 | Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - 456 pagina’s
...posed by Sextus Empiricus: In order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be...thus reduces itself to a form of circular reasoning (diallelus), the discovery of the criterion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow them to adopt... | |
 | Malcolm Ashmore - 1989 - 340 pagina’s
...Berger ( 1969: 59) 1n order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we must first possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be...dispute about the criterion must first be decided. Sextus Empiricus (no date:ll.e.xx) The structure of the area in which we are operating here calls for... | |
 | Leo Groarke - 1990 - 204 pagina’s
...arisen about the criterion, we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able tojudge the dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion,...becomes impracticable, since we do not allow them to adopt a criterion by assumption [for the existence of a criterion is in question], while if they... | |
 | Robert P. Amico - 1993 - 180 pagina’s
...criterion exists. Besides, in order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be...becomes impracticable, since we do not allow them to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion by a criterion we force... | |
 | Martin Hollis - 1996 - 300 pagina’s
...of scepticism, 'In order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we must first possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be...criterion, the dispute about the criterion must first be decided.'5 To escape Sextus, the existence of a core must be taken as a precondition of 1 ()utliar\... | |
 | J. A. Fernández-Santamaría - 1998 - 240 pagina’s
...Empiricus' objection that "in order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute; and in skeptic doubts/denies his ability to do so. The Renaissance magus is a peculiar breed of dogmatist... | |
 | Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend - 1999 - 464 pagina’s
...dispute about the criterion must be first decided. And when the argument thus reduces itself to the form of circular reasoning the discovery of the criterion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow the Dogmatic philosophers to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion... | |
 | Luciano Floridi - 2002 - 174 pagina’s
...position (Floridi [1996]): [l]n order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be...becomes impracticable, since we do not allow them [the dogmatics] to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion by a criterion... | |
 | György Kampis, George Kampis, Ladislav Kvasz, Michael Stöltzner - 2002 - 404 pagina’s
...appeared in Sextus Empiricus: In order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be...accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion must be first decided. And when the argument thus reduced itself to the form of circular reasoning the discovery... | |
 | Kenneth R. Westphal - 2003 - 166 pagina’s
...dilemma: [I]n order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion [of truth], we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be...criterion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow [those who make knowledge claims] to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge... | |
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Besides, in order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion must first... 
