This Janus of imagination hath differing faces; for the face towards reason hath the print of truth, but the face towards action hath the print of good; which nevertheless are faces,

"Quales decet esse sororum."

It was well said by Aristotle, "That the mind hath over the body that commandment, which the lord hath over a bondman; but that reason hath over the imagination that commandment which a magistrate hath over a free citizen;" who may come also to rule in his turn.

3. Observations upon the imagination.

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Poesy is rather a pleasure or play of imagination, than a work or duty thereof.

Of the Understanding.

1. Knowledge respecting the understanding is to most wits the least delightful; and seems but a net of subtlety and spinosity; but it is the key of all other arts.

As knowledge is " pabulum animi ;" so in the nature of men's appetite to this food, most men are of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that would fain have returned "ad ollas carnium.”

2. The art of inventing arts and sciences is deficient.

This is such a deficience as if, in the making of an inventory touching the state of a defunct, it should be set down, that there is no ready money. For as money will fetch all other commodities, so this knowledge is that which should

purchase all the rest. And like as the West-Indies had never been discovered, if the use of the mariner's needle had not been first discovered, though the one be vast regions, and the other a small motion; so it cannot be found strange if sciences be no further discovered, if the art itself of invention and discovery hath been passed over.

3. Proofs that the art of inventing arts and sciences is deficient. 1. Their logic does not pretend to invent sciences or

Men are rather beholden to a wild goat for surgery, or to a nightingale for music, or to the ibis for some part of physic, or to the pot lid that flew open for artillery, or generally to chance, or any thing else, than to logic, for the invention of arts and sciences.

It was no marvel, the manner of antiquity being to consecrate inventors, that the Egyptians had so few human idols in their temples, but almost all brute.

Who taught the raven in a drought to throw pebbles into an hollow tree, where she espied water, that the water might rise so as she might come to it? Who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea af air, and to find the way from a field in flower, a great way off, to her hive? Who taught the ant to bite every grain of corn that she burieth in her hill, lest it should take root and grow?

2. The forms of induction which logic propounds is de

To conclude upon an enumeration of particulars, without instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can assure, in many subjects upon those particulars which appear of a side, that there are not other on the contrary side which appear not? As if Samuel should have rested upon those sons of Jesse which were brought before him, and failed of David, who was absent in the field. 3. Allowing some axioms to be rightly induced, middle propositions cannot be inferred from them in subject of nature by syllogism.

Here was their chief error; they charged the deceit upon

the senses which in my judgment, notwithstanding all their cavillations, are very sufficient to certify and report truth, though not always immediately, yet by comparison, by help of instrument, and by producing and urging such things as are too subtile for the sense to some effect comprehensible by the sense, and other like assistance. But they ought to have chargeu the deceit upon the weakness of the intellectual powers, and upon the manner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of the senses.

4. Bacon's intention to propound the art of inventing arts and sciences by two modes: 1st. Experientia literata. 2d. Interpretatio naturæ.*

INVENTION OF SPEECH OR ARGUMENT

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1. It is more properly memory with application than invention. We do account it a chase, as well of deer in an enclosed park as in a forest at large.

2. Modes of producing this recollection: 1st. Preparation. 2d Suggestion.

Preparation.

1. It is the storing arguments on such things as are frequently discussed.

2. It consists chiefly of diligence.

Aristotle said the sophists "did as if one that professed the art of shoe-making should not teach how to make a shoe, but only exhibit, in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes." But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly customed.

Our Saviour, speaking of divine knowledge, saith, that the kingdom of heaven is like a good householder, that bringeth forth both new and old store.

* The Experientia Literata is contained in the Treatise De Augmentis; and his Interpretatio Naturæ, constitutes his Novum Organum.

3. This subject is more fully investigated under the head of thetoric.

1. It directs the mind to certain marks, as a mode of exciting it to the production of acquired knowledge.

2. Different sorts of topics: 1. General. 2. Particular.

General Suggestion.

1. Its uses are to furnish arguments to dispute probably: to minister to our judgments: to conclude right, and to direct our enquiries.

A faculty of wise interrogating is half a knowledge. For as Plato saith, "Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for in a general notion; else how shall he know it when he hath found it ?"

Particular Suggestion.

1. It is a direction of invention in every particular knowledge. 2. Ars inveniendi adolescit cum inventis.

In going up a way, we do not only gain that part of the way which is passed, but we gain the better sight of that part of the way which remaineth.

Judgment

1. It relates to the nature of proofs and demonstrations.

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2. Different modes of judging: 1. By induction, which is referred to the Novum Organum. 2. By syllogism.

Of Syllogism.

1. Syllogisms are agreeable to the mind, and have been much laboured.

The nature of man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his understanding fixed and immoveable, and as a rest and support of the mind. And therefore as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all motion there is some point quiescent; and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient

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fable of Atlas, that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling, to be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conversion is accomplished; so assuredly men have a desire to have an Atlas or axle-tree within, to keep them from fluctuation.

2. The art of judging by syllogism is the reduction of propositions to principles by an agreed middle term.

3. Syllogisms are direct, or ex absurdo.

4. Division of the art of judgment: 1st. The analytic art. 2. The doctrine of elenchs.

5. It is for direction.

The Analytic Art.

6. It sets down the true form of arguments, from which any deviation leads to error.

The Doctrine of Elenchs

7. It is for caution to detect fallacies.

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In the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth, as Seneca maketh the comparison well, as in juggling feats, which though we know not how they are done, yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to be.

8. Elenchs are well laboured by Plato and Aristotle. 9. The virtuous use of this knowledge is to redargue sophisms: the corrupt use for caption and contradiction.

The difference is good which was made between orators and sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound, which hath his advantage in the race, and the other as the hare, which hath her advantage in the turn.

10. Elenchs extend to divers parts of knowledge.

11. The references touching the common adjuncts of essences is

an elench.

12. Seducements that work by the strength of impression are

The mind of man, which I find not observed or inquired at all, and think good to place here, as that which of all