4 it should be, is thus not only one of feasibility of proposed protective measures. intent but of the The Applicable Standards То assist in a state's approach to emergency planning, federal agencies responsible for nuclear plant licensing have set forth comprehensive standards and guidelines. It is those rules that I am obliged to follow in exercising my judgment as Governor. To begin with, it is clear from the guidelines that several factors which have a significant relation to health and safety are beyond the purview of the Governor. Such on-site factors as design of the reactor, strength of the containment vessel, quality of management, and quality of reactor operator training are all important to protection of the public. Nonetheless, under federal law these are questions exclusively for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. My judgment is not to be influenced by the evidence on these issues. Indeed, the statistical probability of a serious nuclear accident as distinguished from the adequacy of the response is not a proper part of the state's deliberations. and safety on several assumptions Instead, I am mandated to base my judgment regarding health stated in the federal guidelines. As a general matter I am directed that no single specific accident sequence should be isolated as the one for 5 different consequences. Rather, as the guidelines state, "the range for planning purposes is very large, starting with a zero point of requiring no planning at all . . to planning for the worst possible accident, regardless of its extremely low likelihood." Within this mandated spectrum, federal guidelines direct Governors to assume among other things that an accident could Occur with offsite release within thirty minutes, reaching a radius of five miles within two hours. While the seriousness of the release to be assumed is not specifically stated, the assumptions appear to include a release of material similar to that at Chernobyl, without radioactive regard to the particular cause of the release. In summary, the central tenet of emergency planning is that an accident can occur. My limited role in the federal process is to attempt to devise emergency response plans to deal with such an event if it does happen. Chernobyl This in general terms is the context for my review and for state planning. Last spring, with the assistance of the Attorney General, I was within a few weeks of reaching a decision on submission of offsite emergency plans. Then, on April 26, 1986, an accident occurred at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station in the Soviet Ukraine, which constituted the 6. power catastrophe, with World's first actual nuclear substantial loss of life, widespread exposure to radiation, and serious damage to the environment. We have learned that the radioactive release at Chernobyl was several million times greater than Three Mile Island. Until Chernobyl planning and judgment relating to major accidents were essentially based on computer models and mathematics. Chernobyl represents real experience, a test of the experts' predictions and an opportunity to derive potentially important lessons about planning for Seabrook. applicability of the and to advise me regarding the Chernobyl experience to Seabrook. Dr. Carnesale has devoted several months, without compensation, to this task. All citizens of Massachusetts owe him a debt of gratitude for his careful, objective analysis. As it turns out, there are fundamental lessons to be learned from Chernobyl, directly applicable to my decision on Seabrook. As Dr. Carnesale has told me, in a field as intensely studied as this, what is to be learned is not entirely new, but tends to tell us more directly than computer 7 models ever could which factors could prove pivotal in accident and where emphasis must be placed in planning. аг far It has been debated as to whether Chernobyl offers any lessons for design of nuclear plants, in light of the fact that the Chernobyl reactor reflects a design philosophy different from and inferior to those used in this country. under federal guidelines, that debate is not relevant to my decision. It is the aftermath of the accident But - the impact of - that we the accident the radioactive release and the human response to it must analyze for guidance. And in this realm Chernobyl has much to say. As Dr. Carnesale has put it, confirms beyond question that adequate offsite planning is essential and must be taken very seriously. The overriding characteristic of the Chernobyl accident is that, as bad as it was, it could have been far worse. First, the geographical and weather conditions at Chernobyl reduced the threat to life by dispersing the release over a remarkably large area, extending in diffuse form to places remote from the plant, rather than depositing lethal population areas close to the plant. The flatness of the Ukrainian plains where Chernobyl is located, and the hot, dry climatic conditions prevalent in that area tended to keep the radioactive debris aloft for relatively long periods of time. concentrations in Second, the nature of the explosion and the thermodynamic effects of a graphite reactor fire as occurred at Chernobyl meant that the altitude reached initially and thereafter maintained by debris coming out of the reactor was quite great, about 4,000 feet. This contributed independently to the subsequent dispersion of radioactive material over a wide area. Because graphite is absent from its design, it is expected that serious releases from a plant like Seabrook will rise to and be maintained at lower altitudes and therefore be deposited over a smaller area, even under favorable geographic and weather conditions. Third, the combination of clear, constant weather and a high altitude release permitted Soviet authorities to predict the direction of the radioactive plume and to execute a well-timed, coordinated usage of sheltering and evacuation of 135,000 residents within 18 miles that would prove virtually impossible in circumstances where time is short and the path of the plume uncertain. Fourth, sheltering Chernobyl makes absolutely plain that adequate essential to emergency planning. The 45,000 within two miles is residents living in the immediate vicinity - - received relatively low dosages of radiation because of the 72-431 0 - 87 4 |