There are two palpable considerations which will satisfy any reasonable mind that this impression is unjust and absurd, viz. 1. The success of Local Courts. 2. The eminently practical character of the Lord Chancellor by whom the Judges of the County Courts were selected (Lord Cottenham). No system of tribunals, however excellent in itself, could ever have succeeded as the County Courts have done, if entrusted to Judges without that anxious regard to the public good which influenced the appointments of the eminent person alluded to.

But among the obstructions to which the Judges of the County Courts are subject, must not be omitted the adverse sentiments of a large majority of the Profession of the Law, including probably a majority of the Judges of the Superior Courts.

Within the last few months one of the London Judges, Mr. Clive, a man confessedly of excellent abilities, and a gentleman by birth and character, has been subjected to a frivolous action. Another London Judge, Mr. Amos, has been exposed to the indignity of a Criminal Information, for which it has been decided there was no ground whatever. The latter occurrence is especially calculated to excite sentiments of indignation and regret in the minds of all to whom this gentleman is well known by his amiable manners, and his distinguished attainments. It may, perhaps, be needless for us to state that Mr. Amos is a lawyer of the highest eminence; he has held the important office of Commissioner for Revising the Laws of India, and is at present Vinerian Lecturer at Cambridge. Probably there are but few, possibly none, of the learned Judges of the Superior Courts who can be compared with him, as an accomplished and profound Jurist.

When the malignant proceeding of which he was the object came on for hearing, it was duly reprobated by the Judges who presided on the occasion. It does not, however, seem to have suggested itself to those learned persons to consider how far such an occurrence, which is a misfortune to the community, might be traced to antecedents not altogether beyond the control of the Judges of Westminster Hall.

For example. Let us suppose that some of the present Judges of the Superior Courts were so deeply and sincerely impressed with an opinion adverse to the system of unpaid magistrates, and so strongly influenced by that impression as to think it expedient to give frequent utterance to their sentiments on the subject, not merely in the privacy of their families, or in public meetings, in the exercise of their rights as citizens, but when acting as Judges, and when pronouncing decisions on cases connected with the acts of magistrates; no one can doubt that the consequence would be a speedy increase in the number of malicious proceedings against magistrates; for, with low practitioners, such expressions of opinion would operate as an encouragement and an incentive to such proceedings, though never meant to produce that effect.

Now it must be obvious that similar expressions are calculated to lead, however unintentionally, to similar results as regards the Judges and officers of the County Courts, or any other constituted authority. To give an example of our meaning. Mr. Justice Maule is reported to have announced lately the determination of the Judges to decide appeals from the County Courts, without assigning any reasons, in accordance with the course pursued with respect to appeals from the decisions of " the Commissioners of Taxes."

In a pamphlet before us, called "Violations of the Principles of Local Courts," which has just been published by Mr. Johnes, that learned Judge enters into the particulars of the case of Williams v. Holdsworth, in which he clearly proves that Mr. Baron Alderson acted to a County Court Judge as no Judge would act to the Judges of the so-called Superior Courts. We trust that the spirited conduct of Mr. Johnes will be imitated by his brother Judges, and that they will not tamely submit to be held up before the public as fools, or something worse. And the Judges of the Courts of Westminster should remember that if every weak decision of theirs was held up to ridicule, and they were thus brought before the public, they might not long enjoy that respect which we hope they may long deservc.

Little do the community at large suspect the various secret sources to which are to be traced those personalities and that daily detraction to which various bodies of public men are exposed; and which, in some instances, are repeated so often, that the note is mistaken for the voice of truth, and the dictates of public opinion.

There are, probably, few public functionaries who have been exposed to more vexatious obstacles in the discharge of their public duties, than the Judges of the County Courts few who have had so often to contend with the clandestine, but many-tongued misrepresentations of selfishness, prejudice, and revenge.

If a question of conflicting evidence arises in one of the Superior Courts, in which one or other of the witnesses must necessarily be stating a falsehood, their comparative credibility is determined entirely by a jury. In the County Courts, the Judge has to decide which is the witness of truth, and which the witness of falsehood. Thus his decision is often received as (and, in fact, often necessarily is), a brand and an indelible stigma on some one witness, who not uncommonly becomes, from that time forth, the ever active calumniator of the Judge, whose sole crime has been the discharge of a painful, but imperative duty. If connected with the Press, or with the Law, a person thus discredited has ample means of slander and misrepresentation.

Repression of the prolixity, irregularity, or chicanery of a low attorney, or of a barrister of a disreputable class, will bring similar consequences on a Judge of the County Courts; who, from the vast number of cases he has to decide, must very frequently encounter such characters; and who, not having the aid of other Judges, or of a Jury, is exposed to bear the whole brunt of the hatred of dishonest parties and witnesses, and of dishonourable legal practitioners.

ART. XIV.-THE CHANCERY QUESTION.

Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee of the House of Lords appointed to consider the Bill intituled “ An Act to give Primary Jurisdiction to the Masters in Ordinary of the High Court of Chancery in certain Cases," and to report thereon. 1851.

THIS most important subject really lies within a very narrow compass; and we undertake to place it before even our lay readers in a very few pages, so as to leave neither difficulty in apprehending it, nor doubt on the opinion to be formed respecting it.

We begin by assuming that which the unanimous voice of the public and the profession, of suitors, of practitioners, of Judges, of bystanders declares, and loudly declares, the strong and the pressing necessity of an immediate and a thorough reformation. The only difference among these various classes, is as to the kind of reform; for no one, not even the practitioners and the Judges, will venture to propound any scheme to which they do not give the name of a complete and effectual remedy.

The bill first proposed by the Government, in the present Session, was so universally condemned as not merely ineffectual, but really tending directly to increase the evils complained of, that it was only described on the motion for leave to bring it in; and never was brought in at all, though leave had been given.

Another bill was, after a considerable interval, brought in, and has passed, or is nearly passed, into a law. It gives considerable relief in one important particular; it probably enables the Court to get rid of the arrear-possibly it may prevent the future accumulation of arrear and it affords some relief to the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords, by establishing a Court of Appeal in Chancery, and thus enabling the Chancellor to sit in the Lords, although the constitution of the new Court consisting of two, as it must do in his absence, is liable to great objection. The whole amount of this

improvément is not great, even where it is unexceptionable. But, were the change in the constitution of the Court ever so beneficial, by far the greater bulk of the evils complained of would remain untouched.

It is absolutely necessary that the Chancery Procedure should undergo a complete revision, and that the change should be effectual. The fact is admitted; it has been stated by the great body of the solicitors; no man can now, if he be of sound mind, go into Chancery for so small a sum as a thousand pounds. All causes of moderate amount are, therefore, kept out of Court; and the suitor is altogether deprived of his relief. It becomes absolutely necessary, therefore, to lessen the expense, and shorten the delay of Chancery proceedings. One remedy proposed, has been to give the County Court Judges a delegated power of acting as Masters in Chancery. This has now been adopted. But this is, though very beneficial, still an inadequate remedy. It lessens the expense in a considerable degree in Country causes; and it improves the manner of conducting them. But the bulk of the expense and of the delay continues.

The bill for giving the County Courts general equitable jurisdiction to a certain extent, and under certain restrictions, would have been a far more useful measure; but it could not be carried through Parliament, owing to the threatened opposition of certain Law Lords, and the certain opposition of professional men elsewhere. The bill for giving Masters primary jurisdiction, exposed to the same resistance, has, in like manner, been postponed till next Session. But neither of these measures, highly important as they are, can make an end of the evils so universally and so justly complained of. There is but one course to take; the Court of Chancery must no longer be suffered to be the only Court in which only half the judicial business or less is done by the Judges. The Equity Judges must become habituated to working out their own decrees, sitting in Court or in Chambers, according as they are dealing with general matters or with details; with legal questions or with facts; and not sending to the Masters all inquiries consequent upon the principles which