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SECT.
II.

They are

forming any

general or

extensive

ration.

to his rank. The cavalry, by way of distinction, was called The Battle, and on it alone depended the fate of every action. The infantry, collected from the dregs and refuse of the people, ill armed and worse disciplined, was almost of no

account.

As these circumstances rendered the operaincapable of tions of particular kingdoms less considerable and less vigorous, so they long kept the Princes plan of ope- of Europe from giving such attention to the schemes and transactions of their neighbours as might lead them to form any regular system of public security. They were, of consequence, prevented from uniting in confederacy, or from acting with concert, in order to establish such a distribution and balance of power as should hinder any state from rising to a superiority which might endanger the general liberty and independence. During several centuries, the nations of Europe appear to have considered themselves as separate societies, scarcely connected together by any common interest, and little concerned in each other's affairs or operations. An extensive commerce did not afford them an opportunity of observing and penetrating into the schemes of every different state. They had not ambassadors residing constantly in every court, to watch and give early intelligence of all its motions. The expectation of remote advantages, or the prospect of distant and contingent evils, were not sufficient to excite nations to take arms. Such only as were within the sphere of imme

II.

diate danger, and unavoidably exposed to injury SECT. or insult, thought themselves interested in any contest, or bound to take precautions for their own safety.

little con

WHOEVER records the transactions of any of They were the more considerable European states during nected with the two last centuries, must write the history of each other. Europe. Its various kingdoms, throughout that period, have been formed into one great system, so closely united, that each holding a determinate station, the operations of one are so felt by all as to influence their counsels, and regulate their measures. But, previous to the fifteenth century, unless when vicinity of territory rendered the occasions of discord frequent and unavoidable, or when national emulation fomented or embittered the spirit of hostility, the affairs of different countries are seldom interwoven with each other. In each kingdom of Europe, great events and revolutions happened, which the other powers beheld with almost the same indifference as if they had been uninterested spectators, to whom the effect of these transactions could never extend.

DURING the violent struggles between France and England, and notwithstanding the alarming progress which was made towards rendering one Prince the master of both these kingdoms, hardly one measure, which can be considered as the result of a sagacious and prudent policy,

A confir

mation of

this from

the affairs

of France.

SECT.

II.

From those of Spain.

From those of Germa

ny.

was formed, in order to guard against an event so fatal to Europe. The Dukes of Burgundy and Bretagne, whom their situation would not permit to remain neutral, engaged, it is true, in the contest; but, in taking their part, they seem rather to have followed the impulse of their passions, than to have been guided by any just discernment of the danger which threatened themselves and the tranquillity of Europe. The other Princes, seemingly unaffected by the alternate successes of the contending parties, left them to decide the quarrel by themselves, or interposed only by feeble and ineffectual negotiations.

NOTWITHSTANDING the perpetual hostilities in which the various kingdoms of Spain were engaged during several centuries, and the successive occurrences which visibly tended to unite that part of the Continent into one great monarchy, the Princes of Europe hardly took any step from which we may conclude that they gave a proper attention to that important event. They permitted a power to arise imperceptibly, and to acquire strength there, which soon became formidable to all its neighbours.

AMIDST the violent convulsions with which the spirit of domination in the See of Rome, and the turbulent ambition of the German nobles, agitated the empire, neither the authority of the Popes, seconded by all their artifices and in

II.

trigues, nor the solicitations of the Emperors, SECT. could induce any of the powerful monarchs in Europe to engage in their quarrel, or to avail themselves of many favourable opportunities of interposing with effect and advantage.

THIS amazing inactivity, during transactions so interesting, is not to be imputed to any incapacity of discerning their political consequences. The power of judging with sagacity, and of acting with vigour, is the portion of men of every age. The monarchs who reigned in the different kingdoms of Europe during several centuries were not blind to their particular interest, negligent of the public safety, or strangers to the method of securing both. If they did not adopt that salutary system which teaches modern politicians to take the alarm at the prospect of distant dangers, which prompts them to check the first encroachments of any formidable power, and which renders each state the guardian, in some degree, of the rights and independence of all its neighbours, this was owing entirely to such imperfections and disorders in the civil government of each country, as made it impossible for sovereigns to act suitably to those ideas which the posture of affairs and their own observation must have suggested.

This inacsioned en

tivity occa

tirely by the state of government.

BUT, during the course of the fifteenth cen- Events tury, various events happened, which, by giving Princes more entire command of the force in

their respective dominions, rendered their opera

ring the 15th cen

happened during

tury, which

render the

SECT.
II.

efforts of

nations

erful and

extensive.

tions more vigorous and extensive. In consequence of this, the affairs of different kingdoms becoming more frequently, as well as more intimore pow- mately connected, they were gradually accustomed to act in concert and confederacy, and were insensibly prepared for forming a system of policy, in order to establish or to preserve such a balance of power as was most consistent with the general security. It was during the reign of Charles the Fifth, that the ideas on which this system is founded first came to be fully understood. It was then that the maxims by which it has been uniformly maintained since that era were universally adopted. On this account, a view of the causes and events which contributed to establish a plan of policy more salutary and extensive than any that has taken place in the conduct of human affairs, is not only a necessary introduction to the following work, but is a capital object in the history of Europe.

The first of

these was the depriving the

English of their terri

tories on the Continent.

THE first event that occasioned any considerable alteration in the arrangement of affairs in Europe, was the annexation of the extensive territories which England possessed on the Continent to the crown of France. While the English were masters of several of the most fertile and opulent provinces in France, and a great part of its most martial inhabitants was bound to follow their standard, an English monarch considered himself rather as the rival than as the vassal of the sovereign of whom he held. The Kings of France, circumscribed and thwarted in

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