1. It omits many duties, as not objects of compulsion. For as it never speaks but to command, and commands only where it can compel; voluntary duties, such as piety to God, bounty to the poor, &c. must necessarily be omitted, as beyond the reach of the law. II. It permits, or rather does not punish, many vices, because they are incapable of positive description; for instance, prodigality, disrespect to parents, &c. For either it must define accurately the crime to be punished, or it must leave to the discretion of the magistrate the application of a vague description to the individual case; and thus lead the way to the tyrannical abuse of power. In all cases, where the uncertain nature of the act defies a previously fixed description, the law, in free states, chooses rather to leave men at liberty, than to invest the magistrates with a power so full of danger. CHAP. IV.-LAW OF GOD. Whoever expects to find in the Scriptures a specific solution of every doubtful point of moral conduct, looks for more than he will meet with. Had it been otherwise, the volume would have been too bulky to be read, much less circulated; and, in the language of St. John, the world itself would not have contained all the books necessary to be written. This will appear manifest from considering, that the laws of England alone, with its acts of parliament and decisions of the courts, occupy nearly one hundred folio volumes; and yet in not one instance out of ten, when looking for a particular case, can you find one exactly in point; to say nothing of 18 What duties does the law of the land omit? 19 What kind of duties are not objects of compulsion? 20 Can there be law without compulsion? 21 What class of vices go unpunished by the laws of the land? 22 Mention a few examples. 23 What are the only two methods that will lead to their punishment? 24 We have said that the first cannot be done. Would it be proper to trust to the discretion of the magistrate? Why ? 25 Is it done in free states? 26 What is the consequence of not granting that power? 27 Can we find in the Scriptures a particular rule for every act of morality? 28 Why is that the case? 29 What evidence have we that particular rules would render the Scriptures too bulky ? other numerous doubtful cases, on which the law neither does nor professes to state and thing positive. So far, then, from imitating the particularity of human laws, by which the bulk, not value, of the volume would have been increased; the Scriptures teach morality by general rules, relating to piety, justice, benevolence, and purity; such, for instance, as to worship God in spirit and in truth; to do as we would be done by; to love our neighbor as ourself; and, that pollution arises, not from what goes into the mouth, but what comes out of the heart. These rules are illustrated by fictitious examples, as in the parable of the good Samaritan; or by real events, as in Christ's praise of the widow's mite; or by answers to questions put to Christ or his disciples, as in the case of the young man who asked, "What lack I yet?" This plan of instruction is, in fact, the same that is pursued in the practical sciences; where certain rules are laid down, and examples subjoined, not with a view to embrace every possible case, but merely to explain the principle, and to exhibit a specimen of its application. In the Scriptures, however, there is this difference; that neither the rules nor examples are given methodically, but as occasion suggested the one or the other; and thus both carry with them a feeling of vividness far superior to the coldness of a regular sys tem. Besides, as the Scriptures are addressed to persons not quite ignorant of the principles of natural justice, they do not so much teach new rules of morality, as enforce the practice of it by new and better motives. Thus, for instance, extortioners are condemned by the Scriptures, while the act of extortion is supposed to be known, and consequently not defined there. Thus much has been said to prove, that, if the Scriptures be deficient, they are so from design; and that they do not supersede the use of a science by which such deficiency can be best supplied. 30 How is morality taught in the Scriptures? 31 How are these rules illustrated? 32 How does the scriptural plan of instruction agree with that pursued in practical science? 35 Give an example. 33 Is there any difference between the two plans? CHAP. V.-THE MORAL SENSE. The father of Caius Toranius, having been proscribed by the triumvirate, concealed himself in a place known only to his son; and by this son, who soon after came over to the interests of the triumvirate, he was betrayed. The old man, mcre anxious for his son's safety and advancement, than about his own danger, inquired of the officers who seized him, whether his son was well, and had done his duty as a soldier? "That son,' ," said the officer, "so dear to thee, has betrayed thee; and to him," striking the old man with a poniard, "thou owest thy death." The unhappy parent fell, affected not so much by his fate, as by the treachery of his child. If this story were related to a savage, uninfluenced by the modes of thinking and acting common to civilized life, would he feel that sentiment of disapprobation of young Toranius' conduct which a civilized being feels? They who maintain the existence of a moral sense, or an instinctive love of virtue and hatred of vice, affirm that he would; they who deny the existence of such a sense, assert that he would not. ["To those who are at all acquainted with the history of this dispute, it must appear evident that the question is here completely misstated; and that in the whole of Dr. Paley's subsequent argument on the subject, he combats a phantom of his own imagination. Did it ever enter into the mind of the wildest theorist to imagine that the sense of seeing would enable a man brought up from the moment of his birth in utter darkness, to form a conception of light and colors? But would it not be equally rash to conclude, from the extravagance of such a supposition, [that of a savage as above,] that the sense of seeing is not an original part of the human 38 What is the intention of the author in chapter 5? Ans. To ascertain whether there is a natural moral sense or conscience. 39 How does he commence the inquiry? 40 What answer would be given by those who believe that conscience is a part of our nature? 41 Who assert that he would not? 42 Is Dr. Paley's supposition concerning the last two assertions a proper statement of the case? 43 By what parallel question is the absurdity of Paley's statement shown? 44 What is the point of Stewart's argument? frame?"-Stewart's Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man. Book ii. chap. ii.] ["It is necessary, for the supposition above, that the savage should understand, not merely what is meant by the simple relations of son and father, and all the consequences of the treachery of the son, but that he should know also the additional interest which the paternal and filial relation receives from the whole intercourse of good offices from infancy to manhood. The author of our mere being is not all which a father, in such circumstances, is, he is far better known and loved by us as the author of our happiness in childhood and youth, and the venerable friend of our maturer years."-Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind, Lecture 75.] ["In contending for the independence and originality of our moral feelings," says Dr. Brown, "I do not contend that we are capable of these feelings at a period in which we are incapable of forming any conception of the nature and consequences of actions :-that, for example, we must feel instant gratitude, to our mother or our nurse, for the first sustenance or first cares which we receive, before we are conscious of any thing but of our momentary pleasure or pain. We only assert, that when we are capable of understanding the circumstances of actions, we then have feelings of moral approbation or disapprobation."-Ib. Lecture 79.] As the experiment with the savage before mentioned, has never been made, and is not likely, even if it were possible, to be made, the event can be decided from probable reason alone. They who contend for the affirmative, say that we approve of virtue, and condemn vice, on the instant and without deliberation, unaffected by personal interest, and unable even to give a reason for such approbation; and that as this feeling is universal, it can arise only from an instinctive moral sense. 45 What does Mr. Brown say is necessary for Paley's supposition? Why? 46 If a person has this knowledge, can he be called a savage? 47 What follows from this fact? 48 What is not contended for, by the advocates of instinctive conscience? 49 What do they assert? 50 In what manner should we be obliged to judge of the event, if the supposition was correct? Why? 51 What reasons have they who would answer in the affirmative ? To this it has been replied, 1. That this feeling is not universal; that there is scarcely a single vice, which is not countenanced in some age or country; that, for instance, in one place aged parents are supported, in another destroyed by their children, under the same plea of affection; that suicide was in Rome heroism, is in England felony; that theft, which is punished here, was praised in Sparta; that, in fine, many things reprobated by civilized nations are practised without reserve by savages. Nor is this difference confined to different nations; even persons living in the same place view the same acts in a different light; and their different opinions, depending on the accidental circumstances of sex, age, or station, cause some to consider forgiveness of injuries as magnanimity, while others deem it a meanness; and so of other acts, which are approved and condemned according to ever varying fashion, unstamped with the steady hand and indelible characters of universal nature. ["But the historical facts which have been alleged to prove, that the moral judgment of mankind are entirely factitious, will be found, upon examination, to be either the effects of misrepresentation or to lead to a conclusion directly the reverse of what has been drawn from them :proper allowance being made, 1. For the different circumstances of mankind in different periods of society; 2. For the diversity of their speculative opinions; and, 3. For the different moral import of the same action, under different systems of external behavior."-Stewart's Outline of Moral Philosophy.-Mr. Stewart also says, "It is sufficient to refer, on the origin of infanticide, to Mr. Smith's Theory on Moral Sentiments; and, on the alleged impiety among some rude tribes of children towards their parents, to Charron Sur la Sagesse, and to an excellent note of Dr. Beattie's in his Essay on Fable and Romance."] ["Again, the same action (if that can truly be called the same action, which is performed, perhaps, with very different views or in different circumstances) is, as we might 52 What reply has been given to these reasons? 53 What examples have been adduced to substantiate the reply? 54 What differences are mentioned as found among those who may be supposed to associate together? 55 What does Mr. Stewart remark concerning the examples here mentioned? 56 What allowances does he require to be made? |