"esting. of Covernor Amesbury, Massachusetts Noverter 18, 1086 Page rive Sc evacuation from the Seabrook area will take several hours under the best of circumstances, and under normal weather conditions evacuation it wil1 take even longer. This is the great irony of the Seabrook case. The siting of th's nuclear plant is just not good from an emergency planning standpoint. The transportation difficulties are obvious. The area is marked by some of the most popular beaches in New England, where hundreds of thousands of people go for recreation during the summer months. Many of the beach areas are served by two-lane roads, such as the one out at Plum Island. Of course, much of this has been apparent for years. Our Attorney General, Frank Bellotti, worked very hard ten years ago to have the Nuclear Pegulatory Commission realize the extent of the emergency planning problems that were caused by siting the Seabrook plant at this particular site. The Attorney General's warnings were not heeded, and the N.P.C. allowed the Seabrook plant to go into construction. When the Three Mile Island accident finally compelled the N.P.C. to take heed of emergency planning the Seabrook plant was already several years into construction. Other serious problems with emergency planning at Seabrook were dramatized for us by the Chernobyl disaster. Mr. Chairman, as you know, when the Chernobyl disaster occurred I suspended our emergency planning efforts so that we could learn all we could from this tragedy. Chernoby! was the first major nuclear accident in the nuclear era. Much of our previous planning for response to a nuclear accident was based on modelling or extrapolation from Three Mile Island. When the Chernobyl accident occurred I felt that it was very important for us to stop long enough to examine whether the data from the Soviets would in any way teach us new lessons. Professor Albert Carnesale, who had been President Carter's designee for the chairmanship of the M.P.C., agreed to assist us in weighing the lessons of Chernobyl. As it turned out, quite a bit more information from Chernobyl was released than many of us thought would be the case. Much of what we learned may not be new science, but it does pose troubling lessons for Seabrook. Testimony of Governor Michael S. Pukakis Amesbury, Massachusetts November 18, 1986 Page Siy We learned that, in many ways, the Soviets were lucky. The Chernoby! accident shot radioactivity up to a high-altitude, where it could be dispersed. The weather was hot and dry, and this aided the dispersion. Prevailing winds blew the radioactivity away from the neighboring population long enough for a massive evacuation to be mobilized. During those critical early hours much of the local population was sheltered in masonry buildings that provided relatively good insulation from radiation. When the time came to evacuate, forty-five thousand people were moved in about two hours. Even with luck on their side, thousands of people within five miles of the Chernobyl reactor received radiation dosages at least eight times greater than the level at which we would order immediate evacuation in this country. Then again, the Soviets must contend with dozens of square miles of land that may remain uninhabitable for years. What strikes us about Seabrook is that, unlike Chernobyl, the weather conditions are not constant. Winds are constantly changing. The air is not often calm and dry. The Seabrook reactor is designed, thankfully, to keep radiation contained which means that after a possible breach of the containment, escaping radiation would be kept close in, subject to the churning of the changeable winds. The nearby population would not be sheltered in concrete construction, for the most part, and in fact many people would not be sheltered at all. When I consider all this, along with the evidence that evacuation from the area wil take several hours even under good conditions, then I conclude that emergency planning for Seabrook cannot be adequate. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Federal regulations mean what they say, that emergency plans must be "adequate to protect the public health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency." We have looked hard at emergency planning for Seabrook. We do not believe it can be done in any way that is "adequate" by any sense that would be meaningful to you, me, or the public. The sting of the Seabrook plant creates insuperable difficulties that neither time nor money can correct. We have drawn this conclusion in good faith, and with deep regret that emergency planning issues were not resolved when they should have been, before construction of Seabrook Station was permitted. Be that as it may, the Federal regulations have created a reasonable and appropriate standard for the protection of the public health and safety. I believe my decision has met that standard, and I trust and expect that it will be upheld. STATEMENT OF GOVERNOR MICHAEL S. DUKAKIS REGARDING THE SEABROOK NUCLEAR POWER STATION September 20, 1986 Under federal statutes and regulations I am called upon as Governor of Massachusetts to play a particular role in the licensing process for the proposed Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. After lengthy and painstaking review of all the pertinent information, and careful analysis of the applicable standards, I have reached a decision, which I am announcing today. The Historical and Regulatory Context The Commonwealth's involvement in the licensing of Seabrook actually extends back very far. In 1975, when the construction license for Seabrook Station was under consideration, Attorney General Frank Bellotti, appearing in opposition, issued warnings that have proved prophetic. He first told the federal regulators and then the federal courts that siting a nuclear power plant at Seabrook ignored considerations of public safety. Pointing to the proposed plant's proximity to the crowded beaches at the New Hampshire and Massachusetts border, the Attorney General argued, as he has for nearly twelve years, that the lack of shelter for the beach population and the inadequate highway system in the area made protection of the public in the case of a serious accident a near impossibility. 2 То prevent huge financial resources from being irretrievably committed to a plant that might never be licensed, he urged the federal authorities not to proceed. Despite the Commonwealth's strenuous argument that the choice of site was a monumental error in judgment, construction was permitted. At the time, prior to the 1979 nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, the local health and safety concerns raised by the Attorney General were, at best, peripheral factors in the federal licensing equation. Three Mile Island, however, brought a long overdue, rude awakening. It became clear that federally mandated planning for an emergency was wholly inadequate, and that health and safety were being seriously jeopardized. One outgrowth of the accident was reassessment of the prospects for nuclear energy itself in light of the risk. No new plant has been approved for construction since Three Mile Island. Only the few plants already in construction in 1979, of which Seabrook is one, remain to be considered for final operational licensure. It is by now beyond question the escalation in cost and controversy given a second chance to avoid - given that if we were to be construction altogether, no prudent person would in hindsight choose Seabrook. - 3 For those plants already in operation and those approved for construction, the federal government responded to Three Mile Island by making off-site emergency planning a primary statutory requirement. On this issue, the importance of state and local participation was explicitly acknowledged by Congress with the requirement that there must exist a state, local or utility plan which provides reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not endangered by the operation of the facility." "no In the words of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, operating license. . . will be issued unless a finding is made that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." Federal agencies look first to the state through its Governor to make this determination. I must judge whether a plan can be devised which in the opinion of the state is adequate to protect the public health and safety of its citizens living within the emergency planning zones" - by providing -- a "reasonable radius typically of ten miles assurance that state and local governments can and intend to effect appropriate protective measures offsite in the event of a radiological emergency." The standard for the Governor, as |