I want to congratulate you, and congratulate your constituents on having a Congressman who is alert to the situation, and who is willing to come before the committees of Congress and tell them of the things that affect your District. Thank you very kindly. Mr. MCCARTHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is always a pleasure to come before this committee under your chairmanship. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Friedel? Mr. FRIEDEL. No questions. I want to compliment you on a very fine statement. The CHAIRMAN. Anyone else? If not, we thank you. Our next witness, Mr. Al H. Chesser, is chairman of the RLEA Safety Committee and national legislative representative of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. Mr. Chesser. Would you identify the gentlemen who are with you for the record? STATEMENT OF AL H. CHESSER, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, AND CHAIRMAN, SAFETY COMMITTEE, RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES' ASSOCIATION; ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM FRAVEL, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT; SHELDON BERNSTEIN, COUNSEL; AND WINFIELD M. HOMER, LABOR BUREAU OF THE MIDDLE WEST Mr. CHESSER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, at the table here with me this morning is our counsel, Mr. Sheldon Bernstein, and Mr. Fravel, on my far right, of our staff, and Mr. W. M. Homer, on my left, of the Labor Bureau of the Middle West. The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed. Mr. CHESSER. Mr. Chairman, we felt it was the wish of the committee that we file our entire statement and attachments for the record and that we review that statement in the essence of your time. The CHAIRMAN. I think that would be fine. Mr. CHESSER. We will attempt to do this. You have before you the text of my testimony, a memorandum on a release by the Association of American Railroads, and a supplementary memorandum prepared by Mr. Homer of the Labor Bureau of the Middle West on some statistical information, and a leaflet he prepared, outlining and indicating some accidents, and those leaflets are with Mr. Williamson, clerk of the committee. The CHAIRMAN. We would be very glad to have your testimony. The complete text will be inserted in the record, and you say you are going to summarize it; that will be fine. Mr. CHESSER. Thank you, sir. The text of Mr. Homer's presentation here includes the accident experience for the carriers, viewed in the light of technological and operational changes made over the last three decades, the causes of railroad accidents today, and the human and monetary costs of railroad accidents. And with reference to my full statement, attached to this statement, you will find a number of suggested amendments to H.R. 16980, which we certainly hope you will give consideration to. Those are attached at the back. Also attached to that statement is the text of the present laws that are administered now by the Department of Transportation, the Railroad Safety Division. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Al H. Chesser. I am national legislative representative of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and I am also here this morning representing the Railway Labor Executives Association, as chairman of the committee on safety of this association. The affiliates of this association are listed on page 1 of my testimony, so in the essence of time, I will defer from reading those, if it is permissible to the chairman. I will briefly summarize the major points, and ask that my entire statement and the attachments that I just reviewed be included in the record, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. That is agreeable. (The documents referred to follow :) STATEMENT OF AL_H. CHESSER, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my name is Al H. Chesser and I am National Legislative Representative of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. I also serve as Chairman of the Committee on Safety of the Railway Labor Executives' Association, which association has affiliated with it the following railway labor organizations: American Railway Supervisors' Association American Train Dispatchers' Association Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen Brotherhood Railway Carmen of America Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers International Brotherhood of Firemen & Oilers International Organization Masters, Mates & Pilots of America National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association Order of Railway Conductors and Brakemen Railroad Yardmasters of America Railway Employes' Department, AFL-CIO Seafarers' International Union of North America Sheet Metal Workers' International Association Switchmen's Union of North America Transportation-Communication Employees Union These organizations and the Railway Labor Executives' Association appreciate the opportunity allowing me to testify today on H.R. 16980, introduced by the Chairman, Representative Staggers, and on H.R. 17093, a companion bill introduced by Representative McCarthy of New York. We are grateful for the recognition, though belated, that such legislation is imperative to assure the safety of the traveling public and of railroad employees. Incidentally, I would like to commend our good friends, Representative Moss and Senator McGee, who earlier recognized the necessity of such legislation by introducing measures to provide for railroad safety laws (H.R. 5934, H.R. 5935, S. 526 and S. 527). While meaningful and effective railway safety legislation will require a number of revisions of the pending bills to which this statement is addressed-and these proposed revisions will be discussed later in my statement-railway labor strongly supports the basic thrust of this legislation because of its long standing and deep concern over the deplorable safety record of the railroads. The Department of Transportation has reported that 2,684 human beings were killed and 25,552 were injured in railroad accidents in the year 1966; 159 employees on duty were killed and 18,195 were injured. There were 6,793 train accidents-a record for recent years for which comparable figures are available. Preliminary figures published for 1967 indicate that train accidents last year exceeded the record 1966 levels by about 5%; and the first two months of 1968 exceeded the same period of 1967 by about 10%. Thus, there is no indication that the transfer of safety responsibility from the Interstate Commerce Commission to the Federal Railroad Administration has yet had any effect in improving railroad safety. Virtually all types of accidents have increased collisions, derailments, railhighway grade-crossing accidents, accidents involving track motor cars, accidents involving inflammable and explosive materials, accidents affecting both operating and non-operating classes of employees. Although there have been many causes of railroad accidents, prime responsibility must be placed directly on the carriers. The limited legal authority possessed by the Federal Government over railroad safety has made it impossible for the government to take meaningful action to compel railroads to operate safely. Existing laws relating to railway safety leave wide gaps where neither Federal nor state agencies have any authority or control. Furthermore, even where Federal laws do operate, penalties for violations are far below what is needed to deter the railroads from violations when corporate objectives dictate otherwise. Each of these shortcomings in the existing pattern of Federal regulation is dealt with in the bill before the Committee. I shall discuss these matters in some detail. Existing federal regulation of railway safety is covered by nine statutes. Exhibit A attached to my statement contains the texts of these laws. The most important are the Safety Appliance Acts, the Locomotive Inspection Act, the Signal Inspection Act, the Transportation of Explosives' Act, the Hours of Service Act, and the Accident Reports Act. The Safety Appliance Acts which, to a limited extent, cover certain safety devices are seriously defective even within their limited scope. The other Acts, although broader in coverage within their several spheres, fall far short of providing comprehensive protection for the general public or for railroad employees. The Safety Appliance Acts best illustrate the infirmities in the Federal system of safety regulation. These Acts-legislated over a long period stretching from 1893 to 1958-provide in their language specific delineation of Federal powers. This explicitness, however, is limiting in its effect and application. Let me illustrate. The original Act of 1893 requires that cars and locomotives be equipped with automatic couplers, that such couplers or draw bars be at a standard height above the roadway, that they can be uncoupled without the need of men going between cars, and that grab irons or handholds be installed on the ends and sides of the cars for the security of the men doing the uncoupling. But the statute says nothing about the levers the men must operate to perform the uncoupling. The action of coupling and uncoupling cars is among the most hazardous tasks faced by railroad employees. Eight men were killed and 1,017 were injured in the year 1966 while coupling and uncoupling cars and in related tasks. One hundred eighty one (181) were injured in the single act of manipulating the uncoupling lever. This is clearly a function and a device that should be completely subject to adequate legal controls. But, because the uncoupling levers were not specifically mentioned in the statute, the courts have held the Interstate Commerce Commission without power to specify standards governing them. To the credit of the Interstate Commerce Commission, it prescribed standards for uncoupling levers; however compliance has been wholly a matter of voluntary acceptance by the carriers. Air brakes, of course, are of the utmost importance to operating safety. The 1893 Act provided that some cars in the train (the number or percentage of such cars to be determined by the Interstate Commerce Commission) must be equipped with power brakes. However, the Commission was given no legislative authority whatever to control the installation, inspection, maintenance, and repair of such brakes or the testing of air brake systems. Although the Commission requested authority for such controls for many years, it was not granted until Congress passed the Power Brake Act of 1958. If, next week, or next year, railroad equipment manufacturers invent a new device which will provide some significant operating or economic benefit to the 1 Apache Ry. Co. v. Shumway, 158 P. 2d 142, 62 Ariz. 359. railroads, there will be nothing the Federal Department of Transportation can do within its present authority to prevent installation of such a device even if it adds gross hazards to operating employees or to the travelling and shipping public. In the absence of broad legislation such as is under consideration here, it would take a new specific act of Congress to authorize powers for such regulation. This is a real not a theoretical problem. The Baltimore and Ohio Railway has put into service a large covered hopper car with a capacity of 100 tons, identified as Pullman Standard TLDX cars, 7000 series. When this car is in use in a train operating on a curve of six degrees or more, it develops a critically dangerous rocking motion at speeds between 10 and 25 miles per hour. The railroad accordingly has put out a special rule that any train including such cars must be operated either at speeds below ten miles an hour or above 25 miles an hour. It should be possible to enforce a regulation that this car either be removed from service or be prohibited from interchanges with other railroads. But the Federal government has no power whatever to issue any regulation in this area. I have cited these illustrations only to show that even in areas where there are now elements of control-such as those embodied in the Safety Appliance Actsthe control is strictly limited by the language of the Acts. This is an absurd situation-that the Department of Transportation, now charged with the administration of safety laws in the whole field of transportation, should be so restricted in its controls for the largest transportation agency, the railroads. The bills which you are considering will fill in the gaps in the regulatory authority now residing in existing laws. Among the more significant areas where additional regulatory controls are essential are the following: (1) Railroad structures, track and roadway.-Hundreds of train accidents are caused every year as a result of defects in way and structure elements; in addition, many train service casualties to both operating and maintenance employees occur because of unsafe conditions that go uncorrected in railroad yards, and on and about railroad facilities. Except to the extent to which way and structure items are included under the Signal Inspection Act, the Federal government presently has no authority in this area. A full discussion of the consequences of this major hiatus in regulation will be presented by Mr. Harold Crotty, President of the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, who will appear later as a witness. (2) Railroad equipment. Thousands of train accidents and many train service casualties result from defects in railroad equipment. As I have indicated above, items of railroad equipment are subject only to limited controls by the Federal government. Locomotives, in general, are covered by the Locomotive Inspection Act, but freight and passenger cars are covered only to the extent to which specific items have been set forth in the Safety Appliance Acts. Thus, the government has no authority with respect to car undercarriages, trucks, wheels, or even couplers and draft gear except to the limited extent set forth in the Safety Appliance Acts. In 1966, 265 train accidents occurred as a consequence of defects in trucks; 789 were caused by defective wheels and axles; defective couplers, draft gear and related parts caused 346 train accidents; defects in sills, sides, floors, doors and other car structural parts caused 143 train accidents; and many hundreds of casualties were caused by defective hoses, brake shafts, steps, stirrups, footboards, and other car parts.2 I have mentioned the Locomotive Inspection Act. This is an area where nominally the Federal government already has some power to control practices— particularly to require that locomotives be not dispatched into service when they are in an unsafe condition. However, the record of the carriers over many years has shown serious laxity in this respect. Each year, the Annual Reports of the Director of Locomotive Inspection have recited accidents which occurred because of unsafe conditions on locomotives. Many such accidents occurred after Interstate Commerce Commission inspectors had reported unsafe conditions, sometimes many times; the conditions, however, went unheeded and uncorrected until they resulted in accidents and injuries to employees. The attention of the Presidential Railroad Commission was directed to this amazing condition in 1961; thereafter, for some reason, the Interstate Commerce Commission stopped reporting this information in the reports to Congress of its Director of Locomotive Inspection. I cannot believe that these violations and oversights just stopped happening. I cite this circumstance, however, to illustrate how careless the carriers can be of their equipment even in circumstances within the control of the Federal government. (3) Railroad operating rules. Thousands of train accidents and a large proportion of the train service casualties which occur each year are directly attributable 2 Preceding statistics are all preliminary. to acts of personnel which are subject only to the operating rules of the carriers. The Interstate Commerce Commission has never had any significant controls in this field. Operating rules are determined by each individual railroad. A degree of standardization may have been imparted to such codes of rules through committees of the Association of American Railroads and other similar voluntary agencies. Nevertheless, the number of accidents which occur each year that should be averted by safe practices in operations is almost unbelievable. In this connection, it must be remembered that railroading is by nature a hazardous profession, and that many conditions of modern railroad operations have increased hazards over the years. Trains operate much faster today than they did a few decades ago. Trains are much longer than they once were. Back in the days of steam motive power, trains of 100 or more cars were unusual. Today, with multiple diesel locomotives affording almost unlimited horsepower, trains of two hundred and more cars are common. Furthermore, cars are much larger and carry much more weight. The average gross weight of trains in 1921 was 1,435 tons; in 1966 it was 3,613 tons. All of these things have added potential hazards to railroad operations. The pressures in railroad yards where trains are made up and broken up have increased heavily. In 1966, there were 1,240 switching collisions.3 Railroad operating officials have long considered yard operations the biggest single efficiency bottleneck they face, and efforts to speed up yard work have been heavy and continuous in recent years. The result, in increased pressures on yard personnel, has shown up in the accident records. The higher speeds and heavier trains of modern railroading have affected flagging conditions, and should have led to the adoption of more stringent rules covering the positioning of flags when trains stop in unexpected circumstances. Many carriers instead have proposed just the opposite; in some territories where automatic block signals are used, they have eliminated flagging altogether. Use of radio equipment as a substitute for flagging has also led to many dangers, as Mr. Crotty will point out. Track motor car operation and the movements of other self-propelled equipment units have little protection against collisions with other traffic. Accidents involving such equipment in maintenance of way and signal department work have been a constant and continuing source of death and injury to employees. Again the only controls are the rules adopted by the railroads themselves. The major cause of these accidents has been the failure to provide adequate protection for the movements of such cars. The Interstate Commerce Commission in its Accident Investigation Reports dealing with such accidents has reapeatedly recommended that protection be provided. The Commission's recommendations however carried no authority to order the carriers to install safe procedures. In this connection, the Commission stated in Accident Investigation Report No. 3996, dated June 21, 1963: "During the past 10 years, the Commission has investigated 52 accidents involving the operation of track motorcars. These accidents resulted in the death of 63 persons and in the injury of 111 persons." Ten years earlier in 1953, Report No. 3518 stated: "Since January 1, 1944, the Commission has investigated 45 collisions, including the present case, which were caused by failure to provide adequate protection for the movement of track motor-cars. These accidents resulted in the death of 81 persons and the injury of 144 persons. In the report covering the investigations of these accidents, the Commission repeatedly has recommended that the carrier take measures to provide adequate protection for the movement of track motor-cars on its line." (4) Rail-Highway Grade-Crossing Hazards. In 1966, there were 4,117 highway grade-crossing accidents resulting in 1,782 deaths and 4,073 injuries. Grade, crossing accidents account for more fatalities than any other cause. Federal control over motor vehicle safety standards, as discussed below, is more complete than its authority over railroad operations; nevertheless, this control can be exercised only over carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, and control over general highway safety is more completely under the authority of the state and local governments than under the Federal government. Insofar as railroad operations affect rail-highway safety, the Federal government's restrictions with reference to operating rules carry over into this area also. Even so simple a matter as the prescription of the amount of time for the warning of the approach of a train has been beyond the powers of the Interstate Preliminary. 95-388-68-5 |