rection going toward all agreements, evacuation plans, if, indeed, there is going to be a need, all on the table, and agreed to before one permit is given—not for a reactor, for the purpose of even putting a building there.

I think unless we do that, we are going to have this problem forever in this country, and it is a suggestion, and, in my judgment, a good one for the committee to study, Mr. Chairman.

Governor DUKAKIS. Mr. Chairman and Congressman, I agree with you obviously, and I think the present scheme is totally flawed, and I do not think there is much disagreement here or elsewhere at that.

But I think the point Congressman Smith raised was an important one, which is even in the case of very small research reactors, if there is a conceivably a safety problem, should we not be dealing with that one thoroughly and well; and the answer to that question is yes, and we have learned a lot over the course of the past several months in this State and in this region and in this country, especially after that accident in the Soviet Union, and I can assure you we are going to be taking those responsibilities very, very seriously. Mr. SMITH. I would just like to respond to my colleague, Mr. Mavroules, and to say that I agree with you, Nick. I think that the issue that we face, hopefully in the future if there are any more plants licensed that they will be done with all of these details worked out prior to any authorization and licensing.

But I think what we are dealing with now is something that is ongoing, and the question is how do we deal with that, and I think if it is basically as you have said, Governor, if it is basically an issue of one of safety, then I think certainly if a new plant is not safe, then older plants are less safe, and therefore perhaps we ought to be applying the same standards there; and I think, you know, these are this is just a point

Mr. MAVROULES. Right.

Mr. SMITH. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ATKINS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MARKEY. Sure.

Mr. ATKINS. Just a point of correction on the instance of Lowell, and the reactor at the University of Lowell, that, in fact, has been shut down. I think it is a good case in point as to how we can deal with these things. That was costing close to $50,000 a student for the students who were involved in the facility, and they shut the facility; they used all of the proper safety precautions to protect the public; and they now use it for other research and more conventional modes and cheaper modes, I might add, of energy generation.

So, I think you are on target in looking at the older kinds of facilities. I think in Massachusetts we have started to do that. The example is Lowell; we have saved the taxpayer millions of dollars now by shutting down their facility, and I guess the question is now whether we aren't going to make sure that we do not make a mistake, contaminate the facility at Seabrook with low-power testing; and then add a huge burden to all of the taxpayers and ratepayers when we have to shut that facility down.

Mr. MARKEY. The gentleman's time has expired.
Governor, we thank you very, very much-

Governor DUKAKIS. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. MARKEY. Secretary Pollard, Secretary Barry. I just wanted to tell you that on a regular basis governors from other States-mention you as the example, as the leader on the growing need to exercise States' rights to curb a growing turn in this administration to preempt the legitimate rights of State and local governments. Thank you for your leadership.

Governor DUKAKIS. Thank you for giving us an opportunity to testify.

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you very, very much.

[Responses to subcommittee questions follow:]

Response to Questions From the House Subcommittee on
Energy Conservation and Power

Office of Massachusetts Governor Michael S. Dukakis

1) What is and should be the responsibility of State government, if any, in offsite emergency planning and preparedness activities for nuclear power plants?

The responsibility of State government ought to be in developing effective emergency plans and certifying their adequacy before construction permits are issued for new nuclear power plants. This was not the case at Seabrook. In the Seabrook case, potential problems regarding emergency planning were raised early and often in the NRC licensing process, by the Commonwealth and others, only to be largely dismissed as superfluous to the "defense-in-depth" strategy of nuclear reactor design. Only with the Three Mile Island Accident, and the resulting creation of the NRC/FEMA emergency planning rules, was the issue of offsite emergency planning given the priority it had always deserved in nuclear plant licensing.

The creation of the new emergency planning rules has subjected the Seabrook plant to a regrettable double-jeopardy in licensing. Nevertheless, we believe strongly that the NRC/FEMA regulations mean what they say: that no plant should receive an operating license unless the appropriate governors have found that emergency response plans are adequate to protect the public health and safety. Admittedly, the NRC/FEMA regulations also provide several avenues for the approval of plans without a governor's certification as to their adequacy. Nevertheless none of these avenues have yet been used successfully, and we doubt that anything short of radical amendment of the regulations will allow a plant's licensure on such a basis. The burden will fall to the NRC to demonstrate a credible basis for such amendments.

In the meantime, public trust in the nuclear program can only be maintained by adherence to what we believe is a strong and appropriate role reserved for state governments in the existing regulations; that is, the role of devising and certifying adequate emergency plans before an operating license is granted.

2) What is and should be the responsibility of local governments, if any, in offsite emergency planning and preparedness activities for nuclear power plants?

Local governments are essential partners to state government in devising emergency effective emergency response plans, for the simple fact that local government agencies (police, fire, etc.) are the first line of defense in almost every kind of emergency.

Over the last few months we have disagreed with many good people about whether local governments ought to be given absolute approval or veto power over emergency plans for their own towns. Governor Dukakis believes very strongly that governors ought to retain control over the ultimate approval or disapproval. The governors have a broader responsibility and a broader authority than local officials. The governors are often called on to make decisions regarding important and controversial non-nuclear facilities that may serve the general public while imposing burdens on their immediate neighbors. Nuclear power plants are much the same kind of facility, and the governors ought to exercise the same kind of authority over radiological emergency response plans.

Nevertheless, common sense tells us that the effectiveness of emergency plans will be directly related to the degree of cooperation and involvement that local governments put into those plans. The recommendations of local government must always be given serious consideration by a responsible governor.

3) What is and should be the role of State government, if any, in the implementation of radiological emergency response plans for nuclear power plants ?

If emergency response plans are found adequate and approved by the governor, then those plans ought to be implemented in good faith by state and local government. Implementation should not be at issue, as long as emergency plans have met a meaningful standard of adequacy. We cannot foresee any plan that will meet such a standard without the full participation of state government, since in our opinion state government must play an absolutely central in any effective emergency plan. Only state government has the ability to mobilize emergency resources quickly over a wide area. There is no other credible substitute for a strong state role, if plans are to be truly effective.

4) What is and should be the role of local governments, if any, in the implementation of radiological emergency response plans for nuclear power plants ?

If State government is the central player in effective emergency response, then local governments and their agencies form the critical first line of defense. In most situations during an emergency, local police and fire departments and related agencies will be the first on the scene to render assistance. Local governments have a responsibility to implement emergency plans in good faith once they have been deemed adequate; the determination of adequacy will rest in some considerable measure on local government's ability and willingness to respond.

5) What is and should be the role of State government in the development and establishment of safety standards for nuclear power plants ?

Historically, the role of State government in developing and establishing safety standards for nuclear plants has been virtually non-existent, given the strong, pre-emptive authority delegated to Federal regulators under the Atomic Energy Act.

State governments should be able to play a strong role in the development of safety standards through the licensing process, but at this point in time the issue is secondary, since no new nuclear plant has been ordered in several years, and it is unlikely that any will be ordered in the foreseeable future.

The relevant issue concerns the role State governments ought to play in establishing standards for existing plants. Ideally, this authority should be centralized in a Federal agency, where the highest level of expertise can be concentrated. The most significant safety issues in nuclear plant design and construction are of a far more specialized nature than those that ordinarily confront State environmental and safety agencies in the implementation of their programs. For that reason we believe that our national effort in ensuring nuclear plant safety ought to be focused on making the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or a successor agency- as effective as possible. States ought to have an automatic right to intervene in NRC proceedings concerning safety issues that are pertinent to nuclear plants in or near their borders, however. Moreover, the States ought to be afforded the right to trigger such proceedings at the NRC whenever the States present the NRC with credible evidence that safety issues regarding these plants have not been fully addressed by the NRC and its staff. We are concerned that such rights not only because such rights are not currently afforded the States, but because of what appears to be sentiment prevailing at the NRC to limit the ability of States and other intervenors to participate in NRC proceedings as they are currently structured.