason and truth," or "the promotion of public good," or, lastly, on "obedience to God's will." The ultimate result in all cases

is "happiness."

For, by "the fitness of things" is meant their fitness to produce happiness; by "the reason of things" is meant the principle by which is formed a judgment of the power of things to produce happiness, and "truth" is a result of this judgment. Hence, what promotes general happiness is agreeable to the fitness of things, to reason, and to truth. And, again, as "the will of God" requires only what promotes general happiness, whatever leads to that end must needs be "6 right;" by which term is merely meant a conformity with the rule of moral conduct, whatever that may be.

[On this subject Dr. Dewar has well said, "The will of God does not create moral distinctions, but is the expression of distinctions which eternally and unchangeably exist; and which are founded in his own nature." And again, "The distinctions of right and wrong are necessary, immutable, and founded in the nature of things."-Book iii. chap. 4.]

But it may be asked, why is a man obliged to do what is

1 What are the several answers to the question "why is a man obliged"?

2 What may be said of them all?

3 What is meant by fitness of things?-the reason of things?

4 What is agreeable to all these?

5 Does the will of God coincide with rule? Why?

6 What is the meaning of the term right?

7 What does Dr. Dewar say of the will of God?

8 What does he say of the distinctions of right and wrong?

right, or suited to the fitness of things, or to nature, reason, and truth, or to promote public good, or to obey the will of God?

To answer this question, it is necessary to inquire, 1. What is meant by saying that a man is obliged to perform any act; and, 2. Why he is obliged to perform that act. And we will propose for example, the act of keeping his word.

CHAP. II.-THE MEANING OF THE WORD " OBLIGATION."

[An obligation is "that which constitutes legal or moral duty, and which renders a person liable to coercion and punishment for neglecting it."-Webster.]

A man is said to be obliged, when he is urged by a violent motive which results from the command of another.

The motive must be violent. For, if not, his acquiescence will be voluntary, and not compulsive; and consequently, there will exist no obligation to perform the act in question.

The act must be done at the command of another. For, if a man is actuated by the hope of a gratuity, he is not obliged, but induced or prevailed upon.

But as no command can be effective unless accompanied by the hope of reward for obedience, or the fear of punishment for disobedience; the obligation to do what is right is referred at once to the violent motives of expected pleasure or pain, which are to result from obedience or disobedience to the will of God.

[On this subject Mr. Stewart says, "The notions of reward and punishment presuppose the notions of right and wrong. They are sanctions of virtue, or additional motives to the practice of it; but they suppose the existence of some previous obligation.

"It is absurd, therefore, to ask, why we are bound to

9 After all the reasons that are given, what question may still be asked ?

10 In order to answer this question, what two inquiries are neces

sary?

11 How does Dr. Webster define the word obligation?

12 When is a man said to be obliged?

13 Of what quality must that motive be?

14 What is the result called when the motive is not violent?

15 For what reason must the act be done?

16 What do we say of it if there is an expectation of reward? 17 To what motives is the obligation referred? Why?

18 What does Mr. Stewart say of these motives?

practise virtue? The very notion of virtue implies the notion of obligation. Every being, who is conscious of the distinction between right and wrong, carries about with him a law which he is bound to observe; notwithstanding he may be in total ignorance of a future state."-Outlines. Part ii. chap. 1. sec. 6.].

From the preceding view of the question, it appears that when a man is said, in one case, to be induced to perform any act, and in another, to be "obliged" to perform it, we do not suppose that he is impelled by different kinds of motives; but only if he is obliged, he is influenced by a strong inducement which results from the command of another. In like manner, an act of prudence differs from an act of obligation only in a degree still further removed; for in the former, we consider what we shall gain or lose in this world; in the latter, we think of the pleasures and pains of the world to

come.

CHAP. III.—THE QUESTION, WHY AM I OBLIGED TO KEEP MY WORD?

To the question, "Why am I obliged to keep my word?" the answer will be, Because I am "urged to do so by a violent motive," (namely, the expectation of future reward if I do, and of future punishment if I do not ;) and that "this motive results from the command of another;" that is, of God.

This recurrence to the hopes and fears of a future state as the grounds of moral obligation, has been and may be still objected to, but to no purpose; unless the objectors can show that virtue leads always to happiness here, or at least to a greater share than its opposite vice ever attains.

[Concerning these hopes and fears, a writer in Rees's Cyclopedia says, "Here then we come to the ultimate, or (as we should prefer saying) the remotest obligation of vir

19 Does he think one bound to do right, if he does not believe in a future state? Why?

20 Do we suppose the motives for inducement, and those for obliga tion to be different in kind? How do they differ?

21 How does prudence differ from obligation?

22 Why am I obliged to keep my word?

23 What is the motive? At whose command is it?

24 Are these motives agreed to by all?

25 In order to dispose of them, what must the objectors show? 26 What are these hopes and fears called in Rees's Cyclopedia?

tue; and from this point we shall proceed, till it appears that the end of human existence will be best answered by resting at a somewhat nearer and equally stable ground of obligation. And we cannot forbear observing, that it will clearly appear, from carefully considering the laws of our mental frame and the circumstances of mankind, that the love of God, of man, and of duty, (in other words, the affections of piety and benevolence, and a regard to conscience,) should be our primary aim, since he will be most happy, in whom those principles exist with the greatest strength and vigor."]

Since, then, we cannot dispense with the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, as the ground of moral obligations, we have to inquire,

1. If there be, in reality, such a state; and,

2. What actions will be rewarded, and what will be punished.

Of these questions, the first relate to the evidences for the truth of the Christian religion; the second to the detail of the code of Christian morality. Both questions are too much for one work; and the first is, therefore, taken for granted in the present treatise.

CHAP. IV.-THE WILL OF GOD.

As the will of God is our rule, the whole business of Christian morality turns upon our knowledge of what that will is; and that once known, our duty is known also.

Now the will of God is known, 1. By the express words of Holy Writ; and, 2. By such inferences as are drawn by the light of nature from the works of God.

When an ambassador has his instructions in his pocket, it would be strange if he did not look into them. When those instructions are clear and positive, there is an end to all deliberation concerning his duty. In the same manner, the Scriptures, as far as they go, must be our rule of conduct.

27 Should our actions be governed directly by them?

28 What should be our primary aim in our duties?

29 What two great inquiries are necessary to form a code of morality?

30 How is the first settled?-Of what does the second consist?

31 What is the whole business of forming a moral code?

32 What two means are there of knowing the will of God?

33 Give an example of the first method. What does it teach?