make use of the Court less complicated, less protracted, and less expensive.

The most important change, and one which is based on the proposals submitted to the Secretary-General by the United States, permits the use of chambers of the Court in situations where recourse to the full Court is unattractive to the parties. Moreover, the Court will consider the preferences of the parties in determining which members of the Court will comprise a chamber and will permit the chamber to sit at a site convenient to the parties and to follow procedures preferred by them. This reform has potential for encouraging greater use of the Court, providing as it does for a regionally or functionally oriented bench, or a bench composed of a minority of the Court satisfactory to the parties. It could also lead in time to lower costs, litigation of briefer duration, and less formality. A Court with such characteristics would presumably be more attractive as a third-party recourse in case of disputes.

As with the General Assembly recommendations, these reforms have not, as yet, increased use of the Court. This is, in large part, due to a widespread reserve among states toward third-party dispute settlements, particularly of a binding character. Communist states have particularly opposed third-party settlements, while some Third World countries seem to view the Court as a creation of Western legal systems and have been cool toward expanding its role.

The United States has nevertheless continued to encourage greater use of the Court. Most recently, in response to Senate Resolution 78 of May 9, 1974, the State Department submitted in 1976 a major study on widening access to the Court. It recommends expanding the jurisdictional capacity of the Court through a "preliminary opinion" procedure; by according the United Nations the right to appear before the Court as a party in contentious proceedings (where so authorized in regard to specific issues both by two-thirds of the General Assembly and by the Security Council, including its permanent members); and by enlarging the roster of international organizations authorized to seek advisory opinions from it. The most useful of these recommendations may be the "preliminary opinion" procedure, under which appellate national courts should refer any question of international law to the ICJ for its advisory opinion whenever it was the judgment of the national court that such a reference would be desirable before it rendered its own final decision.

There are, in addition, other steps which the United States can take to enhance the use of the Court which do not require amendment to the Charter or Statute. Since 1946, the United States has committed itself without reservation to the jurisdiction of the Court in 34 multilateral treaties and 21 bilateral agreements with respect to disputes arising under them. This is an effective way of widening the Court's jurisdiction which is readily available to us.

Under the so-called "optional clause" of the Court's Statute, Article 36, paragraph 2, states may declare that they recognize the

Court's compulsory jurisdiction in certain categories of legal disputes in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation. The United States declaration provides that it does not apply to disputes essentially within U.S. domestic jurisdiction "as determined by the United States"-the quoted words being the Connally Reser

vation.

The Connally Reservation, which conflicts with the provision of the Court's Statute that the Court shall determine what matters are within its jurisdiction, has caused other States to question U.S. confidence in the Court, and it (or its equivalent) in other states has been used as a means to defeat the Court's consideration of legal issues which are clearly international in character.

The Department of State is on record that the Reservation does not provide the United States with any substantial benefit, and every Administration since that of President Eisenhower has urged its repeal.

Dept. of State, Reform and Restructuring of the U.N. System, Selected Docs. No. 8 (1978), pp. 16-18; Sen. Comm. Print, Proposals for United Nations Reform, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1978), pp. 13–16.

See further, the 1976 Digest, pp. 650-680.

The Statute of the Court is annexed to the Charter of the United Nations, signed June 26, 1945. TS 993; 59 Stat. 1031, 1055; 3 Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949 (1969), pp. 1153, 1179 (entered into force for the United States Oct. 24, 1945). For the Rules of the Court, as amended on May 10, 1972, see International Legal Materials, Vol. 11, No. 4, July 1972, pp. 903–918.

Chapter 14

LEGAL REGULATION OF USE OF FORCE

§1

Resort to War and Armed Force

Regional Security Systems

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Council met in Washington, May 30-31, 1978, and was attended by heads of state/government of the fifteen members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In President Carter's address to the Council on May 31, he discussed various aspects of the NATO Long-Term Defense Program, the commitment to which he afterwards characterized as the most important subject considered by the NATO summit meeting. The President also reconfirmed that the United States was prepared to use all the forces necessary to defend the NATO area. Excerpts from his remarks follow:

When I took office 16 months ago, I . . . concluded that the United States should give top priority to Europe, especially the conventional defenses needed in the initial stages of a conflict. I reached this conclusion for two reasons.

• First, the Warsaw Pact countries, especially the Soviet Union, have steadily expanded and modernized their conventional forces beyond any legitimate requirement for defense. They are now able to attack with large armored forces more rapidly than we previously believed.

Second, although U.S. nuclear forces remain strong and are fundamental to deterrence, the long-recognized role of conventional forces in deterrence of war is increasingly important.

As a result, I directed the Secretary of Defense to strengthen initial conventional defense capacity in Europe. Of course, such efforts would amount to little unless accompanied by improvements in the conventional capacity of our NATO allies. European NATO countries, not the United States, provide the bulk of our military forces in Europe. Also, the competing demands of our free societies limit the portion of our resources we can use for defense. Therefore, we must coordinate our defense planning to make the best use of these limited resources.

... We are all making significant, real increases in our defense budgets. We are strengthening our national forces-and we will do

more. Finally, we have designed a bold Long-Term Defense Program to pull together a more effective collective defense during the years ahead.

Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces

As we improve our conventional defenses, we must remember that the strength of our strategic and theater nuclear forces is also necessary for deterrence and defense. These forces are-and will befully adequate. Arms control can make deterrence more stable and perhaps less burdensome, but it will not, in the foreseeable future, eliminate the need for nuclear forces.

For years, the alliance has relied principally on American strategic forces for deterring nuclear attack on Europe. This coupling of American strategic forces to Europe is critical for it means that an attack on Europe would have the full consequences of an attack on the United States. Let there be no misunderstanding. The United States is prepared to use all the forces necessary for the defense of the NATO area.

As an alliance, we must continue to review our nuclear deterrence needs in light of developments in Soviet nuclear and conventional forces. As one result of the Long-Term Defense Program, the Nuclear Planning Group is examining in detail the modernizing of our theater nuclear forces, including the question of long-range nuclear systems. We need also to consider jointly the relation of long-range theater nuclear systems to arms control.

Let me now turn to conventional forces-the bulk of the LongTerm Defense Program. After all, our largest expenditures are for conventional, not nuclear, forces.

Conventional Forces

We must prepare to fight more effectively together as an alliance. We must markedly improve our ability to work together on the battlefield. We should overcome unnecessary duplication in our national programs thus buying more security for the same money.

That is what the Long-Term Defense Program is all about. It is an unprecedented attempt by NATO to look across a longer span of years than ever before. It seeks a more cooperative course as the only sensible way to improve our defenses without unnecessary increases in defense spending. It lays out specific measures of alliance cooperation. It is the blueprint we need, and we must carry it out vigorously.

Of course, each of us depends on legislative approval for particular programs and projects within the Long-Term Defense Program. Because we lead democracies, we cannot bind our people by fiat. We can, however, pledge to do what is necessary to secure this approval and make this program work.

The United States is already responding to many Long-Term Defense Program recommendations, particularly in the field of reinforcement. And the recommendations will receive the highest priority in our own national defense programming. In short, we will do

our part in adapting or modifying U.S. programs to support the NATO Long-Term Defense Program. I am confident that you will take similar action.

Establishing Procedures

Finally, I want to mention the one remaining unresolved aspect of the Long-Term Defense Program. Although the program calls for new and unprecedented alliance cooperation, no procedures have yet been devised for insuring that it is carried out. We must avoid bold programs heartily endorsed-then largely ignored. The report before us directs the Secretary-General to present for national review what changes are essential for vigorous follow-through.

Both the NATO task forces and we Americans have made several specific proposals to this end. . . . But I do not ask that you discuss our proposals today. Instead, I ask that all alliance leaders here today join me in calling for vigorous follow-through of the program.

In conclusion, let me state that we confront a unique opportunity to bring our national defense programs closer together. The result will be a more effective defense. The consequences will be greater security for our people.

....

Weekly Comp. of Pres. Docs., Vol. 14, No. 22, June 5, 1978, pp. 1020-1022; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 78, No. 2016, July 1978, pp. 2-3.

In his remarks at the final session, May 31, the President referred to two other basic propositions considered by the North Atlantic Council summit meeting: (1) cooperation in development and production of weapons; and (2) completion of analysis of a year-long study of East-West relationships, political, economic, and military, which in his opinion "cemented a common understanding of the present and possible future interrelationships among the Warsaw Pact countries, their friends, and other allies and also the NATO community, friends, and allies." Ibid.; Weekly Comp. of Pres. Docs., ante, p. 1025.

The text of the final communiqué of the NATO summit meeting follows:

FINAL COMMUNIQUE, MAY 31

I. 1. The North Atlantic Council met with the participation of Heads of State and Government in Washington on 30th and 31st May, 1978.

2. Since its inception the Alliance has served to guarantee security, enhance cooperation and cohesion and promote peace. Its fundamental vitality lies in the fact that all Allied countries enjoy democratic systems of government. The Allies remain convinced that these systems provide the most humane and effective means of organizing society to deal with the challenges of the modern world. They reaffirmed the central role of the Alliance as the guardian of their collective security and renewed their pledge to consult with one another about the common goals and purposes of the Alliance for the years ahead.

3. The Allied leaders noted that their meeting follows a year of intense activity, analysis and reassessment, aimed at ensuring that the Alliance can meet future tasks. In particular, the Allies have successfully undertaken the study and implementation of the decisions and initiatives taken in common at the Council's meeting in London last May.

4. The fresh study of long term trends in East-West relations, decided upon in London, has confirmed the continuing validity of the two complementary aims of the Alliance, to maintain security and pursue détente. Based on an examination of the situation and trends in the U.S.S.R. and the other Warsaw Pact countries, the Council's study concludes that members of the Alliance must maintain their solidarity and their vigilance, and keep their defenses at the level rendered necessary by the Warsaw Pact's offensive capabilities, while,