power of chufing exist in the mind, or în the object chofen? If it be answered, that the power of choice is in the mind, and not in the object which influences the mind, the man who was at a lofs which of his friends to vifit, while the objects were in equal force on his mind, was entirely ignorant of it; and admitting it was fo, it might as well have been otherwife, for the power of chufing, in his mind did him no good; he was, after all. dependant on a certain circumftance, which, being attached to one object, made it preferable to the other. Again, admitting the power of choice to be attributed to the mind, and not to the object which gives perceptions to the mind and influences it, it muft be as eafy for the mind to chufe a minor as a major object. It will be granted, on all fides, that perfons may chufe an object in preference to another, which is not half fo valuable; but this is always in confequence of error of judgment. Now it is as objects appear to the mind, that we ought to confider them in our prefent query. Suppofing a poor man, who has a wife and fome hungry children to feed, is offered a dollar, or a guinea, for a day's work; he does not know the value of either, not being acquainted with money, or its value, or the nature of the metals which are stamped with value. He

confults, or means to confult the good of thofe for whom he is willing to labor, and would, if poffible, receive that which would do the moft towards removing their wants; and fays to himself, the dollar is much the largeft, and the probability is, worth three times as much as the guinea; it is finally his opinion that that is the cafe. Now I afk. in relation to my argu ment, which of thofe pieces of money he will be the moft likely to chufe? The anfwer is, the dollar. But I afk, why? If his mind is at real liberty. it is no more attached to the dollar, than the guinea; the influence which the dollar has on his mind more than the guinea, deftroys not the liberty of his mind to chuse the guinea; I wish to be told, why he is more likely to chufe the dollar than the guinea. Or, to alter the ftatement, fo that the mind is not deceived, the man perfe&ly knows the value of both guinea and dollar. The good of his wanting family is what he means to confult; which will he be moft likely to chufe, in this cafe? Answer, the guinea. 1ask, again, why? Is there a ny reafon, or is there not? There is, and it is the greater value. Then, the object governs the choice. I afk, in the above inftance, had the mind any power or lib. Ferty to chufe the object which appeared of the least value, and refufe that which ap

peared of the greateft? I am fure there is not a person in the world who would say that it had. Again, admitting, for the fake of the argument that the mind pof fffes this imaginary liberty; I then afk, how came it to poffefs fuch liberty? Anfwer, God gave it. Then the matter ftands thus, God produced a mind, and gave it liberty to will, or chufe, and it wills or chufes; I afk. what is the original caufe of this willing and chuting? The reader will eafily fee, that if I grant my opponent's arguments, it will not be to his advantage. Again, for the last time, if God gave to man a liberty whereby he can chufe or refufe the fame object, did he not give his creature a liberty which he did not poffefs himself? Did not the Infinitely Wife eternally know all that he himfelf would do? It must be granted. Then I afk, again, does he poffefs any liberty in his nature, whereby it is in his power to abandon the general fyftem contained in his divine omnifciency, and em. brace one entirely different? I am fure

there are but few in the world who would not fay, as did the apostle, "He cannot deny himfel." If the creature poffeffes an ability which is not in his Creator, I would afk, firft, where he got it? And fecondly, if the Almighty knew all the confequences which would arife from fuch an

ability? If the answer is in the negative, it argues that his wifdom is finite and limited, and that he does not know but this unaccountable ability of willing and chufing may finally deftroy his whole plan in creation, providence and redemption ! If it is granted, that he did know all the confequences that would arife from this ability of willing and chufing, which is called liberty of will, it is denying its exiftence. For if thofe confequences were all known, it argues they were all certain and none of them avoidable.

Having, as I hope, to the reader's fatiffaction, answered the objections in refpect to the liberty of the will, I would again invite him back to our fubject.

The immediate caufes of fin are found in our natural constitutions, and the moft distant of those immediate caufes are the fame as the most distant of the immediate causes of our virtues; but the most immediate caufes of our virtues and our vi ces are extremely different. For instance, two men meet at an Inn; both of them have families which are in want of bread; they have each fifty cents, which they had just taken for their day's work. One fays to the other, come, fit down, and we will take fome drink, for our comfort after a hard day's labor. The other reflects in his mind, and fays to himself, to let my E

children fuffer, at home, to gratify my conpany in what is in indifferent to me, would be abominable, having no particular appetite for fpirits; he, therefore, refuses, bids his company good night, goes and purchafes neceffary provifions for his family, and goes home. He has done as a virtuous honest husband ought to do.

The other poffeffes a violent appetite for ardent fpirits; the moment he comes where it is, his want of it overpowers his love and duty to his family, the latter being at a dif tance, and the former being nigh; he calls for drink till he fpends his fifty cents, and then goes home to his expecting family intoxicated. In this, according to the fcriptures, though he were a profeffed chriftian, he is worfe than an infidel.

In the mirror prefented, the reader may fee, that thofe two men acted equally alike from their natural wants, appetites and paffions. Had neither of them any wants, appetites or paffions, neither of them would have done any thing at all. They would not have labored for the money; and if they had the money, they would not have laid it out in any way poffible. Therefore, we fee, that want, ap. petite and paffion, in one, produced virtue, and in the other, vice. But, the ftill more immediate caufes were not the fame in both perfons; and the confequences to