preconditions in the form of economic assistance. We have said that we would accept no preconditions, and, therefore, there has been no progress with respect to the question of normalization.

We have not yet received any statement from Vietnam to the effect that this precondition which they have previously spoken about has been dropped. I have read references to statements that they are alleged to have made to others. No statement has been made to us yet with respect to any change of position.

Dept. of State Press Release No. 311, Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 78, No. 2018, Sept. 1978, p. 23.

At a news conference on November 3, the Secretary was questioned about the subject again, with regard to an alleged report by the Vietnamese that they had no preconditions for diplomatic relations. Answering a request for a prediction on establishment of embassies, he said:

As you know, last year we had three sets of meetings, which took place in Paris, with respect to the overall question of normalization. During those talks, the position of the Vietnamese was laid out. That position was one which was unacceptable to the United States because of the demand for aid.

There has been another meeting recently, as you know, at the United Nations during the General Assembly [talks between Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach and Assistant Secretary of State Richard C. Holbrooke, September 29, 1978], at which there was a general review of the situation as between our two nations. The position of the Vietnamese is somewhat clarified as a result of those discussions. No decisions, however, have been made with respect to this issue. And as I said at the outset, I cannot make any prediction about if and when there would be normalization. Asked whether the Vietnamese had dropped their demand for aid as a precondition for normalization, Secretary Vance replied that he would so interpret their statements.

Ibid., No. 2021, Dec. 1978, p. 20.

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, P.L. 95-426, Oct. 7, 1978 (92 Stat. 992), had provided in sec. 705:

PROHIBITION ON AID OR REPARATIONS TO VIETNAM

Sec. 705. (a) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated in this Act may be used for the purpose of reparations, aid, or any other form of payment to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

(b) The President shall continue to take all possible steps to obtain a final accounting of all Americans missing in action in Vietnam.

At the Department's daily news briefing on December 5, 1978, John F. Cannon, the Public Affairs Adviser for the Bureau of East Asian Affairs, stated that, while the United States had had discussions about normalization of relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam since May 1977, and expected these conversations to continue, the

United States was seriously concerned over the growing conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia (Democratic Kampuchea) and the swelling numbers of refugees, which were factors being seriously considered in determining the pace and timing of normalization.

Dept. of State News Briefing, DPC 227, Dec. 5, 1978.

Vietnamese military forces launched a major drive against Cambodia, Dec. 25, 1978, which led to the capture of Phnom Penh on Jan. 7, 1979, and to the ouster from that capital of the Pol Pot government. The Dept. of State's position on normalization of relations with Vietnam (expressed in a press briefing paper prepared by Mr. Cannon for Department of State Spokesman, Hodding Carter III, Jan. 9, 1979) was that there was no question of any movement toward them under the prevailing circumstances. Dept. of State File No. P79 0055-0003.

North and South Yemen

On June 24, 1978, the President of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen), Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Hussein al-Ghashmi, was killed in his military headquarters at Sana by the explosion of a bomb in the briefcase of a special visiting envoy from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), who was reportedly delivering a letter from the President of South Yemen, Salim Rubay'i Ali. The explosion also killed the special envoy. Shortly after the assassination, the North Yemeni Government announced that it had severed diplomatic relations with South Yemen, and in a statement accompanying the announcement, the North Yemeni Foreign Minister accused South Yemen of being behind the assassination of President alGhashmi. The South Yemeni Government denied involvement in the assassination.

On June 26, 1978, President Salim Rubay'i Ali of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) was ousted from office and executed, following an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow a personal and ideological rival within the Presidency Council, which involved heavy fighting between troops loyal to him and a "people's militia," led by his more pro-Soviet rival. At the time, Joseph W. Twinam, the Department of State's Country Director for Arabian Peninsula Affairs and a former Ambassador to Bahrain, was due to arrive in Aden on June 26 to discuss with South Yemeni officials, in an exploratory and noncommittal way, problems existing between the United States and South Yemen on a variety of issues. Under the circumstances, the Department of State informed the South Yemeni Government, through the British Government, the protecting power for United States interests in South Yemen, that the decision had been made not to send the Twinam mission to Aden.

When word of the assassination of President al-Ghashmi of the Yemen Arab Republic had been received, Secretary of State Cyrus

R. Vance had sent a message of condolence to the Yemen Arab Republic's Foreign Minister, Abdallah al-Asnaj, expressing shock and sadness at President al-Ghashmi's death "under such brutal circumstances." He then requested Ambassador Twinam to proceed to Sana, to meet with North Yemeni leaders and to deliver a message of sympathy and support from President Carter to North Yemeni Republican Council Chairman Abd al-Karim Abdallah al-Arashi (it was delivered on June 28).

At the daily news briefing on June 26, the Department's Spokesman, Hodding Carter III, was asked whether the "switching" of the Twinam mission from Aden to Sana would be seen as an indication that the United States in fact held South Yemen responsible for the assassination of President al-Ghashmi. He replied that since the United States had relations with the country in which the assassination took place, it was an opportunity to express concern and support for that country, and that there was not an implication of assessing responsibility for the assassination.

Dept. of State News Briefing, DPC 120, June 26, 1978, and DPC 121, June 27, 1978; New York Times, June 27, 1978, p. 1, col. 4; p. 6, col. 3; and p. 7, col. 1. The People's Republic of Southern Yemen had severed relations with the United States on Oct. 24, 1969. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXI, No. 1586, Nov. 17, 1969, p. 420.

Solomon Islands

Recognition of States

The Solomon Islands achieved independence on July 7, 1978. President Carter extended United States recognition by a letter addressed to Governor General Baddeley Devesi under the date of June 27, which Senator John H. Glenn, the President's Personal Representative and head of the United States delegation to the independence ceremony, delivered to Prime Minister Peter Kauona Keninaraisoona Kenilorea on July 7.

Dept. of State File No. P78 0125–1525.

President Carter's letter also expressed the hope that diplomatic relations could be established between the two countries. In this connection, on Aug. 31, he appointed the American Ambassador at Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, Mary Seymour Olmsted, also as Ambassador to the Solomon Islands, the agrément for her appointment having been given informally by the Chief Minister's Department of the Solomon Islands on June 26. Telegram 0956 from Port Moresby to Dept. of State, June 26, 1978. Ambassador Olmsted presented her credentials to Governor General Devesi on Oct. 9, 1978. Telegram 1707 from Port Moresby to Dept. of State, Oct. 10, 1978. On Aug. 28, President Carter concurred in the Dept. of State's recommendation for agrément to the appointment of Francis Bugotu, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Solomon Islands, as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Solomon Islands to the United States (with residence in Honiara, the capital of the Solomon Is

lands); Ambassador Bugotu presented his credentials to President Carter on Mar. 30, 1979. Telegrams 219002, Aug. 29, 1978, and 081522, Apr. 1, 1979, from Dept. of State to Port Moresby.

The British Embassy at Washington informed the Dept. of State, in a note, Sept. 20, 1978, that, following the granting of independence to the Solomon Islands on July 7, it would, unless the Department had any objections, assume responsibility for the interests of Solomon Islands citizens visiting or residing in the United States, to which the Department replied on Oct. 18 that it had no objections. Dept. of State File Nos. P78 0147-1288 and P78 0160-0625.

Tuvalu

Tuvalu, formerly called the Ellice Islands and a part of the British colony known as the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, was legally separated from the Gilbert Islands on October 1, 1975, and thereafter became known as Tuvalu, the final separation occurring on January 1, 1976. Tuvalu achieved independence on October 1, 1978; and President Carter extended United States recognition of its independent status by a letter to Governor General Penitala Teo, October 1, delivered in Tuvalu by the head of the U.S. delegation to the independence ceremony, the President's Personal Representative, Mrs. Elizabeth G. Stevens.

Dept. of State File No. P79 0051-1175.

Nonrecognition of Bophuthatswana

In reply to a note from the Embassy of the Republic of Burundi, December 14, 1977, transmitting the statement of the Government of Burundi concerning the independence of Bophuthatswana, the Department of State confirmed, on January 17, 1978, that the United States did not intend to recognize the independence of Bophuthatswana, and added:

The South African Government's policy of establishing separate homelands for black South Africans was devised without reference to the wishes of the blacks themselves. For this reason, and because it does not constitute a viable solution to South Africa's problems, the United States opposes this policy. In December 1977, the United States voted in favor of a United Nations General Assembly resolution which called for nonrecognition of any of South Africa's homelands which might be granted independence.

Dept. of State File No. P78 0047-1809.

U.N.G.A. Res. 32/105 N, adopted Dec. 14, 1977, by a vote of 140-0-0, reads, in part:

The General Assembly,

BANTUSTANS

Recalling its Resolution 31/6 A of October 26, 1976, entitled "The so-called independent Transkei and other bantustans,"

Further condemning the racist regime of South Africa for its stubborn pursuit of the bantustan policy and its plans to declare the so-called "independence" of Bophuthatswana,

Reiterating that the bantustan policy is designed to divide the African people of South Africa and deprive them of their inalienable rights in the country,

1. Again denounces the establishment of bantustans as designed to consolidate the inhuman policy of apartheid, to destroy the territorial integrity of the country, to perpetuate white minority domination and to deprive the African people of South Africa of their inalienable rights;

2. Denounces the declaration of the so-called "independence" of the Transkei and that of Bophuthatswana and any other bantustans which may be created by the racist regime of South Africa and declares them totally invalid;

3. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the African people of South Africa in the country as a whole;

4. Declares its firm support to Lesotho and any other States which may be subjected to threats and pressures by the racist regime in the pursuit of its bantustan policy;

5. Again calls upon all Governments to deny any form of recognition to the so-called "independent" bantustans, to refrain from any dealings with them and to reject travel documents issued by them;

6. Again requests all States to take effective measures to prohibit all individuals, corporations and other institutions under their jurisdiction from having any dealings with the so-called “independent" bantustans.

U.N.G.A. Off. Rec., 32d Sess., Supp. No. 45 (A/32/45), p. 40.
See, further, the 1976 Digest, pp. 20-21.

Nonrecognition of the Transkei

On April 10, 1978, the Prime Minister of the Transkei, Chief Kaiser Matanzima, announced that the Transkei had broken diplomatic relations with the Republic of South Africa. When asked at a news briefing whether the United States (in consequence) had any intention of contacting the Transkei or of discussing the subject of setting up diplomatic relations with the Transkei, Thomas B. Reston, acting as spokesman for the Department of State, replied:

We do not believe that the announcement of a break in diplomatic relations between Transkei and South Africa changes the fundamental character of the relationship between them. We have never recognized Transkei as an independent entity, and there is no question of our doing so now . [W]e do not recognize the Transkei as an independent nation.

Dept. of State News Briefing, DPC 67, Apr. 11, 1978, pp. B3-B4. For Chief Matanzima's announcement, see New York Times, Apr. 11, 1978, p. 1, cols. 3, 4 ; p. 4, cols. 3, 4.

Section 503 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978 (Public Law 95–105, August 15, 1977, 91 Stat. 844, 858), called for